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ABSTRACT 
 
The European Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) has been 
formulated as a response to the global financial crisis, which climaxed in the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. Although many financial analysts expected such 
a crisis in the US for some time before that incident, its transnational dimension has 
exceeded the expectations of many market participants and stakeholders. The securitisation 
of real estate risks that came about by the launching financial innovations such as asset-
backed securities (ABS), mortgage-backed securities (MBS), collateralised debt 
obligations (CDO) or structured investment vehicles (SIV) contributed to the fast 
worldwide circulation of ‘poisoned’ papers.  
It is questionable whether any legal response to the recent financial crisis should single 
out the abovementioned or other related financial innovations. Until the outbreak of the 
financial crisis of 2008/2009, the alternative investment segment and the private equity 
segment in particular, was not regulated in the European Union (EU) in a targeted and 
specific way. The UNCITS Directive is primarily addressed to small (portfolio) investors 
and captures, not institutional strategic or financial investors. Thus, the European 
Commission as the European legislator does not avail itself of real, resilient experience that 
could contribute to a proportional, sustainable and path-breaking response to the financial 
crisis of 2008/2009. A strong private equity segment seems almost indispensable for the 
steady credit supply of an increasing part of the real economy and the consolidation of 
young, growth or strategically repositioned corporations that need a well-functioning 
access to capital.  
Assuming that the financial crisis of 2008/2009 was the consequence of wrongfully set 
incentives that primarily concerned the fund managers’ remuneration, the European 
Commission followed the ideas of Jacques de Larosière, Klaus-Heiner Lehne and Poul 
Nyrup Rasmussen and set the legal focus on the fund managers, as these entities launch 
and distribute financial products such as those mentioned above and also decide on the 
investment strategy that might bear systemic risks. Due to their financial market potential 
and in view of the design of financial products, these entities admittedly have a strong 
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impact on the financial market development and may jointly be responsible for the 
realisation of systemic risks of transnational dimensions. In particular, in the view of a 
steady credit supply of the real economy, the enormous transnational mobility of capital 
and the global competition of financial market regulations, it seems doubtful whether one 
can identify the fund managers as those responsible for the financial market crisis of 
2008/2009. This thesis highlights the history, symptoms and supposed core reasons of the 
financial crisis of 2008/2009 and critically assesses whether the AIFMD can reach its 
objective to effectively contain systemic risks in the context of a globalised financial 
system. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Due to the recent financial crisis of 2008/2009, the European Commission recently 
made a proposal for the future regulation of private equity 1  and other alternative 
investments, which is based on the reflections of the former French secretary of finance, 
Jacques De Larosière. In his report2 dated 25 February 2009, Monsieur Larosière pointed 
out that “any appropriate regulation of alternative investments must be extended, in a 
proportional manner, to all firms or entities conducting financial activities which may 
have a systemic impact (…) even if they have no direct links with the public at large.” This 
proposal is aimed at the containment of similar systemic risks as those that can be seen as 
the initial cause of the financial crisis of 2008/20093 , doing so by focusing not on the 
financial firms themselves but on the business attitudes of its managers. This focus is based 
on the belief that the portfolio managers had false extrinsic incentives that led  them to run 
a too short-term portfolio strategy with too strong speculative elements, which finally led 
to a deepening of moral hazard scenarios.4 In general, alternative investments cover a 
broad category of investments, other than stocks and bonds, including venture capital, 
private equity, real estate, precious metals, collectibles and hedge funds.5 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC6) came to the final conclusion that too 
many financial institutions acted recklessly and dared short-term financial engagements, 
                                                          
1
  On the economic need and the legal requirements of private equity cf. Kiebeck/Jesch, Corporate Finance 
law No. 6/2010, pp. 372-378; Leible/Lehmann, Hedgefonds (2009). 
2
  Report of the high-level group on financial supervision in the EU, dated February/25th/2009, p 23; 
published in the Internet under http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ finances/docs/ 
de_larosiere_report_en.pdf, requested August/25th/2011. 
3
  As it is not otherwise explained above, the terms “financial crisis”, “financial market crisis” or “recent 
financial crisis” refer to the financial crisis of 2008/2009 that was strengthened with the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers on September/15th/2008 as the initial point of a global economic depression. 
4
  The moral hazard phenomena results from the conflict of interest that typically exists between the 
directors, respectively the staff and the investors. 
5
  Cf. Grabaravicius Dierick, ECB-Occasional Paper No. 34 (August 2005), p. 69. 
6
  As an independent Commission, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) was implemented by 
the US-Government in May of 2009 and recruited of ten members (former US-American politicians, 
CEOs and economists). Under its chairman Phil Angelides, former treasury of California (1999-2007), it 
was the central objective of the FCIC to identify and to discuss the main causes of the financial crisis of 
2008/2009. The widespread competence of the FCIC reaches from the enforcement of evidence, the 
inspection of confidential documents and the hearing of witnesses. Its final Report was published in 
January of 2011 and set the closing point of the Commission´s investigation. It follows a descriptive and 
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extending too much trust while bearing  non-acceptable risks.7 In the context of a market 
economy such as that of the United States and most Member States of the EU, it is the first 
objective of every corporation to obtain a suitable return of investment that normally 
conveys the basis of a sustainable economic development. To reach this first objective, the 
managers of a corporation should be given a suitable freedom of action which enables 
them to employ the most profitable business strategy and to react to sudden market 
developments. This freedom of action is called the business judgment rule (BJR). The 
abovementioned extrinsic incentives fulfil the function of conducting the portfolio strategy 
of the managers. Thus, it is doubtful whether the assumption of the European Commission 
that the recent financial crisis was caused by the involved portfolio managers is a suitable 
approach to prevent a similar financial crisis in the future. Nevertheless, one has to 
consider that those extrinsic incentives that entail the managers’ portfolio strategies and 
that set the framework for their economic freedom of action are extrinsic incentives that 
are set by their corporations. If the portfolio manager does not follow the economic 
philosophy of her or his corporation, she or he may be fired. In light of this, it shall be 
discussed here whether the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (Directive 
2011/61/EU, AIFMD8) of the European Commission that was set into action in November 
2010 is really a suitable and a sustainable regulatory approach to preventing a similar crisis 
in the future.  
 
Before the contents of the Alternative Fund Managers Directive 9  (Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund 
                                                                                                                                                                                
analytical method consisting of the publishing of facts, the identification of responsible persons and the 
understanding of the crisis. 
7
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 8. 
8
  Directive of the European Parliament and the European Council on Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers and for the amendment of the directives 2003/41/EG and 2009/65/EU Nr. 1095/2010 – 
AIFMD, published under http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:174:0001:0073:EN:PDF. 
9
  For further information on the AIFMD see Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 188, 
191-196; Kramer/Recknagel, DB No. 37/2011, p. 2077 ff.; Tollmann, Hertz-
Eichenrode/Illenberger/Jesch/Keller/Klebeck/Rocholl, Private Equity-Lexikon (2011), p. 4 ff.; For 
information on the discussed alternative solutions see Thomsen, EBOR 10:1/2009, pp. 97-114; about the 
transformation into German law: Haisch/Helios, BB (No. 1/2013), p. 23 ff.; Krause/Klebeck, BB (No. 
34/2012), p. 2063 ff.; Loff/Klebeck, BKR (No. 9/2012), p. 353 ff.; Schwaldt, DIE WELT (2011/01/15), 
p. 21. 
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Managers and amending drafts 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC10) - AIFMD - are introduced 
in detail, a brief overview on the history will be given, including the symptoms and the 
supposed core reasons of the recent financial crisis. The objectives of this thesis are to 
focus critically on the contents of the AIFMD and to discuss possible alternative 
approaches of Walker.11 This discussion will not only offer a legal analysis but also the 
economic and monetary issues of a sustainable European solution for the financial 
architecture of the 21st century. 
  
                                                          
10
  Published in the Internet under http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/ alternative_ 
investments_de.htm (requested March/21st/2011). 
11
  See the following contributions edited by George Walker: Walker, JBR (09/2010), Editorial 1-5; 
Walker, BJIBF (11/2007), pp. 567 ff.; Walker, European Banking Law (2007), pp. 1 ff.; Walker, 
Financial Regulation International (12/2008), pp. 1 ff. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation 
(2010), pp. 179 ff. 
11 
 
The European Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) -  
an appropriate approach to the global financial crisis? 
 
11 
 
 
First Chapter -  
ORIGINS OF THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS  
 
1.   History  
1.1.  The rise of the “originate-to-distribute” model 
Normally, it should be compulsory for each merchant to restore an adequate 
relationship between her or his equity position and her or his loan capital (its risks).12 
According to the opinions of economic experts, an equity position of 4% should be 
compulsory for each corporation.13 An adequate relationship between the equity position 
and loan capital is one essential condition to preserve the steady solvency14 of an enterprise 
and to build a shield against the consequences of an economic crisis. Although the 
financial crisis of 2008/2009 actually resulted more from an initial lack of liquidity than 
from an insufficient solvency, the steady solvency of a corporation cannot be 
underestimated because it is the condition for the “breath” of a corporation: When the 
solvency of a corporation comes to an end, the economic viability stops immediately. 
Because the financial crisis of 2008/200915 concerned the lower-income brackets, one can 
also call it a subprime crisis.16,17  
 
                                                          
12
  Dam in Straus, Subprime Crisis (2009), pp. 95, 102. 
13
  Sinn, Kasino Kapitalismus (2009), p. 243 ff. 
14
  The solvency is the ability of a corporation to fulfil its contemporary payment obligations. 
15
  Background information and further facts on the financial crisis 2008/2009: Bermudez/Vidal in O´Neill, 
Global Financial Crisis (2009). pp. 13-27; Bruno in O´Neill, Global Financial Crisis (2009), pp. 7-11; 
Dam, Subprime Crisis (2009), pp. 95-106; Herzog, Finanzmarktkrise (2008), pp. 9 ff.; Sinn, Kasino 
Kapitalismus (2009), p. 1 ff. 
16
  On the situation in the subprime market at the eve at the recent financial crisis cf. Walker, BJIBF 
(11/2007), p. 567 (568). 
17
  For the issue “Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation” see Dam in Straus, Subprime Crisis (2009), 
pp. 95-106. 
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Obviously, the protagonists of the recent financial crisis did not realise the requirement 
of a proportional relationship between equity position and risks. Instead of setting the focus 
on real economic development, they overrated the opportunities of their businesses and 
ignored the risks of the securitisation of real estate risks for a long time. In lending with 
homes as security, what the American banks often do is  make (or buy) a large number of 
such mortgage loans and then package them together in securities, using the underlying 
packaged mortgages as collateral (mortgage-backed securities, or MBS).18 Normally, the 
process of mortgage securitisation helps financial institutions to manage their asset 
portfolios, interest rate exposure, capital requirement and deposit insurance premiums.19 
According to Saunders and Cornett, asset securitisation provides a mechanism for 
financial institutions to hedge the interest rate risk, to enhance the liquidity of the asset 
portfolio of financial institutions and to provide an important source of fee income.20 In 
September 2008, however, this mechanism seemed to fail dramatically.21 
 
Traditionally, there was an on-going relationship between the bank which lent the 
money and the customer who borrowed the money, which led to a direct financial interest 
on the part of the money lending Institutions to make sure that customers were likely to be 
able to repay the money.22 This traditional model, which can be described as “originate to 
hold” (OTH), changed into another model, “originate to distribute” (OTD). The OTD was 
also practiced by government-backed social mortgage lenders, such as Fannie Mae (the 
Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation).23  
 
Many large credit institutions such as these began to create loans on generous terms for 
people who otherwise could not have afforded a mortgage. But instead of holding these 
mortgage loans, the institutions gave them to commercial financial institutions that found it 
attractive to purchase these loans: If the borrowers were unable to repay the loans, the 
                                                          
18
  Dam, Subprime Crisis (2009), pp. 95, 99. 
19
  Lee/Lee, Finance (2006), p. 518, 519. 
20
  Ibid. 
21
  Sinn, Kasino Kapitalismus (2009), p. 167-175 (Die Verbriefungskaskade). 
22
  McIlroy in Straus, Future of Banking (2009), pp. 119, 121. 
23
  McIlroy in Straus, future of banking (2009), pp. 119, 121; For further information on the rise and fall of 
Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac see Bermudez/Vidal in O´Neill, Global Financial Crisis (2009), pp. 13-27. 
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repayment was guaranteed by the U.S. government.24 The originating bank had no direct 
interest in making sure that the borrower could repay the loan because in the case that the 
borrower was unable to repay, another bank would suffer the loss.  
 
Nevertheless, the FCIC emphasizes that Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac did not set a 
primary condition for the financial crisis of 2008/2009. 25  Indeed, the FCIC qualifies 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as the two „kings of leverage26“ because their common debt 
ratio inclusively credits amounted to 75:1 by the end of the year 2007. They turned out to 
be a wrongfully public promoted business model and contributed significantly to the 
outbreak of the financial crisis. However, they did not cause it. According to the FCIC, it 
was important that the mortgage security instruments of these two companies significantly 
kept their value during the crisis and did not contribute to the heavy losses of those 
corporations that stood in the middle of the crisis.27 
 
The OTD of banking created a serious problem of moral hazard.28 Moral hazard refers 
to the phenomenon that the separation of ownership and control within a modern 
organisation makes it difficult and costly to monitor and evaluate the efficiency of 
management effectively.29 Thus, the originating bank often does not have a substantial 
incentive to be careful to whom it loans money and to which amount. 30  The OTD 
encourages reckless lending that leads to serious consequences, not only in the United 
States but also all over the world.31 Many lenders seemed to have ignored the warnings of 
several financial experts who propose to retain 20% of the risk in relation to the original 
loan, so that the originating banks had a sufficient incentive to taking proper precautions to 
                                                          
24
  McIlroy in Straus, Future of Banking (2009), pp. 119, 121. 
25
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 309 ff. 
26
  Whereas economic leverage is associated with increased assets under management, financial 
(investment) leverage refers to making investments on margin, where the cost of investment is less than the 
exposure it generates (e.g. through the use of financial derivates), cf. Grabaravicius/Dierick, ECB-
Occasional Paper No. 34 (August 2005), p. 59. 
27
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 17. 
28
  McIlroy in Straus, Future of Banking (2009), pp. 119, 122. 
29
  Lee/Lee, Finance (2006), p. 544. 
30
  McIlroy in Straus, Future of Banking (2009), pp. 119, 122. 
31
  Ibid. 
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see if the borrowers could afford to make the repayments.32 It is necessary to clarify that 
the crisis of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was actually not a bank run because these 
entities were “securitisators” rather than deposit-takers. 
 
1.2. The fall of the originate-to-distribute model  
Finally, these firms neglected to build a (sufficient) shield on the basis of an adequate 
equity position for the case where too many creditors asked for the repayment of their 
money at the same time. On 15 September 2008, many creditors wanted to return their 
securities and asked for their money simultaneously. Big American credit institutions could 
not react to this (almost) unexpected development and became insolvent immediately.  
 
The consequences of this incident are well-known. Also, many European creditors and 
well-known credit institutes and insurances could not realise their claims for the repayment 
of their investments. Because indemnity insurance did not exist, the insolvency of the 
abovementioned American institutions caused liquidity problems for their creditors all over 
the world. The spread of the subprime crisis from the United States to Germany and to 
other European Member States is a good illustration of a “domino effect,” through which 
financial stability can spread not just from one bank to another but from one country to 
another.33 
 
2.   Symptoms  
2.1.  Significant market failure  
A significant market failure can be claimed as one essential financial crisis symptom . 
In the centre of any market economy stands the equilibrium of supply and demand. 
Normally, these two powers keep the price mechanism, which can be identified as the core 
                                                          
32
  McIlroy in Straus, Future of Banking (2009), pp. 119, 123. 
33
  Dam, Subprime Crisis (2009), pp. 95, 98. 
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mechanism of a market economy, 34  in shape. The price of a product stands for its 
valuation, specifically its appreciation by the market participants. As a very simple 
formula, it expresses the relation between its available amount and its demand. Thus, the 
price of a product can be identified as the central tool of the market communication. Under 
regular circumstances, it makes the communication among the market participants easy, 
rapid and transparent.  
 
At the very beginning of the recent financial crisis, the price mechanism failed 
dramatically. One could see that the prices of loans and other credits did not convey a 
realistic notion of their real worth. In the first place, many investors decided on the briefed 
loans and mortgages because they were convinced that the price of those products also 
expressed their real worth. At the very beginning of the worldwide financial crisis, their 
real worth was successively revealed, and the affected investors started worrying about 
their money. They rapidly recalled their investments from the credit institutes, which were 
unable to repay the requested volume of money all at once. As a consequence, many of 
those credit institutes, such as Lehman Brothers,35 became directly insolvent. Moreover, it 
should be considered that any national regulation of private equity neglects the necessity of 
a preferably coherent solution and contributes to a regulatory arbitrage:36 Whereas the 
holders of capital could seek out the laxest rules, the national governments that were eager 
to attract financial flows allowed regulators to fall asleep on their watch.37 
 
2.2. Inability of consumers to short-term redemption of loans  
Another major symptom of the recent financial crisis was that many consumers who 
received their mortgage loans at prices that did not convey a realistic impression of the real 
estate’s real worth were unable ten to repay these loans immediately. Therefore, they were 
asked by their creditors to leave their homes and became homeless.  
                                                          
34
  Cf. Horn, Marktwirtschaft (2010), pp. 87-102. 
35
  Basically on the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers cf. U.S. House of Representatives (April/20th/2010), p. 
1 ff.; for further information on Lehman certificates see Maerker, BKR (2011), pp. 147-150. 
36
  For further information on the global tax competition and tax corporations see Soltysinski, Competition 
(2009), pp. 83-88. 
37
  Cf. N.N., rulebook, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 37/2010, pp. 8 (8). 
16 
 
The European Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) -  
an appropriate approach to the global financial crisis? 
 
16 
 
 
2.3. Dramatic drop in prices in the real estate business  
 As a consequence, there was an enormous surplus of demand that directly led to a 
dramatic drop in real estate prices that continued into 2010. On the one hand, this drop in 
prices conveyed for many people the unique opportunity to realise their wishes for a home 
at an unrivalled price. On the other hand, many credit institutes suffered a loss in a 
dimension that caused the necessity for a monetary state intervention. That dramatic drop 
in prices was revealed in the burst of the so-called credit bubble.  
 
2.4. Crisis of liquidity and trust  
 At the eve of the financial crisis of 2008/2009 there was a widespread assumption that 
everyone within the distribution system could rapidly transfer the overrated mortgage 
papers to another owner - this assumption also did not work.38 As a consequence of the 
abovementioned development, a serious crisis of liquidity and trust resulted. The 
willingness of many seriously affected credit institutes to borrow and to grant credits that 
were essential for the functioning of the real economy39 dropped dramatically. Among 
bankers and (other) financial experts there was the repeated tone of a credit crunch 
(“Kreditklemme”): The affected enterprises in the real economy could not achieve the 
requested credits any longer - credits that were indispensable for an on-going operative 
business.  
 
As another consequence, the real economy in most European countries suffered a loss 
that was the biggest in history since the world-wide Depression of 1929/1930. Although 
that financial crisis, which began in 1929, might have been more severe, the financial crisis 
of 2008/2009 affected  many different countries in a serious and simultaneous manner, and 
its economic impact was felt throughout the world as a result of the increased 
                                                          
38
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 14. 
39
  The often-used but legally not determined expression “real economy” stands for that segment of the 
national economy that is opposed to the financial segment. It stands for all (private) corporations that 
produce goods and services that are of direct practical use for the consumer and that have to be 
determined from the question of financing these goods; Cf. also Wieland, BB (2012), p. 917 ff. 
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interconnectedness of the global economy. 40  In most European countries, the gross 
domestic product (GDP) decreased from 5% to 10% in the year 2009. The development of 
the worldwide financial crisis pointed out the very close interdependencies between credit 
institutes, financial markets and the real economy, which underlines the fact that any 
regulation of private equity can also affect the real economy. Therefore, the G20 and the 
Bale Committee41 voted to wait for a new regulation until the end of the financial crisis.42  
 
A lack of trust such as in the recent financial crisis undermines the current fiscal 
stimulation, and correspondingly higher financial costs make any consolidation more 
difficult. Thus, trust in the soundness of public finances is a major prerequisite for both the 
stability of financial markets and the anchoring of moderate inflation expectations.43 
 
2.5. Breakdown of inter-bank markets  
 As a consequence of the wide-spread securitisation of risks and the insufficient 
transparency of financial products, those credit institutes that were seriously affected by 
the financial crisis lost the trust in each other that is indispensable for well-functioning 
business in the financial sector. The capital costs increased, and, as already mentioned, 
many companies suffered a dramatic squeeze of liquidity that encouraged strong 
intervention by the governments of the affected countries.  
 
Until 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers was one of the oldest, biggest and most 
profitable investment banks44 worldwide: In 2006 it had a balance volume of US$504,000 
million, a market capitalisation of US$54,000 million and equity profitability of 33%.45 
Due to its tradition and profitability, however, the American public retained its faith that 
the American government would save Lehman Brothers. On 10 September 2008, however, 
                                                          
40
  Cf. FSA, The Turner Report (2009), p. 5. 
41
  Referring to the requirements of the Bale 3 Agreement this also seems noteworthy: Schmidt, BB (2011), 
pp. 105-109. 
42
  N.N., G20-Agenda, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 5/2010, pp.3 (4). 
43
  Cf. N.N., Lessons, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 5/2010, pp.5 (5). 
44
  On investment banking: Hockmann/Thießen, Investmentbanking (2009), p. 1 ff. 
45
  Sinn, Kasino-Kapitalismus (2009), p. 88. 
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the former US Treasury Secretary, Hank Paulson, who was also the president of the 
worldwide biggest investment bank, Goldman Sachs, declared that the US-American 
government had decided not to save Lehman Brothers.46  
 
Soon the media reported on long lines of customers waiting at the doors of the Lehman 
Brothers offices demanding their money immediately. Their fear was justified because on 
15 September 2008 Lehman Brothers was unable to fulfil its payment obligations. 
Moreover, the inconsistency of the political reaction of the Bush administration to save 
Bear Stearns (the investment bank),  the American International Group (AIG) (the 
insurance company), and Fannie Mae and Freddy Ma,c but not to save Lehman Brothers 
caused a widespread insecurity and panic among the financial market participants.47 The 
insolvency of Lehman Brothers s quickly affected the entire United States and the global 
financial system, which then was reflected in the U.S. money markets.48  
 
The widespread insecurity and panic among the financial market participants was 
particularly highlighted by the contradictory response of the US Government that revealed 
in the different treatment of Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch (ML49). Due to the 
financial crisis of 2008/2009, the Bank of America (BoA50) decided to purchase ML as the 
former third biggest investment bank of the United States at a price of 50.000 Mio. US$, 
which corresponds to some 29 US$/shares. 51  As a consequence of heavy losses that 
covered several thousand million US$, ML had come under pressure: Within only a few 
months, the shares of ML declined from some 80 US$/Share to 17.05 US$ by 13 
                                                          
46
  Hank Paulson and Timothy Geithner wanted banks to save Lehman Brothers themselves without 
Government assistance. 
47
  Cf. N.N., Finanzkrise, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 5/2011, pp.5 (5). 
48
  The money market covers a segment of the financial market where financial instruments with high 
liquid maturities are traded. It is used by participants as a means for borrowing and lending in the short term, 
from several days to just under one year. Money market securities consist of negotiable certificates of deposit 
(CDs), bankers acceptance, U.S. treasury bills, commercial papers, municipal notes, federal funds and 
repurchase agreements (Repos), cf. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moneymarket.asp. 
49
  http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695_15125_17454, last time requested February/18th/2013; Since 1 
January 2009 ML is a complete affiliate of BoA and signs responsible for the business with prosperous 
private clients, the investment banking branch and the capital market business.  
50
  https://www.bankofamerica.com/, last time requested February/18th/2013; since July of 2006 BoA is the 
biggest credit institute in the United States with a top line of 94.000 Mio. US$ and a total balance sheet 
of 2.130.000 Mio. US$ in the year 2011. 
51
  http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/?s=43, last time requested February/18th/2013. 
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September 2008. Due primarily to the intervention of the US Government, Merrill Lynch 
was rescued in the end. In contrast, BoA refused to purchase Lehman Brothers.52 Lehman 
Brothers  spent trusts to be overtaken by the British bank Barclays - in the end, Barclays 
rejected to purchase Lehman Brothers. John Thain, the former chairman and CEO of ML, 
had achieved the acquisition during the rescue discussions about the competitor Lehman 
Brothers.53 ML announced its sale on 15 September 2008. On 1 January 2009, the closing 
date of the acquisition, a single share of ML was traded at a market value of 0.8595 shares 
of BoA. 
 
In Germany, between the 39th and the 43rd calendar weeks of 2008, the balance 
between the deposits and the disbursements differed enormously in comparison to 2007: 
There was an increased demand for cash and temporarily changed behaviour having to do 
with the daily deposits and disbursements that did not normalise before 24 October 2008 
when the volume of disbursements fell below that previous year.54 In October 2008, the 
daily disbursements mostly moved at a level that can be compared with the level at 
Christmas time. 55  In particular, it was significant that the enormous increase of 
disbursements was not compensated by higher deposits: Thus, 10 October 2008was the day 
with the biggest volume of disbursements, whereas in the financial crisis (€4,200 million) 
the volume of deposits only covered €1,500 million.56 
  
As was underlined by Douglas Diamond and Philip Runs, the so-called “bank run”, 
which can be seen in the disequilibrium of deposits and disbursements, is a typical 
symptom of each financial crisis. 57  In that situation, the capital resources underlie a 
dramatic change, which causes the necessity for the government to save the affected credit 
institutes.58 Those credit institutes that can still fulfil the respective capital requirements 
can take further risks to raise their profitability: They bet that they will be saved by the 
                                                          
52
  Cf. New York Times (September/14th/2008): “Lehman Files for Bankruptcy - Merrill is Sold”. 
53
  http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1873835,00.html, last time requested 
February/18th/2013. 
54
  Cf. Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht No. 6/2009, pp. 56 (56). 
55
  Ibid. 
56
  Ibid. 
57
  Cf. Balling, Refinanzierung, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 37/2010, pp. 7 (7). 
58
  Cf. Balling, Refinanzierung, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 37/2010, pp. 7 (8). 
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government - a typical moral hazard problem.59 As a consequence, the refuted assumption 
by the American public and among financial experts that the Bush administration would 
save Lehman Brothers resulted in a widespread distrust towards the financial authorities, 
towards financial analysts and, in particular, towards any credit rating agency (CRA). This 
distrust caused liquidity supply shortfalls among private corporations.60  
 
Moreover, the Lehman Brothers incident revealed the extraordinary macroeconomic 
significance of the term “transformation”. 61  Transformation, specifically maturity 
transformation, is one of the most important devices of the profitability of private banking: 
Whereas the private investors tend to make short-term deposits, the corporations normally 
ask for long-term credits.62 Holding longer term assets than liabilities and thus enabling the 
non-bank sector to hold shorter term assets than liabilities, maturity transformation is 
probably one of the key functions of the banking system.63 
 
By using maturity transformation, the credit institutes combine the requirements of the 
opposed market participants as they borrow money at the lowest conditions and lend that 
money at the highest interest rate possible. For the national economy, maturity 
transformation has an important function because long-term investments in the real 
economy depend on the willingness of the depositors to lend their money short-dated.64 As 
the Turner Report emphasises, on the eve of the financial crisis of 2008/2009, changes in 
pattern of maturity transformation created huge and inadequately appreciated risks.65 After 
the insolvency of Lehman Brothers, that essential macroeconomic function was eliminated 
because its breakdown directly resulted in the collapse of interbank commerce: Whereas 
those credit institutes that possessed money could not dispose of it, the other ones that were 
in need of money to lend were cut off from the credit supply.66  
                                                          
59
  Ibid.  
60
  On the necessity of a steady liquidity support as one essential requirement of well-functioning markets 
cf. Walker, BJIBF (11/2007), p. 567 (569). 
61
  On the increasing importance of maturity transformation cf. FSA, The Turner Report (2009), pp. 21 f. 
62
  Cf. Balling, Refinanzierung, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 37/2010, pp. 7 (7). 
63
  Cf. FSA, The Turner Report (2009), pp. 21 f. 
64
  Sinn, Kasino-Kapitalismus (2009), p. 90. 
65
  Cf. FSA, The Turner Report (2009), pp. 21 f. 
66
  Ibid. 
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2.6. Nationalisation of losses  
 The burdens of the abovementioned 67  governmental measures ran up to several 
thousand million Euros, covered by anyone who pays taxes. If one considers that these 
burdens go beyond the productivity of the present generation - the biggest part of the 
abovementioned programs is debt-financed - they also concern the next generation. 
Referring to the inquiries of Reuters, Fitch Ratings, Morgan Stanley and Bloomberg, the 
public debt of the United States was raised from approximately $US57.000.5 million at the 
beginning of the financial crisis to approximately US$100,000 million at the end of 2010; 
in the worldwide economic depression of the earlier part of the century, it only went up 
from approximately $US17.5 billion in 1929 to approximately $US40 billion in the middle 
of the 1930s.68 Against the abovementioned background is a nationalisation of losses. If 
one considers that the present generation should not spend more money than it can afford 
or is able to repay, the nationalisation of losses is one severe violation of the principle of 
sustainability.  
 
3. Immediate governmental measures  
The recent inquiry of the Federal Reserve (Fed) resulted in the conclusion that the 
worldwide financial crisis was the consequence of human behaviour, omissions and 
misjudgements. 69  Also, the FCIC points out that within the context of individual 
responsibility, one cannot explain the financial crisis by the typical human failures as 
avidity and arrogance - nevertheless, one must consider that typical human failures were 
ignored anyway: Thus, the FCIC understands the crisis as the result of human failures, 
false estimations and misdeeds that directly resulted in a systemic failure. The human 
failure concerns the lack of understanding of the financial market risks - for instance, many 
financial corporations were convinced of risk diversity although there indeed was a risk 
convergence. In view of this awareness, the FCIC regards it as the biggest imaginable 
tragedy if one shares the opinion that the Crisis was unforeseeable and inevitable: If one 
                                                          
67
  Cf. first chapter, 3. 
68
  Cf. N.N., DIE WELT (July/1st/2011), p. 15. 
69
  N.N., Finanzkrise, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 5/2011, pp. 12. 
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shares this opinion, a comparable would happen again.70 It was the „product“ of human 
actions, foreseeable and evitable! Thus, the FCIC points out that „there is still much to 
learn, much to investigate, and much to fix“.71 
 
As was underlined by Ben Bernanke, president of the Federal Reserve and the chief of 
the investigative commission, it was said to have been possible that another 12 of the most 
important American financial institutions on Wall Street could have collapsed within a 
short time period - among them Goldman Sachs.72 In that situation, there was almost no 
other possibility but a strong monetary intervention by the government and the other 
financial authorities. Nevertheless, to avoid the insolvency of the abovementioned 
creditors, the governments of their home countries were urged to take immediate steps to 
back up the companies that were concerned.  
 
Among the immediate administrative and legislative actions that were taken by the US 
Government, there are in particular the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP73), the 
Federal Reserve Emergency Support Programs 74  and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and 
Consumer Protection Act75.76 By name, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act enhances the powers of the SEC and adds a number of requirements  for the 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO,) which became effective 
immediately.77 Also, in many European countries the government decided on immediate 
stimulus programs. For instance, the German government set up an extraordinary fund 
                                                          
70
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 28. 
71
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 24. 
72
  Ibid. 
73
  TARP was implemented on the legal basis of the US Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) 
that granted the Secretary of the Treasury widespread authority to either purchase or insure up to $700 
billion in troubled assets owned by financial institutions. In particular, the definitions of both “troubled 
asset” and “financial institution” allowed the Secretary wide leeway in deciding what assets might be 
purchased or guaranteed and what might qualify as a financial firm, cf. Webel, TARP (2012) p. 1 ff. 
74
  For any further information see http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/why-did-the-Federal-Reserve-lend-
to-banks-and-other-financial-institutions-during-the-financial-crisis.htm, requested on 
February/19th/2013. 
75
  For any further information see http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf, requested on 
February/19th/2013. 
76
  Cf. Levin-Report, p. 43 f. 
77
  Cf. http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/creditratingagencies.shtml, requested on 
February/19th/2013. 
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called SoFFin. 78  SoFFin is the German abbreviation for Sonderfond zur 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung.79  
 
Many of the abovementioned measures succeeded. Nevertheless, one should consider 
that each taxpayer still has to pay for these extraordinary measures, which is one reason for 
the delay of the expected economic recovery. Not only did financial experts talk about the 
“nationalisation of losses”:80 Each taxpayer, including those in the following generation, 
bears the costs of a systemic failure. 
 
Moreover, the abovementioned programs can be qualified as extraordinary subsidies. 
On the one hand, they aimed at stabilising the financial situation of the affected companies 
and overcoming their liquidity squeeze. On the other hand, it was the objective of these 
programs to invest in the creation of future infrastructures, such as motorways that were 
urgently needed for the development of new industrial areas. The realisation of these 
infrastructural measures set one essential condition for a fast recovery of the real economy 
and built a “bridge” over the credit squeeze.  
 
All in all, the infrastructural measures laid an important foundation for the future 
competitiveness of each national economy. Nevertheless, many financial experts criticised 
the function of these programs, claiming that they would be exhausted by building a bridge 
over the crisis. Many consumers advanced their expenses for bigger purchases. As one 
example, the governments of France and Germany granted a financial subsidy to 
consumers if they sold their used cars und purchased new ones. Retrospectively, these 
fears really did not come true. Although European law generally forbids any monetary 
subsidy, the measures that were taken by the governments in Paris and Berlin set one 
                                                          
78
  Koberstein-Windpassinger in Theewen, Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht (2010), p. 827. 
79
  For further information on the governmental rescue packages in Germany see Ungeheuer in O´Neill, 
Global Financial Crisis (2009), pp. 97-101; see also Horn, BB 2009, pp. 450-454. 
80
  For further information on the “nationalisation of losses” see N. N., F.A.S. (2009/03/15), p. 40-41. 
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essential condition to fulfil the requirements of the Kyoto Agreement81 , which aim at the 
reduction of the global emission of CO2. The European Charter of Basic Rights82 and the 
German Grundgesetz (dGG83) contain a compulsory constitutional obligation for the state 
to undertake suitable measures to protect the environment. 
 
The report of the FCIC draws the conclusion that the US government had been 
prepared to the crisis very badly and, moreover, inconsistent governmental responses 
caused uncertainty and panic in the financial markets. 84  In particular, it appeared 
contradictory that the US-government decided to rescue Bear Stearns and AIG, but not to 
rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - another response that amplified the insecurity and 
panic at the financial markets.85 That insecurity and panic was additionally driven by the 
extraordinary public debt, the obscurity of independencies between the „too big to fail“-
institutes86 and, finally, invisible and unknown derivate contracts.87 
  
                                                          
81
  The Kyoto Agreement that is almost synonymous for the principle of sustainability binds the industrial 
nations to reduce its CO2-emissions by 5.2% until 2010 (Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Kyoto-Protocol), 
cf. Gärditz, JuS (2008), pp. 324-329. 
82
  Europäische Charta of Basic Rights (Charta), Official Journal of the European Communities 2007 C 
303, p. 1. 
83
  Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (dGG) as amended on the Federal Law Gazette 
Chapter III, Division No. 100-1, last time amended by the law dated July/11st/2012 (Federal Law 
Gazette I 2012, p. 1478). 
84
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 21 ff. 
85
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 280 ff. 
86
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 16 f.; 65 ff., 380, 414. 
87
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 10. 
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Second Chapter -  
CORE CAUSES OF THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS  
 
1.  Core causes 
1.1.  Overview 
 Notably hedge funds were already subject to legal regulation at the eve of the financial 
crisis 2008/2009. Nevertheless, that crisis revealed the possible need for a harmonized 
legal approach at European level.88 To create a new regulatory framework for the activities 
of hedge funds,89  private equity funds and other alternative investments that face the 
challenging requirements of the 21st century, it is necessary to take a broad look at the 
supposed core causes90 that directly led to the global financial crisis. In accordance with 
Walker, as core cause of the recent financial crisis, one can identify the massive 
accumulation of credit and debt stock, the increasing product complexity and the lack of 
transparency, credit rating errors and mispricing of risks, risk separation and risk mixing 
(co-mingling of financial items with a higher credit standing with those of a subprime 
standing) that means infection and the lack of effective market support91 In spite of the 
existing disclosure requirements, the capital markets92 did not reach their objective because 
of the often enormous product complexity of financially advanced products.93  
                                                          
88
  Cf. FSA, Discussion Paper 05/4, pp. 1 ff. 
89
  On the issue on hedge funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control cf.  
Grabaravicius/Dierick, ECB-Occasional Paper No. 34 (August 2005), pp. 1 ff.; Kahan/Rock, Law 
Review (May 2007), pp. 1021 ff. 
90
  Discussion on the (supposed) core reasons of the financial crisis: Avgouleas, ECFR (2009), pp. 440 ff.; 
Dam, Subprime Crisis (2009), p. 95 ff.; Kindler, NJW (2010), pp. 2465 ff.; Kübler, in: Festschrift für 
Schwark (2009) p. 499 ff.; Litten/Bell, WM (2011), pp. 1109 ff.; N.N., Lessons, Auszüge aus 
Presseartikeln No. 5/2010, pp.5 ff.; Oehlrich/Baltes, ZRP (2011), pp. 40 ff.; Pacces, ECFR (2010), pp. 
479 ff.; Rudolph, ZGR (2010), pp. 1 ff.; Sinn, Kasino-Kapitalismus (2009), p. 1 ff.; Walker, in: The 
Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179, 195 ff. 
91
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (195 ff.). 
92
  The capital markets can be defined as those financial markets for a long-term debt with a maturity at 
over one year and for equity shares and that are used by corporations to raise additional funds, cf. 
Lee/Lee, Encyclopedia of Finance (2006), p. 46. 
93
  Cf. Avgouleas, ECFR (2009), pp. 440, 440. 
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The massive accumulation of credit is underlined by the development of the financial 
segment in the United States: During the period from 1960 to 2007, the relative size of the 
financial sector increased from 4% to 8% of the GDP, while the profits rose from 16% in 
the 1973 to 41% at that point in time immediately before the outbreak of the financial 
crisis.94 Lord Turner should have caused an outcry in the financial sector when he stated 
that “the financial sector had grown beyond a socially reasonable size”.95 According to his 
point of view, the growth of the relative size of the financial sector and, in particular, of 
securitised credit activities, increased the potential impact of financial system instability on 
the real economy.96 As is pointed out by Wymeersch,97 the expansion of the financial sector 
in recent years has been promoted by the overextension of credit due to very low interest 
rates for a long periods of time (the “Expansionary monetary policy”). Furthermore, 
Wymeersch 98  identifies the overleveraging of many financial institutions directly or 
through derivative techniques.99 Consequently, the existence of several asset bubbles100 in 
the real estate sector, in commodities and in the equity markets, leading to over-optimism 
and a relaxing of risk management as outstanding core reasons of the recent financial 
crisis. 
 
1.2.  Lack of equity position/excessive leverage position  
1.2.1.  Definition of the equity position 
 Probably the main reason for the recent financial crisis is the widespread lack of equity 
position respective to capital adequacy, which can be defined as a residual that remains if 
one subtracts the operational debts of a company from its assets.101 Subsequently, one has 
to add those capital resources that are placed by the investors at the disposal of the 
corporation, which cannot be terminated as a credit and which cannot be considered as an 
                                                          
94
  Cf. Wymeersch, ECFR (2010), pp. 240, 240. 
95
  Ibid. 
96
  Cf. FSA, The Turner Review (2009), p. 18. 
97
  Ibid. 
98
  Ibid. 
99
  For the latest information on the disclosure requirements of credit derivates see Litten/Bell, WM (2011), 
pp. 1109 ff. 
100
  The term “bubble” refers to the so-called “bubble theory” and to security prices that move wildly above 
their true values and eventually burst after the prices eventually fall back to their original level, causing 
great losses for investors. The crashes of the stock markets of 1929, 1987, 2000 and finally 2008 can be 
seen as proof of the bubble theory, cf. Lee/Lee, Encyclopaedia of Finance (2006), p. 40. 
101
  Igel, Wirtschaftswissen (2004), p 320. 
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insolvency claim.102 Beside the sales profitability and the return on assets that are very 
significant to the outside creditors, the equity profitability belongs to the most significant 
business ratios of a corporation. One can easily calculate the equity profitability by 
dividing the net income of a business segment by the average equity position.103  
 
1.2.2. Systemic risks of insufficient equity  
The systemic risk is the risk that a default of one financial institution will lead to 
defaults of other financial institutions. 104  Generally, a credit institute is systemically 
significant if the minimum level of its balance sheet total covers no less than €30,000 to 
€40,000 million.105 However, even with the integration of the corporation into general 
monetary transactions, the intensity of its deposit business and its market position with 
certain products are significant signals of the systemic importance of a corporation.106 
Nevertheless, the systemic impact of a financial instrument not only refers to its business 
volume but also to its cross-linking, its substitutability and to the general condition of the 
affected markets.107  
 
In particular, those systemic risks that resulted from mortgages based on flexible 
interests (e.g., option ARMs108) grow up within the financial system because transparency 
was neither held as necessary nor had it been requested. From 2001 until 2007, the debts 
resulting from mortgages almost doubled. The high risky loans based on mortgages 
increased. Massive, short-term borrowing and commitments that were not visible for other 
market participants boosted the probability that the whole financial system could dissolve 
rapidly.109 Against the abovementioned background, the FCIC speaks of „Contagion110“ as 
                                                          
102
  Aleth/Reichel, in: Eilers/Rödding/Schmalenbach, Unternehmensfinanzierung (2008), p. 77 f. 
103
  Reinhart, Auswirkungen (1998), p. 321; overview of the equity profitability of American banks in the 
year 2006: Sinn, Kasino-Kapitalismus (2009), p. 87. 
104
  Hull, Risk Management (2010), p. 529. 
105
  Hank/Siedenbiedel/Von Petersdorff, F.A.S. (March/15th/2009), p. 41. 
106
  Ibid. 
107
  Cf. N.N., G20-Agenda, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 5/2010, pp.3 (4). 
108
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 134 ff. 
109
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 10; „Option ARMs“ can be defined as another common high risk loan that has been offered to 
both prime brokers and subprime brokers during the years leading up to the financial crisis were even 
known as „Pick-A-Payment“. They were primarily adressed to to financially sophisticated borrowers but 
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one of the systemic failures.111 If any financial firm is a large counterparty to other firms, 
the sudden and disorderly bankruptcy might weaken the finances of those other firms and  
cause them to fail.112 The FCIC calls this risk contagion, when, due to a direct financial 
link between firms, the failure of one causes the failure of another: The one financial firm 
was „too big to fail“ if policymakers fear contagion so much that they are unwilling to 
allow it to go bankrupt in a sudden and disorderly fashion.113 Policymakers make this 
judgment in large part based on how much counterparty risk other firms have to the failing 
firm, along with  judgments about the likelihood and possible damage of contagion.114 
Thus, the FCIC concludes that the break-down of the financial markets resulted as a 
combination of excessive debt, risky investments and a lack of transparency.115 
 
In particular, an adequate equity position creates a risk buffer that contributes to the 
protection of the creditors and the protection of the general public.116  In contrast, an 
insufficient equity can cause a real systemic risk. Before the outbreak of the recent 
financial crisis, many financial firms had chosen an extremely small equity position to 
realise the biggest short-term rate of return. In many cases, the available equity position 
was less than 5%.117 Specifically, the five big investment banks (Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, 
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley) run their business with an extraordinary thin 
equity - their leverage amounted to 40:1, that means 40 US$ investment value corresponded to 1 
$US equity to cover possibly losses.118 As the Turner Report underlines, that increase of leverage 
played an important role in driving the boom and in creating vulnerabilities that have increased the 
severity of the crisis.119 Any small decline of those investments could wipe out a whole company. 
So far, the FCIC identifies a too strong leverage, too many short-term lendings and an insufficient 
                                                                                                                                                                                
ultimately became more widespread. According to federal banking regulators and a range of industry 
participants, as home prices inclined rapidly in some areas of the country, lenders started marketing 
payment-option ARMs as affordability products and made them available to less-creditworthy and 
lower-income borrowers, cf. Levin-Report (2011), p. 29 (referring to the GAO report). 
110
  On hedge fund contagion and liquidity shocks cf. Boyson/Stahel/Stulz, Journal of Finance (January 
2010), pp. 1789 ff. 
111
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 459 f. 
112
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 459. 
113
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 459. 
114
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 459. 
115
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 16, 19 ff., 269, 380, 414, 438;  Nationale 
Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen (2009), p. 9. 
116
  Cf. Hank/Siedenbiedel/Von Petersdorff, F.A.S. (March/15th/2009), p. 41. 
117
  Cf. Sinn, Kasino-Kapitalismus (2009), p. 155 ff. 
118
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 19 ff. 
119
  Cf. FSA, The Turner Review (2009), pp. 19 f. 
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risk management as key factors of the crisis.120 Among the reasons behind the recent financial 
crisis, one can identify the lack of equity position in the affected companies.121 The risk of 
a total loss was intensified by an insufficient equity, in many cases amounting to less than 
5%.122  
 
On the one hand, the limitation of equity enables the fund manager the use of leverage 
and can be seen as one of the key factors of the success of alternative investment funds 
(AIF).123 The limitation of equity can help to overcome periods of reduced liquidity.124 
Thin capitalisation, combined with a “borrow short/lend long” strategy, is necessary for a 
bank’s profitability.125  
 
On the other hand, a lack of equity position can cause the risk that the capital of the 
corporation is not sufficient to cover bigger losses. 126  It reduces the immunity of a 
corporation against the rapid development of the globalised financial markets and, in 
dependence of its business volume, can consequently cause a systemic risk. Thus, a serious 
lack of equity position leads to capital costs increase and leads to a higher risk that the 
target corporation becomes insolvent.127 In the financial branch, capital has to be adequate 
to assure that a bank can pay off its creditors at all times.128 Moreover, the use of private 
equity reduces the credit rating of the target corporation, runs the risk that long-term 
investments are neglected and leads to a negative impact on the relation towards clients 
and creditors.129 Financial instability involves the collapse or weakness of other banks - in 
a rapid and systemic failure of the banking system.130 Finally, it can directly lead to a 
nationalisation of losses.  
                                                          
120
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 58 ff.; 141 ff.; 162 ff.; 235 ff.; Cf. Nationale 
Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen (2009), p. 9. 
121
  Sinn, Kasino Kapitalismus (2009), pp. 18, 202-206, 208. 
122
  Sinn, Kasino Kapitalismus (2009), pp. 202-206. 
123
  Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 188-189. 
124
  Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 189. 
125
  Dam, Subprime Crisis (2009), pp. 95, 98. 
126
  Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 189. 
127
  Ibid. 
128
  Dam, Subprime Crisis (2009), pp. 95, 98. 
129
  Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 189. 
130
  Dam, Subprime Crisis (2009), pp. 95, 98. 
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To face these systemic risks in the future, the central banks have undertaken certain 
measures that consist of having most credit default swaps (CDS131) processed through a 
central entity that acts as the buyer of all CDS sold and the seller of the CDS bought, 
thereby eliminating counterparty risk and setting off the positions on a multilateral 
technique that will significantly reduce the nominal amount of outstanding liabilities on a 
continuous basis, thereby reducing exposures.132 
 
1.2.3. Hedge funds as an occurrence of low equity  
Although they did not ask for governmental support during the recent financial crisis, 
hedge funds typically avail themselves of an extreme low equity position that can be 
identified as a key factor of their business strategy. Hedge funds can be described as 
special monetary accumulations that are subject to less restrictions and less regulation than 
mutual funds - they can take short positions and use derivatives, but they cannot publicly 
offer their securities.133 They can be identified as very sensitive to any credit gap because 
they are typically working with a strong leverage and their liability to margin134 calls in the 
case that the markets turn.135 This sensitivity has been proven during the recent financial 
crisis: Although the hedge funds have shown a relative strong immunity against the 
realisation of systemic risks, they are generally considered to have contributed to their 
deepening, mainly as a consequence of their action in the markets.136 As a result, hedge 
funds create a form of “regulatory omission” because they are only regulated through the 
                                                          
131
  The CDS market has become the indicator of the creditworthiness of numerous firms or states and – 
theoretically - may even take over the function of the credit ratings, cf. Wymeersch, ECFR (2010), pp. 
240, 241; in general on the Credit Default Swaps cf. B. Müller in 
Saenger/Aderhold/Lenkaitis/Speckmann, Gesellschaftsrecht (2011), § 16, Marginal no. 105 ff. 
132
  Cf. Wymeersch, ECFR (2010), pp. 240, 243. 
133
  To obtain further information on the implementation, organisation and the regulation of hedge funds: 
Berger/Steck, ZBB (2003), pp. 192-202; Fischer, NZG (2009), p. 703; Leible/Lehmann, Hedgefonds 
(2009); Nietsch/Graef, ZBB (2010), pp. 12-20; Pütz /Schmies, BKR (2004), pp. 51-60; Cf. Ricke, BKR 
(2004), pp. 60-65; Rosowski, Hedgefonds (2009); Spindler/Bednarz, WM (2006), p. 553-600; 
Spindler/Bednarz, WM (2006), p. 601-607; Wentrup, Hedgefonds (2009); Zetsche, NZG (2009), p. 692-
697.  
134
  The margin defines that cash or traded securities that are required from a trader to reduce potential 
losses in the event that the trader defaults cf. Hull, Risk Management (2011), p. 523. 
135
  As it has shown at the background of the financial crisis 2008/2009. 
136
  Wymeersch, ECFR (2010), pp. 240, 244. 
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authorised institutions through which they operate or whom they are dealing with.137 In 
addition, further difficulties and even systemic risks consequently result from their 
generally insufficient transparency, their typical complex investment strategies, high levels 
of leverage, aggressive market positions, high liquidity concentration and possible market 
distortion, market herding and “crowded trade” settlement.138 
 
By choosing a very small equity position, the hedge funds managers try to neutralise 
the normally high volatility of financial markets to build a shield against the cyclical ups 
and downs. Therefore, their financial strategy can be qualified as extremely counter-
cyclical. To implement this counter-cyclical strategy and to build a strong shield against 
the “moods” of the markets, the hedge fund managers normally work with an excessive 
leverage position combined with one highly speculative portfolio strategy. If the real 
economic events correspond to the assumptions of the hedge fund managers, this portfolio 
strategy is highly profitable. In the recent financial crisis, the speculative assumptions of 
hedge fund managers and other financial protagonists did not come true. Thus, hedge funds 
and other concerned companies were unable to correspond to the unexpected reclaim of 
saving deposits. Although they did not ask for governmental or other public support, even 
this “fund run” can be identified as another initial point of the already-mentioned 
nationalisation of losses. Moreover, another reason that contributed to the financial crisis 
of 2008/2009 consisted in the fact that all of the main broker-dealers, such as Lehman 
Brothers, acted as prime brokers with all of the assets of the hedge funds subsequently 
“frozen” until bankruptcy was complete. 
 
 
                                                          
137
  Cf. Shadab, Hedge Fund Regulation (2007), pp. 1 ff. 
138
  In particular, such features result from the hedge funds as an specific appearance of shadow  banking as 
one segment that notably does not underlay the respective equity and supervisory requirements. 
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1.3.  Short-term incentives  
1.3.1.  Corporate conducting by incentives 
Another significant circumstance that can be identified as a core reason of the recent 
financial crisis is the false structure of incentives.139 Although these incentives are often set 
by the corporation, it is its proprietors who finally define its business strategy, which is 
then executed by the agents. Therefore, the recent financial crisis can also be seen as a 
result of wrongfully set incentives.  
 
In general, incentives do result from extrinsic circumstances that motivate someone to 
do something to contribute with her or his actions to the realisation of a common superior 
objective. They are set to conduct the behaviour of a person and can consist of financial or 
economic advantages for the person.  
 
That mechanism can be described as behaviour control by incentives; it also works in 
the financial segment and “conducts” the relation between the corporation, its managers, its 
investors and the general public. Previous to the recent financial crisis, numerous managers 
set too-strong a focus on short-term capital gains. Under normal circumstances, the 
shareholders expect the fund manager to realise a maximum short-term profit. If the fund 
manager corresponds to the investor’s expectation, she or he gains a maximum 
remuneration. Thus, the fund manager realises a strong material incentive for a short-term 
profit. However, a short-term business strategy also increases the volume of systemic risks 
that can be defined as risks that affect not only a single enterprise or a single branch, but 
also the national economy as a system. A short-term business strategy increases the risk of 
a total loss for the corporation. 
 
                                                          
139
  That notably distorted incentives can be identified as one major cause of the here discussed financial 
crisis was commonly examined under „behavioural economics“. 
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1.3.2. Consequences of the business judgment rule  
With the business judgment rule (BJR) the directors of a corporation have widespread 
freedom of action concerning their economic decisions. They are free to make the 
economic decision which is best with regard to the objectives of the corporation. If they do 
respect the limits of this freedom of action, the managers of the corporation  do not bear 
any personal liability - also in the case that their assumptions do not come true and directly 
lead to the realisation of a risk that consequently results in the insolvency of the 
corporation.  
 
1.3.3. The yield as an investment parameter  
The yield of a corporation is one essential parameter for the decision of internationally 
operating investors. Under the conditions of the economic globalisation, its information 
value can be compared with that of the tax rate. Under the conditions of the increasing 
digitalisation of financial information, which forces internationally operating investors to 
reach their investment decisions rapidly if they want to be competitive, the yield of a 
corporation conveys a brief, consolidated and significant parameter of effective investment 
decisions. In many cases it helps to avoid a detailed and therefore time-consuming analysis 
of the target corporation. Moreover, with the regime of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), which advises the concerned corporation to be truthful and 
fairin terms of their net operating results, the yield of a corporation is a very serious and 
reliable parameter. Because the IFRS are respected as one international compulsory 
standard of financial information, the managers of a corporation are authorised to trust it 
without committing a breach of their legal or contractual obligations.  
 
However, the direct relation between yield, risks and the manager’s extraordinary 
remuneration results in an increase of systemic risks and, in particular, a negative 
correlation of personal liability that is essential to a well-functioning and sustainable 
market economy. Up to the outbreak of the recent financial crisis the validity of the BJR 
resulted in the widespread practice that managers profited from hazarding higher risk by 
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contracting highly speculative transactions if their economic assumptions were realised. 
However, they did not have to pay for it if their assumptions were not realised.  
 
1.3.4. Widespread use of highly speculative business models  
In many cases those fund managers who run a highly speculative portfolio strategy 
obtained a comparatively more comfortable remuneration than those who preferred a 
sustainable portfolio strategy, which is defined by a reasonable, cautious composition of 
risks (low risks, middle risks and high risks). In particular, the German Sparkassen140 were 
by far less concerned with the recent financial crisis than the investment banks. 
  
To reach the ambitious targets of equity profitability, there was a widespread custom 
among fund managers and other financial protagonists to run highly speculative business 
models, short sales141 and derivatives. Despite the portfolio strategies, they had one very 
significant character: Opportunities and risks of a financial transaction are not in the hands 
of the same person any longer - from the perspective of (independent) financials one of the 
most significant reasons for the global financial crisis of 2008/2009. 
 
1.3.5. Asymmetric structure of incentives  
One can call this structure of incentives an asymmetric structure of incentives because 
those managers did not have any incentive to avoid an economic loss that consequently 
resulted in the corporation’s insolvency, a realisation of systemic risks and a 
nationalisation of the corporation’s losses as a consequence of the public deposit 
guarantee. In the case of the banks, the disclosure-based market discipline mainly failed  
because of the implicit government guarantee. 142  In many financial corporations, this 
asymmetric structure of incentives created a very frivolous exposure to other people’s 
                                                          
140
  On the “3-column structure” of the banking sector in Germany and the dominating role of the 
Sparkassen under the impact of economic globalisation and the recent financial crisis: Kirchner, in: 
Festschrift für Schwark (2009) pp. 475 ff. 
141
  The term “short sales” stands for a portfolio strategy where shares are sold into the market,which have 
been borrowed from another investor, Cf. Hull, Risk Management (2011), p. 528. 
142
  Cf. Avgouleas, ECFR (2009), pp. 440. 
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money. Numerous managers obtained an extraordinary (financial) settlement (a “golden 
handshake”), also when their portfolio strategy generated an extraordinary loss and the 
corporation’s public reputation forced the supervisory board to dismiss that operating 
director. This happened in the case of the Hypo Real Estate (HRE), the Hamburg and 
Schleswig-Holstein Nordbank (HSH) and Acandor. 
 
1.4. False structure of remuneration  
Furthermore, the remuneration design of the directors and officers is acknowledged as 
one of the major reasons of the recent financial crisis. In the case that the remuneration 
contains a too-big variable share, this can lead to a misalignment of incentives for the 
management. Before the outbreak of the recent financial crisis, the managers of the 
corporation could earn an extraordinary remuneration if their economic assumptions came 
true and directly resulted in an extraordinary short-term yield of the corporation. This 
structure of incentives may be non-hazardous if the business volume of a corporation does 
not reach a systemic significance. However, this structure of incentives is also very 
common among systemically significant corporations such as HRE, 143  Deutsche Bank 
(DB) or HSH Nordbank (HSH) - corporations that are positioned in the investment bank 
segment - where their systemic risk is realised. Nevertheless, this structure of incentives 
may be essential for a corporation to maintain its global competitiveness. In particular, the 
report of the FCIC points out that mortgage brokers paid the real estate brokers a margin 
award in that case where they successfully mediate loans at a higher interest level to reach 
higher broker fees without informing their clients.144 
 
                                                          
143
  After the insolvency of Lehman Brothers the Hypo Real Estate Bank, (HRE) had to gather state 
guarantees of some €100 billion. Up to now, the HRE received more than €6,000 million in new capital 
from the German government. With regard to its systemic significance, the HRE was totally nationalised 
in 2009, cf. N. N., WELT KOMPAKT (22.01.2010), p. 19. 
144
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 12 
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1.5.  Conflicts of interest at the rating agencies  
1.5.1. Assessment of creditworthiness as the principal function 
 Conflicts of interest not only existed between financial managers and investors but also 
at the rating agencies because they issue ratings to issuers and investment banks who bring 
them business. 145  It is the essential function of the rating agencies to assess the 
creditworthiness of financial products, countries and corporations. In general, the rating of 
credits is a procedure to measure the creditworthiness of a bond.146,147 The Levin Report 
defines a credit rating as an assessment of likelihood that a particular financial instrument, 
such as a corporate bond or mortgage backed security, may default or incur losses.148 It 
aims at containing information deficits of the purchasers.149  
 
In contrast to the principal function of rating agencies, at the eve of the financial crisis 
of 2008/2009, many depositors blindly trusted them. In many cases, they were committed 
to use their assistance. As the FCIC points out, the failure of the rating agencies was an 
essential „cogs in the wheel“ of the financial destruction.150 Those mortgage securitised 
instruments that stood in the epicentrum of the financial crisis never could have distributed 
and sold without the assistance of the rating agencies. Thus, according to the FCIC´s point 
of view, the financial crisis never would have taken place without the rating agencies. 
Their assessments led to the financial market rise, and those downgrades of the years 2007 
and 2008 heavily damaged markets and corporations.151 All in all, the rating agencies were 
involved in a severe conflict of interests. 
 
That conflict of interest that became a core reason for the recent financial crisis 
resulted from the concentration of assessing the risks of financial products and the 
purchasing of financial products in the same entity. Up to the recent financial crisis, it was 
                                                          
145
  Cf. FSA, The Turner Report (2009), p. 78; Levin-Report (2011), pp. 31. 
146
  A bond is defined as a long-term debt of a firm, often refers to both secured and unsecured debt and is 
almost always the same as the face value, cf. Lee/Lee, Encyclopedia of Finance (2006), p. 36. 
147
  Hull, Risk Management (2011), p. 516. 
148
  Cf. Levin-Report (2011), pp. 26 f. 
149
  Cf. Kübler, in: Festschrift für Schwark (2009) p. 499, 499. 
150
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 25. 
151
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 16. 
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a widespread practice that rating agencies not only assessed the financial risks of financial 
products, but also the probability of default 152  to enhance the investor protection. 
Normally, the assessment of a financial product as the result of its default probability 
analysis of the rating agencies represents the essential basis for the investment decision. 
Under well-functioning market conditions a bad rating is directly reflected in the price of a 
financial product that informs the investors on the trustworthiness of a certain financial 
product. Under the conditions of the fast-moving financial markets, the price conveys to 
the financial investors perhaps the most significant signal of the credit standing of 
corporations. To realise the financial objectives of their corporation and to restore the trust 
of investors, the portfolio managers must react rapidly to the development of the financial 
markets.  
 
1.5.2. Interference of assessing and disposing financial products  
Up to the recent financial crisis, the abovementioned mechanism was set in force 
because the rating agencies not only accessed the creditworthiness of financial products but 
also disposed of these products. It is easy to understand that the interference of these two 
functions that normally should be clearly separated can directly cause an interruption of a 
well-functioning market economy.  
 
It is usually the main task of a rating agency to access the creditworthiness of people, 
corporations and countries by giving marks that are called “scores”. In recent financial 
practice, it happened that the rating agency that distributed the financial product also had to 
access this product. Thus, credit institutes were enabled to devise securitised products that 
enjoyed an “AAA” rating, which represents the best available credit standing - even though 
the underlying securities were of a far lower grade.153  
 
                                                          
152
  The term “probability of default” refers to the failure to make obligated interest and principal payments 
on a loan. It describes the likelihood that an obligor or counterparty will encounter credit distress within 
a given time period, cf. Lee/Lee, Encyclopedia of Finance (2006), p. 83. 
153
  McIlroy in Straus, future of banking (2009), pp. 119, 120. 
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The conflict of interest that resulted from the interference of those two functions not 
only concerned the access but also the risk weighting of financial products.154 Many rating 
agencies did not focus on the protection of investors but pursued the objective to increase 
the sales volume of those financial products with a high probability of default. The 
interference at the rating agencies caused a widespread overestimation of financial 
products. The initial ratings were too high.155 The risks of AAA-rated tranches of ABS and 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs 156 ) were higher than either investors or rating 
agencies realised.157  
 
To underline these heavy failures of the rating agencies, the FCIC hints at the fact that, 
between 2000 and 2007, Moody´s assessed 45.000 mortgage securitised instruments as 
AAA.158 In contrast, in the first half of 2010 there were only six US-American corporations 
that received the AAA-assessment. 159  In 2006 alone, Moody´s assessed mortgage 
securitised instruments as AAA thirty times each day - with disastrous consequences: 83% 
of the mortgage securitised instruments were downgraded in the end.160 Thus, it can be 
seen as an actual cause of the recent financial crisis that the rating companies mispriced 
structured debt.161 Moreover, it was also an apparent failure of risk management theory.162 
Moreover, as the FCIC highlights, without the rating agencies assessment failures, the 
market for mortgage securitised instruments never would have collapsed.163 
 
The responsible managers at the rating agencies, meanwhile, admitted to themselves 
that their institutions made significant assessment faults. 164  These assessment faults 
sustainably damaged the reputation and the credibility of the whole rating agencies 
                                                          
154
  Dam in Straus, Subprime Crisis (2009), pp. 95, 103. 
155
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 426. 
156
  Security created from tranches of different ABSs; cf. Levin-Report (2011), p. 28 f. 
157
  Hull, Risk Management (2010), p. 341. 
158
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 25. 
159
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 25. 
160
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 25. 
161
  Cf. Volpin/Pagano, Credit Ratings Failures (2009), pp. 1 ff. 
162
  Ibid. 
163
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 16. 
164
  Cf. New York Times (January/28th/2008), C 13: Moody´s Official concedes failure in some ratings. 
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segment.165 The insufficient performance of the rating agencies in the sector of structured 
products 166  - a structured financial product is a derivative designed by a financial 
institution to meet the need of clients (e.g., CDOs)167 - consequently led to the necessity of 
an extraordinary regulatory intervention in almost all industrial countries.168  
 
Rating agencies will be subject to some form of supervision in the future, mainly 
dealing with their organisation and governance, their internal processes, the absence of 
conflicts of interest and an effective disclosure.169 Moreover, there will be the necessity for 
an international corporation to avoid separate and different ratings to be issued, depending 
on the local entity in the rating group that has issued the rating.170 
 
Those assessment faults that resulted in the overestimating of the quality of those 
financial products with a high risk level is probably one of the core causes for the recent 
financial crisis171 Many of the financial products that were not properly assessed by the 
rating agencies are meanwhile possessed by a “bad bank” - a credit institute that was 
founded because of the recent financial crisis to purchase those financial products that 
cannot trade on the “first” financial market any longer because their real financial standing 
is sometimes at the “D” level, which indicates the worst accessed financial products. As an 
extraordinary phenomenon of the recent financial crisis, the bad bank does not underlie the 
legal requirements of the lending law. It overtakes risks papers that suffered extraordinary 
losses and consequently could not be traded on the market any longer and that no longer fit 
into a bank’s portfolio strategy; therefore, the “bad bank” is allowed to run a smaller equity 
position than other credit institutes.172 
 
                                                          
165
  Cf. Kübler, in: Festschrift für Schwark (2009) p. 499, 503. 
166
  For further information on structured finance cf. De Vries Robbé, Structured Finance (2010), pp. 1 ff. 
167
  Hull, Risk Management (2011), p. 529. 
168
  Cf. Wymeersch, ECFR (2010), pp. 240, 241. 
169
  Cf. Wymeersch, ECFR (2010), pp. 240, 243; on the future European financial supervision see Heun, JZ 
(No. 5/2012), p. 235 ff. 
170
  Wymeersch, ECFR (2010), pp. 240, 243. 
171
  Cf. IMF, Initial lessons of the crisis (2009), published under 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/020609.pdf (requested July/17th/2013). 
172
  Cf. N. N., WELT KOMPAKT (22.01.2010), p. 19. 
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1.5.3. Interference by securitisation  
The securitisation of risk173 is a technique to transform illiquid wealth position/assets 
as the book claim of a corporation into a transferable wealth position.174 Probably the most 
important distinction in relation to structured finance applies to the fact that banks 
securitize credit instruments such as mortgages, car loans and student loans by selling them 
to a single special purpose vehicle (SPV) ,which pays for the purchase by issuing new 
ones, notes or commercial papers. In contrast, structured finance thereupon informs the 
secondary securitisation or re-securitisation of the securities produced by the first 
securitisation with large numbers of securitisations that possibly reach a volume of 250 to 
350, all being sought by a higher new SPV that would issue those securities in tranches 
with a number of various risk levels. 
 
Until the financial market crisis of 2008/2009 there was an increasing practical 
demand for securitisations because credit institutes used this technique to reduce their 
capital buffers. Moreover, it even became popular because securitisations contribute to 
minimise counterparty risk and their conception is comparatively easy.175 Even a future 
claim can be securitised. All in all, securitisation is a comparatively new technique to 
finance a corporation. The originating corporation can avail itself of liquid assets before 
the expiry date. In this context, the corporation as the source of the claim takes the position 
as the originator.  
 
From a corporation’s perspective, securitisation became a very popular technique 
starting in the mid-1990s to fit its short-term capital demand and to obtain investment 
capital. Under the regime of the Third Basel Capital Accord (Basel III176), from a bank’s 
perspective, it has become a very popular technique to generate cash because the synthetic 
securitisation enables a credit institute to the isolated transfer of risks (investment risk, 
solvency risk, risk of creditworthiness etc.) at a SPV, respectively an asset-backed 
                                                          
173
  For on-going information on the legal framework of the securitisation of risks see Prüm/Thomas, BKR 
(2011), pp. 133-143. 
174
  Cf. Gronewold, Kapitalanlagegesellschaften, p. 59. 
175
  Cf. Decker/Hubli in Busack/Kaiser, Alternative Investments II, 2006, p. 496 f. 
176
  On the development towards a harmonised European banking supervision under the Basel III-regime cf. 
http://www.bis.org/list/bcbs/index.htm, requested October/24th/2012. 
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securities corporation (ABSC) that takes the position of the distributor and packs the 
assigned claims from several corporations into a transferable, respectively fungible product 
with an often blue-chip solvency. In this context, it seems essential to clarify the 
widespread simplification that the SPV was founded to acquire non-transferable assets 
from the originator. The respective assets are either legally assigned to the SPV by the 
originator on a legal basis or the economic risk transfer based on credit derivatives, such as 
CDS under a synthetic CDO. Synthetic CDOs that were used until the outbreak of the 
financial crisis of 2008/2009 did not contain actual mortgages or other assets that produce 
income but simply “referenced” existing assets and thereupon permited investors to use 
credit default swaps to place bets on the performance of those referenced assets.177 The 
SPV finances the purchase from the originator by editing asset-backed commercial papers 
(ABCP), and transfers the risk of bad debt to the investors.178 The SPV refinances itself by 
the capital market and conducts the interest and amortisation payments by backflows of the 
purchased assets from depositor credits resulting from the operative business of the 
originator.179 
 
By using credit enhancements, the SPV normally obtains a better credit rating, like the 
originator. The resulting commercial paper is often an ABS or a MBS. Practically, it takes 
a specific design to make sure that the ABSC does not belong to the relevant consolidating 
group of the originator.180 Because the SPV often combines several traditional financial 
means into a new financial product one can call this a structured financial product. 
However, the financial expression of the structured financial products not only stands for a 
financial product, but also represents an active portfolio strategy that more strongly 
corresponds with the individual demands of the investor/depositor and that can generate 
protection against the volatility of the (financial) markets. 
 
There is a difference between the true sale securitisation and the synthetic 
securitisation. On the one hand, true sale securitisation that is based on a real transfer of the 
                                                          
177
  Cf. Levin-Report (2011), p. 28. 
178
  Hertz-Eichenrode/Illenberger/Jesch/Keller/Klebeck/Rocholl, Private Equity-Lexikon (2011), p. 192. 
179
  Cf. Volkart, Corporate Finance (2008), p. 883. 
180
  Hertz-Eichenrode/Illenberger/Jesch/Keller/Klebeck/Rocholl, Private Equity-Lexikon (2011), p. 192. 
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original claim that can legally be qualified as a transfer of property with a balance sheet-
liberating effect. Generally, in the case of derivatives, the investors share the risk that the 
put-options are taken under a disadvantageous market trend, and that they are, 
consequently, committed to accept the repurchase of subprime shares.181 The (prospective) 
value of the securitised claim depends on its further development. The true-sale 
securitisation is preferable if the principal objective of the originator is the rise of its 
liquidity.182 
 
On the other hand, under the synthetic securitisation, only the relevant risks, the risk of 
bad debt, are transferred to the SPV. The relevant assets and the original claim remain in 
the balance sheet of the originator. Because Basel III requires the involved credit institutes 
to highlight any risk with an equity position, the synthetic securitisation contributes to a 
bank’s interest to generate cash flow. Until the outbreak of the financial crisis of 
2008/2009, a very popular technique of the investment banks was to achieve an above-
average performance. In the case that the relevant risks are realised, the SPV is committed 
to perform an equalisation payment to the originator. 
 
Among those corporations that systematically use the technique of securitisation are 
General Motors (GM) and Ford, who finance their debtors by these financial means, and 
big commercial banks that outsource and securitize mortgage loans.  
 
1.5.4. Interference by Structured Finance  
Structured financial products aim at the individual requirements and demands of the 
depositor. They represent a combination of several traditional financial products. 
Typically, several conventional financial products are combined into an unusual innovative 
financial item to fit the specific needs of the issuers and the depositors/investors. 183 
                                                          
181
  Cf. Volkart, Corporate Finance (2008), p. 488. 
182
  Vgl. Gronewold, Kapitalanlagegesellschaften, p. 64. 
183
  Cf. B. Müller, in: Saenger/Aderhold/Lenkaitis/Speckmann, Gesellschaftsrecht (2011), § 16, Marginal 
no. 105; Lenenbach in: Assies/Rösler, FAHdB Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht (2012), § 36, Marginal no. 
353. 
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Essentially, structured financial products follow three objectives. On the one hand, they 
aim at credit institutes and other financial market participants to discharge them from 
different types of risks and to enhance their cash flow. On the other hand, they protect 
them against the volatility of the cash market and keep the requested interest level. In 
addition, whereas the so-called interest caps generate a protection against the transgression 
of a certain interest level under the conditions of variable interest rates, the so-called 
interest floors generate the provision to build a protection against the undercut of a certain 
interest level (a financial means to hedge the price level).184 Finally, structured financial 
products, such as futures, forwards and swaps185 contribute to generate a scope for the 
calculation of market prices by fixing certain market prices at a certain point of time.186  
 
In comparison with other types of investment funds, the customer of a structured 
financial product bears a counterparty risk because these products can be legally qualified 
as claims that are secured with a credit risk towards the bank.187  In general, one can 
distinguish structured financial products by the three main criteria of capital protection, 
profit potential and coupon payments.188 
 
In view of the abovementioned functions, structured finance can be defined as the 
coordinated use of credit financing to optimise the relevant financing conditions, even 
under the tax and company-law perspective.189 The depositor/investor purchases a product 
that combines the bond of an often blue-chip issuer with certain payments of interests and 
amortisation whose volume depends on the development of a specific reference value.190 
Very often those bonds that are issued by the SPVs get a better rating at the capital market 
                                                          
184
  Cf. B. Müller, in: Saenger/Aderhold/Lenkaitis/Speckmann, Gesellschaftsrecht (2011), § 16, Marginal 
no. 109.  
185
  On the one hand, a swap can be defined as a contract that commits the involved persons to exchange 
payment streams at a certain point of time in the future. On the other hand, it is a combination of a 
purchased call (long) and a sold put (short) with the same tick size and the same strike. They help to 
protect assets against the volatility of the market, cf. Heidorn/Trautmann in: Busack/Kaiser, Alternative 
Investments II, 2006, p. 536 f. 
186
  Cf. B. Müller in Saenger/Aderhold/Lenkaitis/Speckmann, Gesellschaftsrecht (2011), § 16, Marginal no. 
110.  
187
  Cf. Kaiser, Konstruktion, p. 84. 
188
  Ibid. 
189
  Cf. Hertz-Eichenrode/Illenberger/Jesch/Keller/Klebeck/Rocholl, Private Equity-Lexikon (2011), p. 191 
f.; Levin-Report (2011), pp. 26 ff. 
190
  Cf. Volkart, Corporate Finance (2008), p. 488. 
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than the originator because the outsourced assets normally are of a premium quality, and 
the intelligent structuring of the refinancing into several tranches with different seniorities 
conveys another advantage.191 As a result, the payment flows economically represent a 
combination of bond, reference value and the relevant put/call-options on this reference 
value.192 
 
1.5.5. Further analysis and conclusions  
 Although it is still unknown whether the rating agencies made those fatal assessment 
faults, financial analysts assume that the rating agencies were not properly informed by the 
issuers and their investment banks; it is still not clear why those information deficits were 
not discovered by the rating agencies and whether they did not sanction this behaviour.193 
Moreover, one assumes that also the increasing regulatory use of ratings and several 
abovementioned conflicts of interests contributed to several assessment faults.194 Finally, 
one has to consider that the rating of financial products is completely different from the 
rating of corporations; whereas the rating of corporations refers to their financial stability 
and their prospective cash flow, the rating of financial products sets the focus on a “pool” 
of claims that are directed towards a couple of debtors whose individual financial status 
cannot be identified - in one case, it happens as an empirical analysis and assessment, and 
in the other case, the assessment is based on quantifying methods.195 Below the line, there 
are various factors that reduce the reliability and accuracy of the assessment of structured 
financial products that become even more serious by the “pooling” of MBS, the issuing 
and distribution of new titles (CDOs, SACs) and the impossibility to assess the risk of the 
untimely debt retirement of a mortgage.196 
 
Furthermore, the main problem with the CRAs was that they were primarily involved 
with the assessment of single instruments, such as bonds and, moreover, that they did not 
avail of the necessary expertise to launch financial products with a higher complexity such 
                                                          
191
  Cf. Volkart, Corporate Finance (2008), p. 883. 
192
  Cf. Volkart, Corporate Finance (2008), p. 488. 
193
  Cf. Kübler in Festschrift für Schwark (2009) p. 499 (505). 
194
  Cf. Kübler in Festschrift für Schwark (2009) p. 499 (505). 
195
  Cf. Kübler in Festschrift für Schwark (2009) p. 499 (506). 
196
  Ibid. 
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as CDOs. Thus, there was an inherent conflict of interest with the rating being paid for the 
originating bank. The CRAs also would have used the originating investment firms' own 
models and were compelled under substantial pressure to provide triple A ratings if they 
did not want to lose the investment firm to another CRA - consequently there were 
substantial conflicts of interest. In retrospective, the initial ratings were too high, beginning 
with the first downgrades which became  
even more serious with subsequent down grades. 
 
The CRAs evidently misplaced the relevant risk. All in all, one can identify two major 
faults within all of the financial models that were used before the financial crisis of 
2008/2009. Firstly, they did not incorporate any data on a decline in housing prices. This 
assessment fault is particularly due to US property prices, which alwayshad influence, 
apart from the development in the 1930s. Secondly, the financial models used by the CRAs 
did not incorporate correlation data,  including market prices that were moving together 
rather than against each other. 
 
 If one can draw any lesson from the interference at the rating agencies, the future 
regulatory framework should embrace a mandatory financial supervision that should be 
located at the European level and that should grant an independent assessment of financial 
products, corporations and countries. Following Walker, one way to avoid a similar crisis 
in the future is that all debts are rated properly in very case197 because this had not been the 
case up to September 2008. A bigger transparency of the rating agency’s creditworthiness 
statements could have contributed to a more critical public opinion of the role of the rating 
agencies. 
 
The recent financial crisis demonstrated the signification of an independent rating for a 
well-functioning financial market and a well-functioning economy as a whole. A realistic 
assessment of financial products contributes to an adequate balance of interests between all 
market participants. It is one essential condition of a more sustainable regulatory 
                                                          
197
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (195 ff.). 
46 
 
The European Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) -  
an appropriate approach to the global financial crisis? 
 
46 
 
framework. One first step towards the realisation of this objective has been undertaken 
with the implementation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB198).  
 
1.6.  International separation and securitisation of risks  
1.6.1.  The originate-to-hold model as the initial point 
 Another core reason of the recent financial crisis is the international separation, 
specifically the securitisation of risks that was already mentioned in the context of the 
OTD. Traditionally, under the OTH, the risks of mortgage loans and other comparatively 
complex financial products remain in the hands of the same credit institute that issued the 
mortgage loan. If one concentrates the expectation of profits and the risk of losses in the 
hand of the same credit institution, the respective financial vehicle is comparatively easy to 
handle because its editor can monitor the growth of the product at any time. Also under the 
conditions of economic globalisation the editor of the financial product retains the impact 
on the financial product all the time. Its growth is comparatively easy to monitor and thus 
transparent. 
 
1.6.2. The originate-to-distribute model  
 Under the OTD that was based on the separation of chances and risks came a dramatic 
change. The OTD can be described as the practice where a bank originates loans and credit 
card receivables and securitises them, so that the credit risks are distributed to other 
investors.199 Credit risk exists because the cash flows to be received by the bond markets 
investors are not certain.200 The securitisation of financial products stood for an important 
and useful tool in financial markets for many years and finally contributed to the housing 
bubble based on the idea to sell portfolios of mortgages to companies that created products 
for investors from them.201 In comparison to structured finance that tends to a particular 
                                                          
198
  For further information on the new European supervisory architecture see Bauer/Boegl, BKR (2011), 
pp. 177 ff.; N.N., Larosière-Gruppe, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 37/2010, pp. 7-8; Nietsch/Graef, 
ZBB (2010), pp. 12 ff.; Zülch/Hoffmann/Detzen, EWS (2011), pp. 167 ff.  
199
  Hull, Risk Management (2011), p. 525. 
200
  Cf. Lee/Lee, Encyclopedia of Finance (2006), p. 75. 
201
  Cf. Hull, Risk Management (2010), p. 336. 
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type of more traditional financial instruments - such as bonds, loans and notes -202 the 
technique of securitisation is based on a general asset pool.203  
 
On the one hand, the securitisation of risks leads to a suppression of the portfolio 
manager’s personal liability. In particular, the model of transnational risk separation 
consequently led to a separation of the underlying risk management from the rating and 
trading of financial instruments involved.204 The portfolio managers speculatively set on a 
continuous growth of those financial products they edited themselves and concurrently lost 
the impact on that growth because their risks were distributed all over the world. In 
particular, the allocation or distribution of risk across the market probably became obscure 
with the over-the-counter (OTC205) character of securitisation and the increasing use of off-
balance sheet holding instruments, SIVs and bank conduits.206  In particular, the OTC 
business became very successful after the terminating of the convertibility of gold in 1971. 
Up to that year, the Breton Woods Agreement, which was based on David Ricardo’s idea 
of the comparative advantages of costs207 , defined a fixed (mutual) currency exchange 
system on a gold standard, which consequently led to the expansion of currency swaps 
such as the OTC; the OTC transactions are executed by the banks  in their currency 
commerce centres for their customers.208  
 
Finally, the FCIC draws the conclusion that OTC-derivates significantly contributed to 
the outbreak of the crisis. Namely, the taking effect of the law on the prohibition of the 
regulation of OTC-transactions in the year 2000 could be seen as a turning point on the 
                                                          
202
  The term “note” stands for an unsecured debt with maturity of usually less than 15 years, cf. Lee/Lee, 
Encyclopedia of Finance (2006), p. 192. 
203
  Cf. Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision, Revisions (2013), pp. 4 ff. 
204
  Cf. N.N., Growth Strategies, pp. 19 (30 ff., 42 ff.). 
205
  The so-called over-the-counter market is a market where traders deal by phone and usually represent 
financial institutions, corporations and fund managers, cf. Hull, Risk Management (2010), p. 526; in other 
words, it stands for a telecommunications network of dealers who provide liquidity to investors by their 
willingness to “make markets” in particular securities, cf. Lee/Lee, Encyclopedia of Finance (2006), p. 199. 
206
  By name, financial corporations such as Citigroup, UBS and Goldman Sachs restricted into difficulties 
with their use of conduits that can be defined as specific-purpose highly geared investment vehicles 
(conduits, SIVs) established off-balance sheet. As subsidiaries or funds, conduits invest in assets with a 
comparatively high return and long duration. They finance themselves by the release of ABCPs. Famous 
conduits are the government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
207
  On the theory of comparative advantages of costs cf. Tietje, in: Tietje, Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht 
(2009), § 3, Bullet No. 8. 
208
  Cf. Bloss/Ernst/Häcker/Sörensen, Financial Engineering (2011), p. 273. 
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road towards the financial crisis of 2008/2009.209 Without underlying any supervision, the 
OTC-derivates became rapidly out of control while increasing to a total transaction volume 
of 673 trillion US$.210 The existence of millions of derivate contracts of many different 
kinds, from the most important and systemically relevant financial institutions led to 
insecurity and panic and contributed additionally to the acceleration of governmental 
support for the affected companies.211 
 
One can illustrate this development with the metaphor of a person who only views the 
world with only one eye open. By doing this, the portfolio managers lost their control on 
the distribution and the further development of the edited financial products. It became a 
big speculation bubble that had to burst sooner or later and which could have been 
prevented if the securitisation of risks had competed with an advanced monitoring system, 
enabling the portfolio managers to obtain the essential information on the growth of the 
financial products - including in the case of an intercontinental securitisation of risks. It is 
necessary to establish a monitoring system that sets the focus on the price inflation and 
limits asset price bubbles and coordinates relevant interest rates, exchange rates economic 
policies and fiscal politics. 212  Finally, the rise of the OTD consequently caused 
increasingly high levels on stress on the more traditional money markets and on the 
liquidity management devices of central banks in many countries.213 Because liquidity of 
financial institutions interacts with their solvency, the frontier between liquidity and 
insolvency became blurred and, at the eve of the financial crisis of 2008/2009, the central 
banks primarily acted as the lenders of last resort (LLR).214  
 
 
 
                                                          
209
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 15. 
210
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 24. 
211
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 411; Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der 
Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen (2009), p. 15. 
212
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (196). 
213
  As Walker emphasizes moreover, the financial crisis 2008/2009 was (therefore) a liquidity crisis rather 
than capital crisis, cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (196). 
214
  Cf. Le Maux/Scialom, Cambridge Journal of Economics Vol. 37 (2013), pp. 1 f. 
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1.7.  Shadow banking as a cause of the financial crisis 2008/2009?  
1.7.1. Introduction, overview and background  
Probably the most important function of the financial markets is to support the 
activities of the real economy215 by financing the respective activities and - moreover - to 
transform, access and to monitor terms and production batches. 216  To achieve any 
sustainable and satisfactory economic growth of the real economy and to promote new 
business models like start up-companies that depend on a steady and satisfactory supply of 
venture capital, it takes the legal framework that secures those economic requirements. 
There is little doubt that the financial crisis of 2008/2009 was a crisis of insufficient 
liquidity. The steady availability of adequate liquidity is one essential condition of the 
autonomous value-added process of the banking segment.217 
 
The before-mentioned need of corporations and consumers significantly contributed to 
the rise of a business model that is well known as shadow banking218. Notably, the Basel 
Capital Accord, the global economic disequilibrium between the industrial countries and 
the emerging countries219 and the rapid growth of the transnational capital flows after the 
introduction of the Euro on 1 January 1999 enormously contributed to the rise of shadow 
banking since the overcapacities in the European banking segment increased the 
predominant margin pressure - those overcapacities led to the decline of the credit 
standards  and resulted in risky investments on the US-American real estate market.220 
Huertas points out that, with the benefit of hindsight, shadow banking was probably the 
most severe aspect of finance during the pre-crisis boom.221 
 
                                                          
215
  Definition cf. Annotation No. 39. 
216
  Cf. Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 970. 
217
  Cf. Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 970. 
218
  On the system of shadow banking cf. Adrian/Ashcraft, Shadow banking (2012), pp. 1 ff.; Bengtsson, 
Shadow banking (2009), pp. 1 ff.; Gennaioli/Shleifer/Vishny, shadow banking (2011), pp. 1 ff.; Moe, Shadow 
banking (2012), pp. 1 ff.; Ordonez, Sustainable shadow banking (2013), pp. 1 ff.; Rudolph, ZfbF (12/2012), 
pp. 846 ff.; Rudolph, Kreditwesen (13/2012), pp. 650 ff.; Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt 
(2013), pp. 19 ff.; Schalast, BB (Die erste Seite 2012); Schrooten, ZfBW (1/2012), p. 4 ff.; Utzig, Die Bank 
(10/2012), pp. 80 ff.  
219
  Notably Brasil, Russia, India, Chine, Vietnam, South Africa, Indonesia and Turkey. 
220
  Cf.  Zimmermann, ZfBW (2/2012), pp. 105, 106. 
221
  Cp. Huertas, Crisis (2010), p. 18. 
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According to the inquiry results of the FSB, the total transaction volume of the shadow 
banking segment almost doubled from the beginning of the 20th century until the beginning 
of the financial crisis of 2008/2009 to some 60 billion US$, whereas that of the regulated 
banking segment covered little over 100 billion US$ .222 Nevertheless, it seems important 
to realize that the total transaction volume of the shadow banking segment nationally 
defers, as it turns out by a comparison between Europe and the United States where the 
shadow banking segment dramatically decreased from 20 billion US$ down to  15 billion 
US$ at the end of 2011, whereas that of the Euro zone still increased from 8.5 billion Euro 
in 2007 to  11 billion Euro at the end of the first half of 2011.223 In the November of 2012, 
the shadow banking segment already covered a total transaction volume by some 67 
Billion US$ in the United States. 
 
The enormous growth of the shadow banking segment can be seen as one consequence 
of the massive (economic) disequilibrium between the demand for safe investments, which  
means bonds, and the factual offer for safe investments reflecting the global disequilibrium 
that  occurs in the balances on capital accounts and the balance of current accounts 
between Asia and the United States: The enormous savings of the emerging countries were 
particularly channeled into the high liquid US-treasury markets.224  As the US-treasury 
market has been revealed to be too small to correspond with the enormous demand for safe 
investments, US-American credit-institutes began to release additional - putatively safe - 
AAA-rated assets in the subprime segment of the US-American real estate market - a 
problem that even has not been solved after the burst of the subprime-bubble.225 
 
According to the FSB, the national-economic meaning of the shadow banking segment 
is underlined by the real development between 2002 and 2010: In this time period, the 
global sales of shadow banking segment doubled up to 46 Billion Euro, which corresponds 
                                                          
222
  Cf. FSB, Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation (2011), published under 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111027a.pdf. 
223
  Cf.. ECB, shadow banking in the Euro area - an overview, Occasional Paper No. 133 (2012), published 
under http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp133.pdf 
224
  Cf.  Zimmermann, ZfBW (2/2012), pp. 105, 105. 
225
  Cf.  Zimmermann, ZfBW (2/2012), pp. 105, 105; on the origins of the sub-primie crisis in resume cf. 
Lewis, Accounting Forum Vol. 33 (2009), pp. 114 ff. 
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to 25 percent of the global financial market.226 According to the results of the European 
Commission, the quote of the shadow banking covers some 5 percent, in the United 
Kingdom remarkably 13 percent.227  
 
In Europe, already under Basel II, there were strong incentives to outsource assets 
from the balance-sheets of the regular banks to SPVs to safe equity.228 The widespread 
trend towards shadow banking is obviously driven by Basel III and primarily results from 
the legal obligation of (traditional) banks to generally underlay each credit risk with a 
sufficient equity position that gives them a reason to outsource the respective risks at a 
SPV that is able to circumvent the financial supervision - a business model that 
significantly contributed to the crisis of financial corporations like HRE or Deutsche 
Industriebank AG (IKB).229 
 
1.7.2. Definition of shadow banking  
In view of the before-mentioned development, the term shadow banking is a politically 
charged buzzword.230 It is often used in the context of other buzzwords as one drift of the 
financial crisis of 2008/2009.  The expression shadow banking is not legally defined. 
Neither the international financial law nor the European financial provides any legal 
definition. . Officially, the expression shadow banking was used by Paul McCulley, US-
American economist and former managing director of the Pacific Investment Management 
Company (PIMCO231), at the Economic Symposium of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City in Jackson Hyde (USA) in September of 2007. McCulley explained the 
expression shadow banking as  
                                                          
226
  Cf. http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken/schattenbanken-die-67-billionen-dollar-
branche/7407732.html 
227
  Cf. http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken/schattenbanken-die-67-billionen-dollar-
branche/7407732.html 
228
  Cf.  Zimmermann, ZfBW (2/2012), pp. 105, 106. 
229
  Cf. http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken/schattenbanken-die-67-billionen-dollar-
branche/7407732.html. 
230
  Cf.  European Commission, Green Paper Shadow Banking (2012), p. 3. 
231
  Presence in the internet: http://www.pimco.com/Pages/default.aspx. 
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“the whole alphabet soup of leveraged up non-banking investment conduits, vehicles and 
structures.232” 
 
This very first definition already hinted at the small equity level as one decisive feature 
of shadow banking by taking using expression “leveraged” and, moreover, defining 
conduits as one typical financial mean of shadow banking. Three years later, it was 
followed by (another) definition that was used by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York:  
“Financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit and liquidity transformation 
without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees233”. 
 
On the one hand, the before-mentioned definition of the New York Fed also embraced 
financial corporations, hedge funds, investment funds, Government Sponsored entities as 
Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac and investment banks - on the other hand, it was even 
restricted to these entities.234 Yet the FSB widened the before-mentioned definition by the 
typical financial operations and activities of shadow banking by comprising the shadow 
banking phenomena as 
“the system of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regular 
banking system235”. 
 
According to this definition, shadow banking is notably characterized by three 
significant features: Primarily, shadow banks fulfill one function that is very similar to that 
of the regular banks by offering credit intermediation; secondly, the credit intermediation 
is fulfilled by several actors that closely cooperate at the financial market; thirdly, the 
actors of the shadow bank market are neither subject to the legal bank supervision nor do 
                                                          
232
  Cf. McCulley, Teton reflections (2007), published under 
http://www.pimco.com/EN/Insights/Pages/GCBF%20August-%20September%202007.aspx. 
233
  Cf. Pozsar/Adrian/Ashcraft/Boesky, Shadow Banking, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 
No. 458 (July 2010). 
234
  Cf.  Utzig, Die Bank (10/2012), pp. 80, 80. 
235
  FSB, Shadow Banking  - Strengthening Oversight and Regulation (2011). 
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they have access to central bank liquidity (“parallelism of credit intermediation 236 ”). 
Nevertheless, the credit intermediation of shadow banks does not involve single retail 
customers but a complex counter bearing of (private) institutional investors directed to the 
money market. All in all, shadow banks share a certain financial business model that runs 
almost the same business transactions like the regulated banking segment.237  
 
Following the Green Paper of the European Commission (EC-Green Paper238), which 
was based on the recommendations of the FSB (FSB Global Shadow Banking Monitoring 
Report239), shadow banking activities typically consist of securitisations, security loan and 
pension transactions (“Repos”240).241  Furthermore, they cover different kinds of SPVs; 
money market funds (MMF242) and other kinds of investment funds or investment products 
with features similar to deposits; they serve investment funds that place credits, invest in 
credit products, operate highly leveraged, and invest in funds that are placed outside of the 
stock exchange (exchange traded funds, ETF), such as hedge funds.243 Finally, shadow 
banks hold financing corporations and securities trading houses that place credits or credit 
guarantees or that accomplish liquidity- and term-transformations without underlying bank 
regulation; they invest in assurance and re-assurance companies that launch or secure 
credit products. 
 
According to the definition of the FSB, shadow banking covers a system of credit 
intermediation including entities and activities outside the regular banking system.244 In 
particular, they cover money market funds, exchange traded index-funds, certain hedge-
                                                          
236
  Cf.  Utzig, Die Bank (10/2012), pp. 80, 81. 
237
  Cf.  Fischer, Kreditwesen (10/2012), pp. 485, 485. 
238
  European Commission, Green Paper Shadow Banking, dated 19 March 2012, published under 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/shadow/green-paper_en.pdf. 
239
  Cf.  FSB, Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation (2011), published under 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111027a.pdf.; FSB, Global Shadow Banking 
Monitoring Report (2012), dated 18 November 2012, published under 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121118c.pdf. 
240
  On the Repo-market cf. Hördahl/King, BIS Quarterly Review (12/2008): pp. 37 ff. 
241
  Cf.  Fischer, Kreditwesen (10/2012), pp. 485, 485. 
242
  So far there has been no harmonization or regulation at the European level on what features constitute a 
MMF. Typically, a MMF is set up as an UCITS, cf. Bengtsson, Shadow banking (2009), European Money 
Market funds - Backgrounds. 
243
  On the current discussion of risk and regulatory engagement concerning hedge funds cf. FSA, 
Discussion Paper 05/4, pp. 1 ff. 
244
  Cf. http://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/Definition/verbriefung-von-kreditportfolios.html. 
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funds, and security structures offer financial affairs economically similar to the deposit and 
credit affairs of the (regulated) banks.245 
 
Although the before-mentioned definitions demonstrate a broad congruency of the 
shadow bank activities with those of the regular banks, one cannot deny another significant 
feature of shadow banks which distinguishes them from regular banks: Shadow banks do 
not avail of the legal status of a bank. For example, they are SPVs that run transformations 
of liquidity and terms, such as corporations offering securitisations-- conduits (ABCP), 
other SPVs, MMFs and other kinds of investment funds that offer products with typical 
features-- making them vulnerable for sudden and unexpected calls for the investor 
deposits (bank-runs) or investment funds that place credits or operating highly leveraged or 
ETFs.246  
 
1.7.3. Conception of shadow banking  
The second decisive feature of shadow banking is the close link with the originating 
bank. Due to the “operating definition” of the FSB, the operating of shadow banks leads to 
financial disintermediation (legal arbitration) or sets on a close link (network) with the 
established banking system that defines one essential feature for financial regulation, the 
setting of systemic risks.247 Due to the close link between originating bank and shadow 
bank, numerous banks generate enormous profits resulting from “their” shadow bank 
activities and hold direct and indirect credit exposures towards the shadow banks.248 
 
Shadow banking happens if the regulated credit institute outsources certain 
components of its balance sheet to a SPV that is not subject to the legal requirements.249 In 
particular, the SPV must not run a minimum equity position - as one consequence, it can 
                                                          
245
  Cf.  Fischer, Kreditwesen (10/2012), pp. 485, 485. 
246
  Cf. European Commission, Green Paper Shadow Banking (2012), p. 4. 
247
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 27. 
248
  Cf. Pozsar/Adrian/Ashcraft/Boesky, Shadow Banking, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 
No. 458 (July 2010), pp. 11-20. 
249
  On the impact of off-balance-sheet activities on banks returns cf. Calmés/Théoret, Journal of Banking & 
Finance Vol. 34 (July 2010), pp. 1719 ff. 
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achieve an over-averaged yield which avails of an over-averaged attractiveness towards 
(international) investors. Namely, it is not subject to the requirements of Basel III. The 
shadow banking system enables the originating bank to get rid of significant balance risks 
enhancing solvency and minimizing the respective refinancing costs250. In view of the 
awareness that the financial crisis 2008/2009 was (primarily) a crisis of liquidity, a solid 
and diversified refinancing, including an adequate number of stable sources, seems 
essential.251 
 
As the traditional banking system, the typical shadow banking concept is based on 
three actors: The depositor, the debtor and - instead of the regular bank - the shadow bank 
,the finance corporation with non-banking character. In contrast to the traditional banking 
system, the depositors do not allocate their financial means at deposit accounts but in 
money market funds that the respective bank deposits in debts of the shadow banks - the 
credit intermediation is not accomplished under the same “roof” but within a very large 
and often non-transparent chain of entities that - as already mentioned - do not avail of the 
(legal) bank status.252  
 
Probably, the most significant difference between the regular bank segment and the 
shadow bank segment is that the shadow bank system transforms long-term invested 
savings into short-term money market vehicles to enable refinancing day-by-day.253 The 
operative point is that the depositors of the money market funds are high volatile actors 
that are subject to a herd instinct254  and therefore can easily create a bank-run and - 
simultaneously - a couple of false incentives by the actors resulting from the complex 
chain of credit intermediation. 255  In particular, as one consequence of the increasing 
                                                          
250
  The refinancing costs cover that amount of money any borrower is obliged to pay upfront to refinance a 
mortgage. The Refinancing costs are typically similar to the closing costs a borrower has to invest that point 
of time he firstly pays for a real estate object, cf. http://www.investorglossary.com/refinancing-cost.htm. 
251
  Cf. Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 974. 
252
  Cf. Pozsar/Adrian/Ashcraft/Boesky, Shadow Banking, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 
No. 458 (July 2010), p. 11 f. 
253
  Cf. Pozsar/Singh, The Nonbank Nexus and the Shadow Banking System, IMF Working Paper WP No. 
11/289, p.7. 
254
  Herding can be defined as a situation in which traders emulate or follow the actions of other traders, cf. 
Garbaravicius Dierick, ECB-Occasional Paper No. 34 (August 2005), p. 59. 
255
  Cf.  Zimmermann, ZfBW (2/2012), pp. 105, 107. 
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margin pressure resulting from the deregulation of the banking segment and the 
introduction of the Euro, many banks could no longer afford to keep credits in their 
balance sheets instead of selling these credits to institutional investors to finance their 
credit business: The shadow banking system is particularly based on selling money market 
vehicles256 to money market funds.257 
 
1.7.4. ABCP-conduits in particular  
ABCP-conduits is another type of credit intermediation and probably the prototype of 
shadow banking258 . They represent one typical instrument that is used in the shadow 
banking system. They can be defined as SPVs that are sponsored by commercial banks to 
purchase long term assets issuing short term commercial paper and, moreover, due to their 
legal character as SPVs, do not underlay any (legal) capital requirement.259 Against the 
background that ABCPs became the most important mechanism used by banks to legal 
arbitrage260, from January 2004 to July 2007 the ABCP-segment rose from US$ 650 billion 
to US$ 1.3 trillion.261 On the eve of the beginning of the financial crisis of 2008/2009, 
ABCP was the largest money market instrument in the United States - treasury bills only 
covered a business volume of about $940 billion outstanding.262 Typical ABCP-conduit-
activities consist of activities such as originating, sponsoring and deposing. Another 
significant feature of shadow banks is the OTC-supply with equity that is typically offered 
by hedge funds and private equity corporations. 
 
Thus, although shadow banks are neither integrated into the system of state deposit 
guarantee nor into the liquidity support of the central bank, they cover fundamental 
                                                          
256
  Definition Money market cf. Annotation No. 49. 
257
  Cf. G. Gorton, Slapped in the face by the Invisible hand. Banking and the panic of 2007, prepared for 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta´s 2009 Financial Markets Conference: Financial Innovation and Crisis, 
11.-13.05.2009, Version of May/5th/2009, pp. 23 ff. 
258
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 27. 
259
  Vgl. Bengtsson, Shadow banking (2009), introduction. 
260
  As Garbaravicius/Dierick points out, arbitrage strategies do not eliminate all risks and do entail some 
risk of loss or uncertainty about total profits. Iin theory, a transaction that produces risk-free profit by 
exploiting mispriced securities or any other assets while hedging all risk, cf.  Garbaravicius Dierick, ECB-
Occasional Paper No. 34 (August 2005), p. 1 ff. 
261
  Vgl. Bengtsson, Shadow banking (2009), introduction. 
262
  Vgl. Bengtsson, Shadow banking (2009), introduction. 
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functions of a credit institute and the respective risks.263 As hedge funds or private equity-
funds the shadow banking system is not illegal.264 The outsourcing of typical banking 
activities at a SPV is evidently one widespread technique of the grey capital market265. 
Nevertheless, shadow banks do not operate within a legal grey area. They operate on a 
clearly defined legal basis and typically represent high specialized entities that overtake 
certain activities outsourced by regulated banks.266 
 
1.7.5. Effects of shadow banking  
One serious economic effect resulting from the shadow bank segment can be seen in 
the systemic danger by the conduit model. Already the Austrian economist August von 
Hayek, Nobel laureate and important forerunner of the neo-liberalism, hinted at those risks 
resulting from off-balanced activities by the his explanation  
“The characteristic peculiarity of these forms of credit is that they spring up without being 
subject to any central control but once they have come into existence their convertibility 
into other forms of money must be possible if any collapse of credit is to be avoided.267” 
 
Not seldom, all securitisation activities of a credit institute are ascribed to the shadow 
bank as the hidden entity, whereby even the basic securitisation model can cause a 
systemic risk, if the sponsoring bank additionally overtakes a market-maker-function or the 
investors run a higher leveraged strategy that makes them themselves systemically 
significant.268 Namely, the conduit-model269 - a widespread financial mean at the eve of the 
financial crisis 2008/2009 - can cause additional risks up to a bank-run on single or several 
credit institutes, if the sponsoring bank has (typically) given one promise of liquidity.270 
The danger of systemic risk do often  result from shadow banks that offer the processes of 
                                                          
263
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 27. 
264
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 31. 
265
  The grey capital market either covers a market where a product is bought and sold outside of the 
manufacturers authorized channels or the unofficial trading of a company´s shares, usually before they are 
issued in an initial public offering (IPO), cf. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/greymarket.asp. 
266
  Cf.  Zimmermann, ZfBW (2/2012), pp. 105, 106. 
267
  Cf. Hayek, Prices and production (1935), pp. 1 ff. 
268
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 27. 
269
  Cf. Annotation No. 206. 
270
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 27. 
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the credit-, term- and liquidity-transformation by using the support of a network of bilateral 
contracts directly over the financial markets.271  
 
Within the securitization, the regulated credit institutes give up some of their 
traditional credit intermediation functions and act as originators of the credit claims. 
Moreover, they sponsor and consult the SPVs and take the role of investment bankers that 
place the ABS and the CLOs at the market. By doing this, they transfer their liability for 
the quality of the pooled credit placements at the SPV that even transfer the generated risk 
premiums to the holders of the ABS to offer them an incentive to invest in the structured 
securities. Notably, advanced techniques like the before-mentioned ABCP contributed to 
the rise of shadow banking by outsourcing not only the respective risks and liquidity but by 
transferring the cash flow within the pool to a highly specialized management.272 
 
Among the (economic) advantages resulting from the use of shadow banks, one can 
identify typical advantages of specialization and, moreover, regulatory privileges: Those 
external effects must not be internalized, which causes competitive advantages.273 Rudolph 
holds therefore the view that, to keep a satisfactory level of financial stability274 and to 
create a “level playing field”, it seems inevitable to subject shadow banks to a possible 
“run-effect” and a more effective and efficient regulation.275 Probably the  most significant 
disadvantage of shadow banking consists of the less transparency towards investors, 
creditors and state supervision.276  
 
Another disadvantage that is closely linked to the less transparency is the close relation 
of the SPV to the credit institute that is subject to the respective regulation. As one 
consequence, the before-mentioned bank runs can cause fatal chain reactions and a non-
                                                          
271
  Cf. BVB (July 2012). 
272
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 23. 
273
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 27. 
274
  On hedge funds and ist impact to financial stability cf. Garbaravicius/Dierick, ECB-Occasional Paper 
No. 34 (August 2005), pp. 1 ff. 
275
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 27. 
276
  On the question whether the European financial market supervision sets a too strong focus on the speed 
of regulation cf. Paul, ZfBW (1/2013), p. 2 ff. 
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controlled insolvency that can easily spill over to other credit institutes even in foreign 
countries,277 just as it happened after the collapse of the Government sponsored entities 
(GSE) Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac. Referring to the before-mentioned FSB-research, this 
systemic risk is particularly current in times of short liquidity, Notably, the FSB hints at 
the risk that a non-controlled insolvency  could cause systemic risks resulting from the 
close link towards the originating bank and, moreover, the regulatory omission of shadow 
banking, which could cause significant regulatory arbitrage.278  
 
As one consequence of the 2008/2009 bank run, the business model of the unlimited 
transformation of risks, terms and liquidity was suddenly destroyed and the affected credit 
institutes were forced to take those securities collected in the conduits into their own 
balance sheets and to organize the refinancing on their own - in those cases in which this 
did not succeed, they were forced to accept the (direct) support of another credit institute or 
the state.279 As Perotti points out, it became clear that Safe harbor not only undermines 
unsecured claims like deposit insurance and tax claims, but it possibly create external 
effects on markets.280 
  
1.7.6. Regulation of shadow banking  
In principal, one could set the regulatory focus on the legal entities, the fund managers, 
as preferred by the European Commission (“direct approach”), the interfaces between the 
shadow banks and the sponsoring banks (“indirect approach”), the respective shadow 
banking activities or consider an approach that is integrated into a macro-prudential 
regulation, which could be preferable due to the practical challenge to assigning the 
respective risks to one single financial entity or institution.281 A direct regulation like the 
AIFMD does not consider the legal form of the entity which causes a stronger “compliance 
                                                          
277
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 27; annotations on the effiency 
and stability of financial markets cf. Lux, ZfBW „Verdient der Markt noch unser Vertrauen“ (2013), p. 16 ff.; 
Lewis, Accounting Forum Vol. 33 (2009), pp. 114 
278
  Cf. European Commission, Green Paper Shadow Banking (2012), p. 1. 
279
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 25. 
280
  Cf. Perotti, Shadow Banking (2012), p. 3. 
281
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 31. 
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pressure” on many financial institutions and enhance the compliance costs282  of these 
entities.283 
 
As already mentioned, due to increasing economic significance of shadow banking 
even after the financial crisis of 2008/2009, the European Commission produced the Green 
Paper. It is based on a market survey among market participants and capital market 
institutions and reflects the research results of the FSB. As one regulatory objective, the 
Green Paper aims at the containment of regulatory arbitrage into the grey-market to secure 
an adequate supervision of this market and to identify potential systemic risks on time.284 
As the AIFMD, the Green Paper of the European Commission prefers a direct approach 
that considers the special assets instead of the financial product, specifically the investment 
strategy or the business interfaces towards other corporations. Thus, it exclusively defines 
the special assets that shall underlie a European regulation of the shadow banking segment. 
 
Referring to its legal objective, the Green Paper shall enhance the resistivity of the EU-
financial system, secure that any financial operation contributes to economic growth. This 
objective shall be realized by monitoring the current situation at the financial markets, 
submitting recommendations on this topic and, through this, enabling a broad consultation 
of the different stakeholders. 285  Macro-prudentially, it takes one comprehensive 
identification, valuation and conjunction of systemically relevant information. 286  To 
effectively face future systemic risks, there is obviously the need for careful monitoring 
and regulation of the shadow banking system, as the FSB points out.287  
 
Instead of the direct regulation of shadow banking, which is the preferable option of 
the European Commission, the FSB prefers an indirect regulation, focusing on the 
                                                          
282
  Compliance costs cover those payments that result by those measures that have to be taken by a 
corporation to secure the steady fulfillment of all respective legal requirements. 
283
  On the compliance requirements subject to the AIFMD cf. Klebeck/Zollinger, BB (9/2013), p. 459 ff. 
284
  Cf.  Fischer, Kreditwesen (10/2012), pp. 485, 485. 
285
  Cf. European Commission, Green Paper Shadow Banking (2012), p. 2. 
286
  Cf. article 15 statutory order (EU) No. 1092/2010. 
287
  On the future of shadow banking regulation cf. 
http://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/Definition/verbriefung-von-kreditportfolios.html. 
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interfaces between originating banks and shadow banks. Under the conduct of Lord Adair 
Turner, chief of the British supervisory body Financial Service Authority (FSA288) and 
based on the recommendations of the “High-level-task-force”, the FSB recommends an 
indirect regulation basing on a three-step-concept:289  
 
Primarily, the nature and the total transaction volume of the shadow banking activities 
shall be monitored (“Micro-Mapping”); secondly, the most significant risk factors for 
financial stability shall be focused, notably those risks resulting from the risk-, term- and 
stability transformation - besides the last mentioned risks, the FSB regards the regulation 
arbitrage as another symptom of shadow banking; thirdly, the possible systemic crises that 
probably result from the before-mentioned risks and the regulatory arbitrage shall be 
identified. In addition, the (additional) yield, the respective indicators for the “free lunch”, 
the relations with the established banking system and the growth of the shadow banking 
activities shall be disclosed (enhanced disclosure). 
 
According to the regulatory conception of the FSB there are five principles that should 
be mandatory for any regulation of the shadow banking segment. 290  Primarily, any 
regulatory measure should carefully designed to target the externalities and risks of the 
shadow banking system (“Focus”); secondly, any regulatory measure should be 
proportional to the risks shadow banking poses to the financial system (“Proportionality”); 
thirdly, any regulatory measure should be forward-looking and adaptable to emerging risks 
(“forward-looking and adaptable”); fourthly, any regulatory measure should designed and 
effectively implemented (“effectiveness”); fifthly, the regulators should regularly assess 
the effectiveness of their regulatory measures after implementation and make adjustments 
to improve them as necessary in the light of experience (“assessment and review”).  
 
                                                          
288
  Internet Presence: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/. 
289
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 31 f. 
290
  Cf. FSB, Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation (2011), published under 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111027a.pdf 
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In October 2011, the FSB released recommendations on regulatory measures to be 
examined by authorities that are meanwhile partially implemented. As indirect approach, 
these recommendations face the regulation of MMF, other Shadow banking activities and 
securities- and pension-transactions.  
 
According to the commentary of the True-Sales-Initiative (TSI) that was released in 
May 2012, ABS do not correspond to those features that are typically associated with the 
before-defined terminus shadow banking.291 The already existing regulation was sufficient 
to subject ABCP-conduit-activities of the regulated institutions (banks, funds, assurance 
companies) to the supervision of the responsible authorities. In addition, the TSI 
emphasizes that each direct regulation that does not focus CRD II292- and CRD IV-
activities would bear the risk of further frictions in the financial market regulation. 
Furthermore, the TSI highlights that notably ABCP-conduits do not accomplish term- and 
liquidity-transformations since the sponsoring banks place liquidity lines whose risk is 
already covered by CDR II and CRD IV.  
   
1.7.7. Consequences of a shadow banking regulation  
Finally, the before-mentioned regulatory approaches shall be accessed. In comparison, 
it is obvious that any direct regulation can cause evade reactions and measures of legal 
arbitration.  Thus, the AIFMD that focuses the managers instead of the investment strategy 
or the financial product can back up the before-mentioned expansion of the shadow 
banking system. Consequently, any direct regulation could crystallize as totally ineffective 
                                                          
291
  On the legal character of True-Sale-ABS-transactions cf. Lackhoff, Kreditwesen (10/2012), pp. 503 ff.;  
292
  On September/16th/2009 the European Council and the European Parliament officially released the 
European draft 2009/111/EG which, in combination with the European draft 2009/27/EG and 2009/83/EG, 
represents the second legal package of measures to secure financial solidity of banks and security firms. This 
package of measures aims at the steering of large credits, the quality of equity, the steering of liquidity risks 
and the risk management of securitised products. For internationally operating bank groups, “supervisory 
colleges” became mandatory. These requirements were part of those measures taken by the European 
Commission as a response to the financial crisis 2008/2009 and to strengthen the regulatory frame in those 
segments that are probably responsible for the financial crisis. These amendments must transformed into 
national law until October/31st/2010. The before-mentioned drafts are available under http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:302:0097:01:DE:HTML; http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=493338%3Acs&lang=de&list=493338%3Acs%2C&pos=1&page=1&nbl=1&p
gs=10&hwords=&checktexte=checkbox&visu=; http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=498875:cs&lang=en&list=498875:cs,&pos=1&page=1&nbl=1&pgs=10&hwor
ds=. 
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should the total business volume of the shadow banking segment, as it already happened in 
the United States, exceeds the business volume of the regular banking segment.  
 
One proportional legal approach should secure that it covers the majority of financial 
institutions and must not initialize a “race to the bottom” that negatively affects the public 
wealth in the European Union. The before-mentioned business volume of the shadow 
banking segment underlines the systemic meaning of this banking model and the need for a 
careful and proportional approach: The stronger the European Union controls regular 
banks, that stronger is their incentive to circumvent the legal supervision and the stronger 
the risk of another financial crisis in the future - a drying shrinkage of the shadow banking 
segment by a relentless regulation could accelerate the “vicious circle” of financial market 
regulation.293 A superficial effective regulation neglecting the long-term economic effects 
can easily turn into a boomerang. 
 
In particular, the attempt of the European Commission to define all shadow banking 
entities exclusively induces the challenge to find clear features of the already regulated 
banks and financial institutions without shadow banking character, which could finally 
result in regulatory omissions - this could make another supervision authority (“shadow 
banking regulatory board”) inevitable.294 
 
All in all, an indirect approach, as is recommended by the Commission “Neue 
Finanzarchitektur,” seems preferable since it could contribute to keeping the diversity of 
financial business models and, moreover, to different risk strategies and different group of 
customers: Diversity can be seen as one essential factor to stabilize a financial system as a 
whole. 295  If all banks and shadow banks underlie the same regulatory approach and 
therefore the same legal restrictions, this regulation could easily create a dangerous pro-
                                                          
293
  Cf. http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken/schattenbanken-die-67-billionen-dollar-
branche/7407732.html. 
294
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 35. 
295
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 36. 
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cyclical crisis-amplifier.296  Should another shock happen to the financial markets, this 
could induce the necessity of suitable reactions like “fire sales297” - not one for the banks 
but also for any equally regulated financial institution.298 Under those circumstances, it 
could be advantageous if there still was a “White knight299”: „As dark as they are often 
portrayed, shadow banks may now play the role of white knights for lenders trying to 
offload risky assets to comply with  European regulatory capital targets by the middle of 
2012.“300 
 
Notably the securitisation-model as one widespread manifestation of shadow banking 
could take on increasing importance in the future corporate financing since the 
strengthened regulation of the financial segment since the financial crisis of 2008/2009 
causes increasing costs to many credit institutions that can generally minimized by the 
outsourcing of credit claims.301 Nevertheless, Michael Barnier as the reigning responsible 
EU-Commissioner for the single European Market prefers to aggravate the rules on the 
outsourcing of financial transactions and announced a regulatory directive on shadow 
banking for 2013302.303  
 
In contrast, the German commission “Neue Finanzarchitektur304” under the patronage 
of Ottmar Issing, former chairman of the German Bundesbank, prefers a mandatory charge 
for shadow banks that could minimize the incentive for the outsourcing of risks.305 “Neue 
                                                          
296
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 36. 
297
  In general, the expression „fire sales“ is a synonym for selling goods at heavily discounted prices.  In the 
context of the financial markets, it refers to securities that are trading well below their intrinsic value, such as 
during prolonged bear markets, cf.  http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/firesale.asp. 
298
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 36. 
299
  In the context of the financial market law, a white knight is corporation that acquires another 
corporation on the verge of being taken over by forces deemed undesirable by company officials, cf. 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/whiteknight.asp. 
300
  Cp. Halstrick, Tighter Bank Rules (2011). 
301
  Cf. Rudolph, in: Bortenlänger, Aktie und Kapitalmarkt (2013), pp. 19, 23. 
302
  Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/committees/#maincontentSec2. 
303
  Cf. http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken/schattenbanken-die-67-billionen-dollar-
branche/7407732.html 
304
  Against the background of the financial crisis of 2008/2009, the „Neue Finanzarchitektur“-Commission 
was founded in October 2008 under the patronage of reigning German chancellor, Angela Merkel, to submit 
propositions on defeating that crisis and to prevent similar crisis in the future. The Commission is  well 
known as Issing-Commission. 
305
  On the new international architecture of finance Cf.  Dombret/Engelen, Kreditwesen (22/2012), p. 1156 
ff. 
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Finanzarchitektur” recommends that the ECB shall monitor and access all the respective 
risks. 306  Thereby, Issing prefers an indirect approach due to frictions concerning the 
enforcement of a direct regulation and, moreover, due to the problem that shadow banking 
will increase in the future because it seems to be able to develop innovative special 
solutions in the non-regulated financial segment, and a regulatory arbitrage can contribute 
to the public wealth. A modern Europe without any financial innovations that significantly 
contribute to economic growth and public wealth is hardly imaginable - notably the 
resulting credit volume, the climatic change and the pension funds would suffer by an 
interdiction of securitisations.  
 
Whether any of the before-mentioned recommendations succeed, seems very 
questionable since, on the one hand, dominant financial centers like those in the United 
States or in the United Kingdom already announced determined resistivity against any 
shadow bank regulation and, on the other hand, is seems very ambitious to target some 
shadow banks since these entities transferred their business to tax havens like the Cayman 
Islands.307 Notably an exclusive definition of the shadow bank entities as it is driven in the 
Green Paper of the European Commission would always bear the risk of regulatory 
omission. 
 
Namely, Article 5 of the European directive 2011/89/EU, released on 16 November 
2011, on the amendment of the directives 98/78/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2006/48/EC and 
2009/138/EC concerning additional supervision of financial corporations that belong to a 
conglomerate (financial directive of the European Union) requires the European 
Commission to weigh up whether the scope of the directive shall expanded to those 
corporations such as SPVs that, so far, do not underlay any financial market supervision.308 
The responsible European supervisory bodies prefer a wider scope of the before-mentioned 
                                                          
306
  Cf. http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken/schattenbanken-die-67-billionen-dollar-
branche/7407732.html. 
307
  Cf. http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken/schattenbanken-die-67-billionen-dollar-
branche/7407732.html. 
308
  Cf. http://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/Archiv/16281/verbriefung-von-kreditportfolios-v9.html. 
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directive since SPVs neither underlay any sectoral reporting requirements.309 Thus, further 
regulation of shadow banking activities is expected at the European level. 
 
1.7.8. Statement and interim result  
All in all, it is obviously a too short perspective to only focus on the (possible) 
negative effects of shadow banking and, in particular, the economic contribution of hedge 
funds instead of their positive contribution towards market efficiency and public wealth. 
Primarily, as one consequence of the enormous acceleration resulting from the economic 
globalization, the global disequilibria of commerce notably between the industrial 
countries and the emerging countries and the increasing economic pressure  resulting from 
the digitalization of daily life, any legislation of hedge funds should consider that the 
financial crisis of 2008/2009 was primarily a crisis of liquidity, and that the steady supply 
is significant for continual economic growth. Thus, any too strong regulation could have 
the effect that financial innovations become less attractive or nipped in the bud. An entity 
that does not underlay the respective legal requirements on equity and supervision may 
cause higher risks than any regulated bank. But these risks could probably be contained 
more effectively by a legal approach that focuses the interfaces towards other (regulated) 
credit institutes instead of facing the legal entities itself.  
 
As Walter, the former chief economist of the Deutsche Bank-group (1990-2009) points 
out, an adequate and satisfactory response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009 should 
reduce interdependencies and complexity between the financial market participants: 
Against the background that the (unexpected) insolvency of a big and strongly networked 
credit institute could easily affect other (economically sane) market players - as it revealed 
by the phenomena of contagion310 -, it seems economically reasonable, legally preferable 
and  inevitable to take legal measures to isolate those “candidates” from the other market 
participants.311 Under this provision the mere transaction volume of a financial corporation 
                                                          
309
  Cf. http://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/Archiv/16281/verbriefung-von-kreditportfolios-v9.html. 
310
  On the phenomena of contagion cf. Systemic risks of insufficient equity (1.2.2.) and Annotation No. 
110. 
311
  Cf. Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 975. 
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does not have to be a “source of fear” any longer.312  In view of this awareness, any 
adequate legal response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009 should neither focus the entity, 
as the AIFMD (currently) does, or the mere (financial) business volume, but it should try 
to disentangle the infrastructure of financial market participants.313 Therefore, any indirect 
approach that focuses on the interfaces between the financial market participants seems 
more preferable than the direct approach driven by the AIFMD. Under the provision of a 
stronger entanglement of the market infrastructure, hedge funds can perform one 
significant contribution to market efficiency because they do not underline the general 
equity requirements.314 
 
Under the before-mentioned provision of a stronger entanglement, a stronger 
containment against the realization of systemic risks can be accomplished through a good 
Corporate Governance that sets on clearly distinguished corporate structures particularly of 
financial concerns, intervention of the supervisory board in the case of emergency 
(restructuring, outsourcing of single concern departments, steady survey of the demands 
and obligations of shareholders), contingent capital arrangements (capital supply even 
under the conditions of a difficult market situation, transformation of debt securities into 
adherent equity), stabilizing funds, authorization for early intervention of the supervisory 
board) and internationally directed insolvency regimes following the Winding Up-directive 
of the European Commission and the recommendations of the UN-Commission on 
International Trade Law.315 
 
1.8.  Policy of low interests  
1.8.1.  Expansionary monetary policy 
 Furthermore, the policy of low interest that was run by the Federal Reserve can be 
identified as another reason for the recent financial crisis. On the one hand, low interest 
can be seen as a strong stimulus for the private consumer. Low interest is essential for a 
                                                          
312
  Cf. Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 975. 
313
  Cf. Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 975. 
314
  Cf.  Grabaravicius Dierick, ECB-Occasional Paper No. 34 (August 2005), pp. 1 ff.; Kahan/Rock, Law 
Review (May 2007), pp 1 ff. 
315
  Cf. Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 975 f. 
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strong domestic demand that is one significant condition of a high and sustainable 
employment level in the private economy. On the other hand, it led to an increase in the 
general demand for credit and set the wrong incentives to consumers who forgot their real 
solvency. As the FCIC points out, the credit lenders allowed credits although they knew 
that the borrowers could not afford these financial items and that it could cause dramatic 
losses by the depositors of mortgages.316 
 
Policy of low interest represents a business model that can be called the “Expansionary 
monetary policy”. Also the Federal Reserve runs a business model that stands for the 
advancing of large amounts of credit at very low rates.317 That Expansionary monetary 
policy decreases an appreciation for consumer goods and results in the danger of inflation. 
Inflation is not only a bracket for the general economic development but also an attack on 
the deposits of lower-income groups that are normally more strongly affected by losses of 
monetary value than higher income groups. In addition, any inflation has the effect that a 
person’s debts decrease more quickly. However, a rapid decrease in debts can also affect 
the volume of someone’s debts. 
 
The expansionary monetary policy was accompanied by a general undercut of 
standards. This undercut of standards significantly resulted from the widespread „ratings 
shopping“ by issuers and investment banks, which weakened the rating standards because 
the CRAs who provided the most favorable ratings got more business.318 Moreover, the 
distribution of mortgage loans and mortgage securitised bonds („decline of mortgage-
underwriting standards319“) accelerated the contagiosity: As the real estate prices declined 
and the mortgage lenders got into delay of payment, the lights on Wall Street began to 
shade.320 The creditors often ignored the solvency of their debtors and many participants of 
                                                          
316
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 12. 
317
  On the policy of low interests cf. Second Chapter, 1.1. 
318
  Cf. Levin-Report (2011), p. 31. 
319
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 149, 393; Under the federal securities law, 
particularly the investment banks acted as an underwriter or placement agent liable for any material 
misrepresentations or omissions of material facts made in connection with a solicitation or sale of a 
security to an investor. Until the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2008/2009, they sold RMBS 
securities and CDOs to large institutional investors. cf. Levin-Report (2011), p. 33. 
320
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 22 f., 25 f., 39 f., 127 ff., 137 f. 
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the securitisation system spent too much trust in the rapid risk transfer - as one 
consequence, it came to enormous losses that affected the whole system as soon as the 
debtors stopped fulfilling their credit obligations - despite many warnings the Federal 
Reserve also did not take the necessary measures.321 Many mortgage lenders set the level 
so low that the lenders gave blind trust to the qualification of the borrower while ignoring 
his solvency. Namely, the rating agencies let the markets blow up as the risky securitised 
instruments could not have been distributed without cachet - without the rating agencies 
the financial crisis would not have taken place.322 
 
In particular, concerning the issue as to whether the public housing policy was one 
major condition of the crisis, the FCIC came to the result that, namely, the former US-
presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush set ambitious objections to promote houses of 
one´s own. At the beginning, the Community Reinvestment Act 1977 (CRA 1977323)  
contained the widespread „Redlining“ - a practice that rejected credit requests without 
considering the real solvency of the applicant - and committed the respective financial 
institutes to loan those municipal bodies, to invest in their municipal development and to 
offer (public) services, from whom they accepted financial deposits. All of this happened 
in compliance with the bank´s security and honest business practices.324  
 
 
The FCIC does not consider the CRA 1977 as an essential factor as far as the 
disposition of second-rate credits is concerned. Many lenders of second-rate credits were 
not subject to the CRA 1977 and, moreover, investigations have shown that only 6% of the 
„high-cost-credits“ - representative for second-rate credits - had a relationship to the CRA 
1977 at all. Among those lenders that granted credits subject to the CRA-legislation, the 
probability of insolvency was 50% smaller than among those lenders who were not subject 
to the CRA. As the Report points out, the actual actions undertaken under the CRA-
                                                          
321
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 13. 
322
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 14. 
323
  The CRA was passed by the US Congress in 1977 (12 U.S.C. 2901) to encourage banks to make loans 
in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, cf. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 
http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/history.htm, requested February/18th/2013. 
324
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 27 f. 
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legislation was far beyond the real requirements.325 Concerning the public housing policy, 
the FCIC concludes that the US-government failed to grant credits to those families that 
had no access to the financial markets - in particular, because the Federal Reserve and 
other financial supervision bodies failed to contain irresponsible credit lending.326  
 
1.8.2. Liar loans  
Since 2000 the abovementioned Expansionary monetary policy that was run by the 
Federal Reserve had already begun with the Carter (1977-1981) and Clinton (1993-2001) 
administrations and was then supported by the Bush administration (2001-2009).It was 
originally aimed at a widening of the supply of private homes for lower-income groups. In 
particular, the relaxing of mortgage standards made house purchases also possible for 
families that had previously been considered to be not sufficiently creditworthy to qualify 
for a mortgage; that increased the demand for real estate and prices rose. 327  The 
Expansionary monetary policy aimed at a stronger social integration of those income 
brackets and provoked the widespread assumption that everyone can afford almost 
everything. Nevertheless, it is also seen because of a rapidly increasing demand for 
securitised mortgages that began with the new millennium and which led to many 
mortgage banks being less-careful with assessments of the borrowers and to the 
abandonment of careful documentation.328 Retrospectively, it is assumed that many credits 
were obtained by fraud; thus these credits are called liar loans.329,330 
 
As the FCIC points out, after the refinancing boom, the originators were in need of 
product innovations that could make expensive homes more affordable to still-eager 
borrowers: The solution consisted in riskier, more aggressive, mortgage products that 
brought higher yields for investors but correspondingly greater risks for borrowers.331 The 
                                                          
325
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 18. 
326
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 25, 27 f., 31 ff. 
327
  Hull, Risk Management (2010), p. 333. 
328
  Kübler in Festschrift für Schwark (2009) p. 499, 501. 
329
  “Liar Loans” can be defined as loans where the borrower lies on the application form, cf. Hull, Risk 
Management (2010), p. 522. 
330
  Kübler in Festschrift für Schwark (2009) p. 499, 501. 
331
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 132. 
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Center for Responsible Lending332 warned that holding a subprime loan could become 
something of a high-stakes wager.333 Thus, subprime mortgages rose from 8% of mortgage 
originations in 2003 to 20% in 2005.334 About 70% of subprime borrowers used hybrid 
ARMs whose low “teaser” rate lasts for the first two or three years, and then adjusts 
periodically thereafter. 335  Lenders qualified borrowers at low teaser rates, with little 
thought to what might happen when rates reset. Primarily because from 2000 to 2007 about 
70% of subprime loans were Hybrid ARMs, Hybrid ARMs became the workhorses of the 
subprime securitisation market.336  
  
Apart from the “liar loans”, the „teasers“ also served as another significant cause for 
the financial crisis of 2008/2009. „Teasers“ can be defined as ARMs with higher re-setting 
interest rates. As the FCIC points out, after the refinancing boom, the originators were in 
need for product innovations that could make expensive homes more affordable to still-
eager borrowers: The solution consisted of riskier, more aggressive, mortgage products 
that brought higher yields for investors but correspondingly greater risks for borrowers.337 
Against this background, the Center for Responsible Lending warned that holding a 
subprime loan could become something of a high-stakes wager. 338  Thus, subprime 
mortgages rose from 8% of mortgage originations in 2003 to 20% in 2005.339 About 70% 
of subprime borrowers used hybrid ARMs. .340   
 
 
Moreover, as the FCIC highlights, the „securitisation machine“ generated mortgage 
products such as NINJA-loans. 341  Loans of that kind are characterized by negative 
amortization successively terminating the borrower’s equity.342  Soon there were many 
different kinds of mortgages available on the market, confounding consumers who did not 
                                                          
332
  http://www.responsiblelending.org/, requested on February/19th/2013. 
333
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 132. 
334
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 132. 
335
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 132. 
336
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 134; Levin/Coburn, Financial crisis (2011, p. 28. 
337
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 132. 
338
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 132. 
339
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 132. 
340
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 134. 
341
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 34. 
342
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 34. 
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examine the fine print, baffling conscientious borrowers who tried to puzzle out their 
implications, and opening the door for those who wanted in on the action.343 
 
1.8.3. The asset bubble  
The Expansionary monetary policy is directly based on the already-mentioned 
securitisation of risks. 344  The Expansionary monetary policy ended with the already-
mentioned burst of the speculative bubble. In its very beginning, this bubble did not result 
from the already-mentioned subprime credits but from the flood of savings from rapidly 
growing international emerging markets that dropped down the level of interest in the 
United States.345  Retrospectively, it could have been prevented by a brief look at the 
structure of real estate credits in France: According to financial experts at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the structure of French real estate credits is relatively sound 
because the big French credit institutes, such as Crédit Agricole, predominantly grant these 
credits at a fixed interest rate instead of granting mortgage loans on the model of Fannie 
Mae346 and Freddy Mac.347,348 
 
Concerning the question as to whether an excess of liquidity contributed to the 
outbreak of the financial crisis, the FCIC points out that low interests, widespread easily 
available capital and international depositors that preferred an investment in the United 
States were conditions for the rise of the asset bubble.349 According to the FCIC´s point of 
view the US Government ignored that risk for quite a long time and was little prepared for 
the crisis. The US Government had not developed any strategic plan for the case of the 
crisis and reacted contradictorily - with the result of a widespread insecurity and panic at 
the financial markets.350 As further causes, the FCIC adds the enormous growth of public 
debt between 1978 and 2007 and, moreover, the incline of the profit quote of the private 
                                                          
343
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 34. 
344
  Cf. First Chapter, 2.2. 
345
  Cf. Bill Thomas, Member of the Inquiry Commission of the Federal Reserve, N.N., Finanzkrise, 
Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 5/2011, pp.12 (12). 
346
  Cf. First Chapter, 1.1. 
347
  Ibid.  
348
  Wüpper, DIE WELT (July/30th/2011), p. 20. 
349
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 25. 
350
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 21 f., 24 f. 
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earnings in the United States. Nevertheless, the FCIC concludes that a possible surplus of 
liquidity must not necessarily cause a financial crisis. The essential causes of that crisis 
consisted in the failure to control effectively the excesses at the mortgage and financial 
markets. Indeed the availability of affordable capital is one essential condition of economic 
expansion and growth if the respective assets flow into productive channels.351 
 
1.9. Financial incentives for an expanding consumption  
A low interest rate always conveys a strong incentive to purchase consumer goods one 
normally cannot afford or pay for immediately. Thus, during the global economic 
recession, many firms and warehouses offered consumer credits at an interest rate of 0%. 
This extrinsic incentive has the effect that many consumers do not estimate their future 
financial solvency carefully enough, not considering an unexpected incident such as the 
loss of their job. Their insolvency means the loss of their financial freedom for several 
years and possibly a dependence on public resources.  
 
Against the abovementioned background, wrongfully set incentives that result from 
low interest rates do not create a welfare surplus for anyone, neither for the firm that sells 
consumer goods on a credit basis nor for the concerned consumer, the community of tax 
payers and the general public. It only contributes to the credit institutes that profit from a 
speedier circulation of money. As is shown by the recent financial crisis, this effect is only 
a short-term effect that is more than neutralised if the systemic risk realises that the credit 
granting institute cannot fulfil its obligations towards depositors that result from the 
abovementioned maturity transformation. As it is demonstrated in the case of Lehman 
Brothers,352 the burst of the credit bubble that resulted from the Expansionary monetary 
policy and the low interest rates in particular can consequently cause the collapse of the 
concerned credit institute if an adequate CDS does not exist.  
 
                                                          
351
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 17. 
352
  Cf. First Chapter, 1.2. and 2.2. 
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1.10. Lack of self-restraint  
 Among other core reasons, a widespread lack of self-restraint among financial 
managers and directors refers directly to the already-mentioned353 falsely set (extrinsic) 
incentives that result in a false structure of remuneration, and in the widespread faith in an 
unlimited economic growth and in the already-discussed worldwide separation of risks and 
the lack of personal liability of managers. 
 
From the author´s perspective individual remuneration at the eve of the financial crisis 
2008/2009 was one essential but not the sole crisis cause.354 This objection cannot be 
dismissed completely because in many corporations there is indeed a principal pressure 
that comes from the shareholders as the proprietors of the corporation who decide on the 
investment and accumulation of their capital, often on the basis of the portfolio strategy of 
the managers. The decision as to whether these managers run a sustainable or speculative 
portfolio strategy and even the decision as to the kind of extrinsic incentives is 
predominantly drawn by the association of proprietors, not by the portfolio managers 
themselves. Thus, one cannot identify the widespread lack of self-restraint as a core reason.  
 
1.11. Insufficient transparency of financial products  
 Moreover, the recent financial crisis also resulted from the often insufficient 
transparency of financial products and financial risks. It can be identified as the initial 
point of the realisation of systemic risks. The transnational securitisation of risks 
specifically led to a totally insufficient transparency of financial products. If one cannot 
understand a product, one cannot estimate its risks and cannot take measures to develop 
safeguarding strategies for the case that these risks are unforeseeably realised. John 
Moulton, the head of the private equity355 firm Alchemy Partners, made the observation 
that many private equity firms “bought all this rubbish themselves, most of which their 
senior managers did not understand, and they have been left holding the baby with 
unsalable, overpriced, over-enthusiastic debt.” In other words: Many banks allowed a vast 
                                                          
353
  Cf. second Chapter, 1.3. 
354
  Cf. Second Chapter Annotation 1.4. 
355
  For a further discussion on the regulation of private equity see Thomsen, EBOR 10:1/2009, pp. 97 ff. 
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amount of money to be gambled on products which their senior managers did not 
understand.356 Thus, hardly anyone knew or could calculate the risk profile associated with 
securitised products such as CDOs.357 
 
In particular, the obscurity of CDOs results from the technique of packaging credit 
risks: Several classes of securities are created from a portfolio of bonds and there are rules 
for determining how defaults are allocated to classes.358 The CDOs build, meanwhile, a 
strong industrial sector of the capital market where selected assets are bundled, which can 
be compared with the factoring in the individual business: The risk that the creditor cannot 
repay his loan is transferred to the capital market.359 On the one hand, a securitisation as it 
happened in the case of the CDOs can contribute to an efficient (global) contribution of 
risks and to the stabilisation of a global financial system by diminishing the concentration 
of risks in the banking sector and distributing those risks more widely.360 On the other 
hand, SIVs enable credit institutes to conduct off-balance sheet financing for their 
securitised debt.361 It is noteworthy that SIVs were used in the same way as conduits. 
Finally, the widespread use of these financial innovations minimised the transparency of 
financial products, which is essential to an effective protection of the financial consumer. 
 
The rise of securitised financial products is also to be seen in view of the First Basel 
Capital Accord (Basel I)362 that required banks to hold specified amounts of capital in 
reserve against loans made in certain broad categories.363 As one consequence of the Basel 
I capital requirements, many American banks began to develop a new kind of mortgage 
loan that follows this principle to originate the loans and then (immediately) sell them to 
other banks and insurances, all over the world.  
                                                          
356
  McIlroy in Straus, future of banking (2009), pp. 119, 123. 
357
  McIlroy in Straus, future of banking (2009), pp. 119, 119. 
358
  Lee/Lee, Finance (2006), p. 59. 
359
  Volkart, Corporate Finance (2008), pp. 784, 948. 
360
  McIlroy in Straus, future of banking (2009), pp. 119, 124. 
361
  Ibid. 
362
  For further information on the Basel Capital Accord see Arnold/Boos, Die Bank 2001, pp. 712-715; 
Boos/Schulte-Mattler, Die Bank 2001, pp. 346-354; Elsas/Krahnen, Die Bank 1999, pp. 298-304; 
Enrich/Paletta, The Wall Street Journal (July/27/2010), p. 19; Osman/Riecke/Afhüppe, 
HANDELSBLATT (July/28th/2010), pp. 34-35; Schmidt, BB 2011, pp. 105-109. 
363
  For the latest information on the capital requirements under the regime of “Basel 3” see Schmidt, BB 
2011, pp. 105-109. 
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Many credit institutes purchased the abovementioned financial products. They failed to 
implement an adequate risk management in time to identify their risks, and they did not 
take measures to minimise their consequences before they were realised. As a 
consequence, the recent financial crisis hit these credit institutes dramatically. In the 
author´s point of view it was particularly the commingling of higher-rated debt in financial 
innovations such as CDOs that created a significant risk of infection and distress.364 
Normally, the (national) central banks take the responsibility not only to issue the currency 
but also to set and to manage the monetary policy.365 In the event of the financial crisis 
2008/2009 they seemed to be unable to immediately give a sufficient answer.366  
 
2. Provisional comments  
Against the abovementioned background, one has to realise that the effect of a 
regulatory framework depends on the level of detail. What does this mean for the supposed 
core reasons of the recent financial crisis? It means that a detailed and careful analysis is 
also always a retrospective analysis. Those core reasons that were really crucial for a 
financial crisis in the past must not be that crucial in the future. They convey one general 
conclusion that the origin of a financial crisis that appeared in the past that does not have to 
be valid in the future among other global circumstances.367 As already mentioned, the rapid 
and long-lasting growth of the Chinese economy can be identified as one fundamental 
symptom that global circumstances can turn rapidly. In this context, one could add the 
global disequilibrium of currency and commerce and the unexpected Euro crisis. As a 
conclusion, one has to consider that the supposed core reasons do not offer any claim for 
universal validity. To establish a proportional and sustainable regulatory framework, they 
have to be considered among the presently foreseeable economic and financial 
circumstances. They also must not neglect the global economic development that one can 
foresee for the future.  
                                                          
364
  Cf. First Chapter, 1.4. and Second Chapter, 1.1.; cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation 
(2010), pp. 179 (198). 
365
  Lee/Lee, Encyclopedia of Finance (2006), p. 54. 
366
  Cf. First Chapter, 3; on the future role of the central banks as the lender of last resort cf. Walker, in: The 
Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (199 f.). 
367
  On the consequences of uncertainty for regulation: Cf. Pacces, ECFR (2010), pp. 479 ff. 
77 
 
The European Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) -  
an appropriate approach to the global financial crisis? 
 
77 
 
Third Chapter -  
REQUIREMENTS OF AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE 
TO THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS  
 
1. Compulsory international standards on capital, supervision and 
transparency 
1.1.  Principle of proportionality 
 Moreover, the FCIC concludes that the financial crisis resulted from an undercut of 
standards. It considers the break-down of financial markets stability as the result of a 
widespread failure of financial regulation and supervision.368 In view of this awareness, the 
European Commission made a proposal for a possible future regulation of the AIF segment 
that covers the activities of hedge funds and private equity - one possible conclusion of the 
recent financial crisis? This approach does not apply to the funds as such but to the 
management function. According to the AIFMD, the managers of the funds have to 
register. Furthermore, it provides a minimum level of capital to contain excessive leverage, 
requirements to the fund manager’s remuneration and further general provisions on risk 
management, liquidity management, asset valuation, conflicts of interest and other 
business conduct requirements. Because this directive caused a controversial discussion at 
the European Council, our focus is on the requirements of an appropriate, sustainable and 
proportional regulatory framework that respects the various contents of economic freedom 
that are granted in the Lisbon Contract.369 
 
The Lisbon Contract is mandatory among the current 28 European Member States and 
the EU and came into force on 1 December 2009, representing a new legitimacy basis for 
this supranational European subject community. With its enforcement, the Treaty on the 
                                                          
368
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 7. 
369
  For further information on the Lisbon Contract see Nowak, Lissabon (2011), p. 73-81. 
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functioning of the EU (TFEU 370 ) was put into force. Moreover, those (economic) 
guarantees of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR371) obtained the status 
of real, basic rights. For instance, in the currently discussed context this has the effect that 
each market participant can directly refer to the guarantee of free entrepreneurship (Article 
16 ECFR) and the guarantee of private property (Article 17 ECFR) if she/he holds the view 
that she/he is hurt by a legal act of the European Commission, the European Council or 
even the European Parliament. The respective guarantees convey the status to claim 
directly. 
 
Any sustainable response that is given for the recent financial crisis should correspond 
to the principle of proportionality. 372  Why should one choose a legal regulation if a 
corporate governance regulation has the same effect on the financial market participants 
but causes less welfare losses? 373  It is the essential objective of a financial market 
regulation to protect the financial market participants against the realisation of systemic 
risks. It should not be an objective of a financial market regulation to give the state 
authorities another occasion to demonstrate their power and impact. If there is no necessity 
for a state regulation, it is necessary to abstain from a state regulation. This should also be 
respected by the European Commission, which tries to face the financial crisis by the 
AIFMD, which was set into effect on 11 November 2010. Legally, the principle of 
proportionality is one constitutional and economic essential element of the European 
Contract (Article 5 paragraph 4 of the TFEU) and of the constitution of almost every 
European Member State. It says that any regulation of an economic behaviour that is 
always curtailing private freedom must correspond with the basic economic rights. It must 
be suitable, necessary and adequate to reach the overriding aim of the regulation. However, 
the principle of proportionality is not only a legal requirement.  
 
                                                          
370
  Consolidated version of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the 
European Union, C 115/47, dated May/9th/2008. 
371
  European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR), Official Journal of the European Communities 2007 
C 303, P. 1. 
372
  Cf. third chapter, 1.1. 
373
  On Corporate Governance and the new hedge fund activism cf. Briggs, Journal of Corporate Law 
(2007),  pp. 681 ff. 
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Following Walker, the financial supervisory authorities must consider that any 
overreaction to the recent financial crisis could have the effect of unnecessarily limiting 
future innovation and welfare benefits while possibly overextending the duration and depth 
of the crisis with unnecessary measures that would only restrict liquidity,374 credit creation 
and supply.375 In view of the perpetual risk of over-regulation, any regulation should align 
not only regulatory incentives but also economic incentives.376 To ensure that the “breath” 
of a corporation as the elementary condition for the “breath” of each national economy is 
not restricted under severe economic conditions, each regulation must correspond to the 
principle of proportionality. All in all, the governmental entities should take care to 
carefully regulate the investment segment and the operational activities of hedge funds 
since these entities seem indispensible for a satisfactory liquidity of many segments of the 
real economy.377   
 
1.2. Principle of sustainability  
The abovementioned principle of proportionality as one legal requirement of a 
sufficient response to the recent financial crisis is an almost natural requirement and finds 
its expression in the principle of sustainability.378 This sophisticated principle goes back to 
the final Report of the Brundtland-Commission of 1987 (Brundtland-Report 379 ) and 
demands a development corresponding with the requirements of the present generation 
without neglecting the possibilities of the future generation to satisfy its requirements.380 
The economical, ecological, social and cultural development shall correspond with the 
steady preservation of the conditions of human existence.381 Nobody shall use anything 
that is essential for our daily life in a manner which destroys its source. Each legal measure 
should respect the prohibition of disproportionate measures in order not to destroy 
something that is steadily necessary for the functionality of a civil society, such as a steady 
                                                          
374
  The liquidity of a corporation that is expressed by its cash flow refers to the ease and quickness of 
converting money to cash, cf. Lee/Lee, Encyclopedia of Finance (2006), p. 167; Walker, BJIBF 
(11/2007), pp. 567 ff. 
375
  Cf.Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (195 ff., 202 ff.). 
376
  McIlroy in Straus, Future of Banking (2009), pp. 119, 120. 
377
  Definition of the Real Economy cf. Annotation No. 39. 
378
  On the meaning of the sustainability principle for re-organising economy in the post-financial crisis-age 
cf. Faxon/Köhler/Michie/Oughton, Cambridge Journal of Economics Vol. 37 (2013), pp. 187 ff. 
379
  Cf. Brundtland-Report (1987), bullets No. 72 ff. 
380
  Cf. Käller, in: Schwarze, Europarecht (2012), AEUV, Article 11, bullet No. 14. 
381
  Cf. Käller, in: Schwarze, Europarecht (2012), AEUV, Article 11, bullet No. 14. 
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credit supply for the real economy. By defining these requirements, the principle of 
sustainability primarily aims at the means of livelihood for future generations.  Since the 
taking effect of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992 („Rio-
Declaration“382), it defines a global standard for the actions of any state. 383 It requires that 
our present behaviour shall respect the requirements of  future generations and secure that 
the future generation must not suffer any disadvantage from our present behaviour.384 
 
Legally, the principle of sustainability is defined in Article 3 No. 3 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU385). According to this legal requirement, the EU shall work for the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, 
a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress (...). The principle of proportionality is furthermore based on Article 5 No. 1 TEU 
and Article 11 TFEU.  
 
In relation to the regulation of the financial markets and, in particular, alternative 
investments, the principle of sustainability requires that the trust among financial market 
participants shall be preserved to secure the most reliable credit supply, also for future 
generations. The principle of sustainability requires that any legal measure in view of its 
transaction costs and its complexity should bring the best possible effect. One also could 
call this aspect of the sustainability principle the efficiency criteria. For instance, if one 
really decides to launch the European-wide discussed financial transaction tax (FTT), one 
has to be sure that it not only contributes to generate public money, but that it also  assists 
in containing systemic risks, now and in the future. The principle of sustainability that is 
closely linked to the principle of proportionality has a constitutional dimension because it 
concretises the defence function of the basic rights of all (national) European countries and 
even of the (supranational) EU. Referring to the regulation of alternative investments, at 
the European level it concretises the basic rights of free entrepreneurship (Article 16 
                                                          
382
  Published in the internet under http://www.unesco.org/education/nfsunesco/pdf/RIO_E.PDF, requested 
on February/18th/2013. 
383
  Cf. Käller, in: Schwarze, Europarecht (2012), AEUV, Article 11, bullet No. 14. 
384
  Cf. Käller, in: Schwarze, Europarecht (2012), AEUV, Article 11, bullet No. 14. 
385
  Consolidated version of the treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 
325/5, dated December/24th/2002. 
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ECFR) and of property (Article 17 Abs. 1 ECFR) that are acknowledged as real, basic 
rights under the regime of the Lisbon Contract.  
Admittedly, each legal measure represents a mandatory compromise between the 
counter-rotating interests that have to be equalised by the state because the state has to 
enable the peaceful coexistence of different social actors with counter-rotating interests 
which can be seen as the legitimate basis of the state. A legal measure in compliance with 
the principle of sustainability is one essential key for the steady fulfilment of the 
abovementioned state function. As is shown by the FTT, the effective containment of 
systemic risks is in the public interest. Nevertheless, it is also in the public interest not to 
endanger the steady private credit supply that can be seriously affected by an 
overregulation that not only concerns the individual yield interest of financial market 
corporations but also the public interest of a vital domestic demand if - as a consequence of 
an overregulation - the credit prices rise, and bigger consumer goods become unaffordable 
for many consumers. 
 
Any sustainable response to the recent financial crisis should reflect all the different 
aspects of the crisis. It ought to set the focus not only on the behaviour of bank managers 
and those incentives that led them to run a to short-term business strategy. It can be seen as 
one key aspect as to what constrictions on private profit-making are justified to prevent the 
public costs of a systemic failure in the financial markets:386 Can that development that 
directly led to the recent financial crisis be justified ethically? Could anyone have 
prevented this development? Is it really a financial crisis, or does it possibly express a lack 
of ethical values among bankers and among consumers? Is it possible to identify one major 
responsibility of anyone? In any case, the FCIC draws the conclusion that it was a systemic 
collapse of accountability and ethical principles - for example, the number of borrowers 
that could not repay their mortgage already a few months after the closing has already 
doubled between summer of 2006 and the end of 2007. 387  Consequently depositors, 
corporations and the public lost their trust in the financial system.388 
                                                          
386
  McIlroy in Straus, Future of Banking (2009), pp. 119, 120. 
387
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 22. 
388
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 12. 
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At the beginning of the third year after the outbreak of the recent financial crisis, there 
was a breadth correspondence among financial experts389 claiming that the recent financial 
crisis was the consequence of a couple of things and needs a sustainable approach that sets 
the focus not only on the financial reasons. The principle of sustainability has its origin in 
environmental law and is based on the idea that the consumption of the present generation 
must also consider the requirements of the future generation.390 What is to be done to avoid 
a similar systemic failure in the future? Whatever this approach consists of, a sufficient 
answer must also set the focus on other possible reasons. 
 
Any sustainable regulatory framework should focus on the fact that the economic 
circumstances that can be identified as the fundamental of any economic regulatory 
framework change very speedily, which can be seen in the enormous volatility of the 
equity price. The volatility is an economic measure of the uncertainty of the return realised 
on an asset.391 Whereas in risk management, the daily volatility of a market variable is 
defined as the standard deviation of the percentage of daily change in the market variable, 
the volatility can generally be defined as the standard deviation of the return provided by 
the variable per unit of time when the return is expressed using continuous 
compounding.392 The volatility is represented by the equity price that can underlie dramatic 
changes within one single day. 
 
                                                          
389
  Sinn points out that the financial crisis of 2008/2009 results from a couple of different things: Sinn, 
Kasino Kapitalismus (2009), pp. 108-229; Dam and Herzog hold the opinion that the recent financial 
crisis is based on different circumstances: Dam, Subprime Crisis (2009), pp. 99-106; Herzog, 
Finanzmarktkrise (2008), pp. 9-13. 
390
  For further information on the principle of sustainability and its significance to the regulation of the 
financial market see Kitterer, Wirtschaftsdienst 2002, pp. 67-73; Klesse, Manager-Eid (2009), p. 1; 
Polleit, Wirtschaftsdienst 2008, pp. 720-722; Raffelhüschen, Wirtschaftsdienst 2002, pp. 73-76; 
Steinbrück, DIE WELT (2008/06/21), p. 12. 
391
  Hull, Risikomanagement (2011), p. 210. 
392
  Hull, Risk Management (2010), pp. 175, 197. 
83 
 
The European Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) -  
an appropriate approach to the global financial crisis? 
 
83 
 
1.3. Economic guarantees of the Lisbon Contract  
Under the Lisbon Contract393 any appropriate response to the recent financial crisis has 
to respect the contents of the ECFR.394 The Member State constitutional law, the Lisbon 
Contract,395 is based on the priority of private economy and grants a couple of economic 
basic rights, such as the guarantee of private property (section 17 of the ECFR), the liberty 
of private enterprise (section 16 ECFR), the liberty of business (section 15 ECFR) and the 
guarantee of association (Section 12 ECFR).  
 
The constitutional priority of private economy determines the type of regulation (legal 
regulation or corporate regulation) and the content of the regulation. Private corporations 
can be seen as the “cluster” of a modern civil society. Also, the private corporations in the 
financial sector grant employment and convey a real chance for a financial existence 
independent from the state to many people. Therefore, a regulation should not endanger the 
liquidity situation of private corporations: The end of private liquidity means the end of an 
independent existence. 
 
1.4. Disclosure as a cornerstone of investor protection  
 As Walker mentions, in connection with more complex innovative products and 
techniques, it is essential to maintain adequate levels of transparency and disclosure. 
Transparency is one key requirement of the sustainable equilibrium of those powers that 
represent a market economy and its well-functioning (price) mechanism. It saves the trust 
of market participants - among investors and among consumers - that the product really has 
the worth that it has in the conditions of a free competition. Moreover, it is a shield against 
a too-strong intervention-- specifically, regulation by the financial authorities that causes 
welfare losses because any regulation that binds public resources sets one essential reason 
for the widening of taxes and minimises corporations’ liquidity resources. Finally, it 
                                                          
393
  Basically to the amendments of European law by the Lisbon Contract: Nowak, Europarecht nach 
Lissabon (2011), p. 1 ff.; Suhr, in: FS Fiedler (2011), p. 715 ff.; Wittinger, in: FS Fiedler (2011), p. 739 
ff.  
394
  For this issue see Congdon in O´Neill, Global Financial Crisis (2009), pp. 29-39. 
395
  For further information on the Lisbon Contract see Nowak, Lissabon (2011), p. 73-81. 
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creates a substantial competitive disadvantage to the national economy. Thus, Avgouleas396 
emphasises that disclosure is the cornerstone of any investor protection in securities 
markets. Avgouleas points out that up to the outbreak of the recent financial crisis, it was 
assumed that on the basis of all available information, market actors would adjust their 
decisions and positions and strategies for information content with the aid of arbitrage 
efficient markets and would be perpetuated in accordance with the main assumption of the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which is a direct application of rational choice theory 
to market behaviour. 397 The EMH is based on the assumption that asset prices completely 
reflect relevant (available) information.398  
 
Any standardisation or interdiction of securitised products is a too-strict measure of 
financial market regulation. Nevertheless, to achieve a sufficient level of transparency399 , 
one should seriously consider restricting the use of securitised or those products whose risk 
profile is unascertainable or uncertain.400 Allowing banks to securitise and sell on their 
loans without bearing any continuing risk of those loans has encouraged insufficient 
discipline in terms of the loans made.401 As a consequence of the recent financial crisis, 
banks ought to continue to bear some (substantial) portion of the risk on the loans they 
have originated to encourage them to be careful about the loans they make in the first 
place.402 In particular, CDOs should be transparent so that the person who bears the risk 
can easily be identified.403  
 
A stronger transparency of risks is one way to achieve a stronger protection of the 
financial consumer. Among financial analysts a stronger transparency is held as a standard 
liberal response because better-informed participants are more likely to act rationally in 
their own interest and thus maximise overall social welfare. 404  A stronger level of 
                                                          
396
  Cf. Avgouleas, ECFR 4/2009, p. 441. 
397
  Ibid. 
398
  Cf. Hull, Risk Management (2010), p. 518; Lee/Lee, Encyclopedia of Finance (2006), p. 103. 
399
  For the future transparency requirements in Germany see Schwald, DIE WELT (2011/01/15), p. 21. 
400
  McIlroy in Straus, Future of Banking (2009), pp. 119, 125. 
401
  McIlroy in Straus, Future of Banking (2009), pp. 119, 128. 
402
  McIlroy in Straus, Future of Banking (2009), pp. 119, 129. 
403
  Ibid. 
404
  Thomsen, EBOR 10:1/2009, pp. 97, 105; on the requirement of steadily well-informed market 
participants cf. Walker, BJIBF (11/2007), pp. 567 ff. 
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transparency, therefore, contributes to a minimum of democracy among the participants of 
the financial markets. Finally, the editing credit institute profits from a stronger level of 
transparency because it can reduce its contractual and transaction costs. Transaction costs 
are those costs that are necessary to execute a transaction.405 In particular, they cover the 
costs of information and the costs of communication and coordination between the 
participants of the transaction.406  
 
The level of transparency that is adequate to contain systemic risks cannot be answered 
generally. Nevertheless, it is important that the level of transparency refers to the specific 
risk of the traded financial product. The higher its specific risk, the higher are the 
transparency requirements that have to be granted by the editing institution. All in all, a 
sustainable regulation of private equity and other alternative investments should set the 
focus on a stronger transparency of financial products to enable every market participant a 
realistic view of the worth of a financial product.  
 
In this context one has to consider whether a stronger transparency really needs a 
stronger regulation by the financial authorities, or if a kind of self-regulation is sufficient. 
The idea of a stronger self-regulation of the mortgage markets was promoted by Alan 
Greenspan, the former president of the Fed.407 After the breakout of the financial crisis, 
representatives of the American Republican Party held the view that a stronger regulation 
and a reduction of subsidies for privately owned homes and a stronger liability of bank 
directors would not be the appropriate response to the financial crisis.408  
 
In contrast, the FCIC holds the view that the policy of stronger self-regulation led 
finally to the abandoning of essential protection mechanisms that could have contributed to 
the effective containment of the financial crisis. The policy of self-regulation led to the 
                                                          
405
  Jost in Köhler/Küpper/Pfingsten, Betriebswirtschaft (2007), pp. 782, 783. 
406
  Dietl in Köhler/Küpper/Pfingsten, Betriebswirtschaft (2007), pp. 1750, 1751. 
407
  Cf. N.N., Finanzkrise, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 5/2011, pp.12 (12). 
408
  Ibid. 
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decline of the regulatory requirements subject to financial institutes .409 Moreover, the 
abandoning of the respective protection mechanisms contributed to serious gaps in the 
supervision of critical sections in the volume of several billions of dollars - namely, the 
system of shadow banking and the OTC-segment. The policy of stronger self-regulation 
that was driven by the US Government until the outbreak of the financial crisis of 
2008/2009 permit financial corporations to choose the supervision of their own preference 
which caused a  “race to the bottom”410  for the most neglectful supervisory body.411 This 
race also revealed in the widespread „ratings shoppings“: Issuers and investment banks 
were engaged finding the CRA that offers the highest ratings.412 All in all, the almost 
unlimited trust into the self-regulation of financial corporations resulted in serious 
supervisory gaps.413 In particular, those supervisory gaps also revealed in the omission of 
any statutory basis of the SEC to exercise regulatory authority over the CRAs until the 
enactment of the US Credit Rating Agency Reform Act in September 2006.414  
 
1.5. Coherence of chances and risks  
 It is essential to establish a regulatory framework that terminates the separation of 
chances and risks and reconstructs the direct coherence between the manager’s personal 
profit participation and the manager’s personal liability.  
 
                                                          
409
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 19. 
410
  Within the international competition of locations for business and industries, it normally prevails that 
location with the comparatively most liberal legislation. On the one hand, this competition forces the 
national governments to an efficient use of taxes, other common goods and contributes to their monetary 
budget discipline - on the other hand, it consequently results in a loss of labour standards and 
infrastructural standards. Finally, it can also force other governments to reduce their standards, cf. Hirte, 
in: Hirte/Bücker, Gesellschaften (2006), p. 52 (§ 1, Marginal no. 94) and Bonin, in: Hirte/Bücker, 
Gesellschaften (2006), p. 316 (§ 10, Marginal no. 2). 
411
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 8. 
412
  Cf. Levin-Report (2011), p. 31. 
413
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 19. 
414
  Cf. Levin-Report (2011), p. 43 f. 
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This is an ethical principle that goes back to the teachings of Adam Smith415 and which 
is also an important conclusion of the “Freiburger Schule” 416 ,which holds that every 
participant of a market economy should be liable for his own debts. If one considers that 
the fund managers have a widespread room for manoeuvre that results from the 
acknowledgement of the BJR417 , it should be their first objective that the fund is not her or 
his own property but represents the money of other people. This is relevant to the risks of 
an investment and to the information requirements that should be respected when closing 
the investment contract. Liability of the fund managers is the key for the realisation of a 
stronger sustainability and to prevent a nationalisation of losses in the future. 
 
A direct coherence between chances and risks seems essential for that trust that is 
essential for a well-functioning interbank commerce, for the general public acceptance of 
credit institutes and for the acceptance of the system of a market economy. It helps to 
reduce those transaction costs418 that arise with any financial transaction and contributes to 
the speed of monetary circulation. Among financial experts, there is a widespread consent 
that a high level of monetary circulation sets one significant condition for the realisation of 
higher yields. Based on this assumption, a higher level of monetary circulation creates a 
welfare surplus and contributes to the wealth of a national economy as a whole. Thus, a 
direct coherence between the manager’s personal profit participation and the manager’s 
personal liability is one essential parameter of a more sustainable regulatory framework. 
 
                                                          
415
  Adam Smith, The theory of moral sentiments by Adam Smith, cf. Bonar, Journal of Philosophical 
Studies, I (1926), pp. 333-353. 
416
  For further information on the Freiburger Schule and the German “Ordoliberalismus” see cf. Horn, 
Marktwirtschaft (2010), pp. 20-26. 
417
  In the German corporation law the BJR, whose origin can be seen in the American corporation law, is 
integrated in § 93 paragraph 1 S. 2 of the German Aktiengesetz (dAktG); For further information on the 
BJR see Göppert, Business Judgment Rule (2010). 
418
  Transaction costs are those that result from carrying out any trade that means the commissions plus the 
difference between the price obtained and the midpoint of the bid-offer spread, cf. Hull, Risk 
Management (2011), p. 530. 
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2.  Capital requirements  
2.1.  Minimum capital levels 
The Basel Committee recently released the contents of Basel III that focuses on a 
strengthening of the available equity position. In view of the enormous losses that 
happened during the recent financial crisis, the Basel Committee proposes a range of 
amendments that lead to a general change away from a stronger self-regulation that were 
granted under the Second Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) and that contain stronger equity 
requirements, the introduction of a “stress-test” implemented by the financial supervisory 
bodies, a supervision of OTC derivatives and the implementation of clearing devices for 
CDS. 419  Thus, the latest edition of the Basel Capital Accord intends to strengthen 
regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector to improve the 
immunity of credit institutes against the various financial and economic turbulences, to 
enhance the risk management devices and governance and strengthen their transparency 
and disclosures420 Normally, well-informed investors could make the right decisions or at 
least would be fully informed that they would be acting on their own risks.421 In particular, 
Basel III is based on different tiers that foresee stronger capital requirements by doubling 
the “Core 1 capital” from 2% to 4.5% and adding one conservation buffer of 2.5% that 
raises the “core tier 1 ratio” to 7%.422 
 
2.2. Adequate liquidity support by the central banks  
 The credit supply of the real economy can be identified as one indispensable condition 
for a sustainable economic growth.423 A healthy financial sector is crucial to the stability 
and growth of the entire economy of a country.424 The real economy and the consumer 
have a vital economic interest in a well-functioning credit supply.425 The recent economic 
growth that can be seen in Germany not only results from its strong export trade; it is also 
based on a revived private consumption. The real economy itself has a vital economic 
                                                          
419
  Hull, Risikomanagement (2011), p. 289. 
420
  Cf. Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision, Revisions (2013), pp. 4 ff. 
421
  Cf. Wymeersch, ECFR (2010), pp. 240, 240. 
422
  Cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III (2011, pp. 13 ff. 
423
  Strobel, DIE WELT (2010/11/22), p. 2; on the meaning of the central banks for financial stability cf. Le 
Maux/Scialom, Cambridge Journal of Economics Vol. 37 (2013), pp. 1 ff. 
424
  Dam, Subprime Crisis (2009), pp. 95, 98. 
425
  Strobel, DIE WELT (2010/11/22), p. 2. 
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interest in the credit supply of private consumers because it is less restful to put the 
economic growth on a different basis. Otherwise, a company runs the risk of one-sided 
dependence. 
 
Walker holds the view that an adequate liquidity support by the central banks should 
be granted at any time, whereas central banks - this comment of Walker seems to aim at 
the European Central Bank (ECB426) and the corresponding national institutes, such as 
Deutsche Bundesbank and others - must review the operations of domestic and cross-
border inter-bank markets to ensure that they work effectively in all conditions and at all 
times with necessary funding facilities being made available where appropriate. This point 
of view seems correct because the recent financial crisis became evident when the 
interbank market started to collapse:427 The revitalisation of the well-functioning interbank 
market required an enormous financial intervention by the central banks. 428  At the 
beginning of the recent financial crisis, big-sized and very experienced credit institutions 
had to explain to their shareholders and to the markets that they were unable to sell 
securitised mortgages they had purchased for several thousand millions of US$429 - the 
losses of these institutes run up to more than US$20,000 million.430 
 
Nevertheless, the function of the central banks is actually not to compensate the 
consequences of any insufficient portfolio strategy of the commercial banks431  and of 
investment banks. As it was already mentioned, another reason of the recent financial crisis 
was that the portfolio managers often rely on state assistance when they decided on a high-
risk portfolio strategy. Any future regulatory framework should include a legal clarification 
that there won’t be any bailout: Every credit institute is generally responsible for the 
consequences of its own portfolio strategy, and it is responsible in the case the assumptions 
of the portfolio managers do not correspond to the actual developments. The principle of 
second liability is also applicable between investment banks and the central bank. 
                                                          
426
  Short information on the election of the president of the European Central Bank: Cf. Haede, EWS 
(2011), pp. 173-175. 
427
  Cf. First Chapter, 2.5.  
428
  Cf. Kübler, in: Festschrift für Schwark (2009) p. 499, 500. 
429
  Ibid. 
430
  Cf. New York Times (February/1st/2008), C 6. 
431
  A commercial bank is a credit institute that takes deposits and make loans. 
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Nevertheless, during the recent financial crisis, the financial losses of several credit 
institutes ran up to an extent that they really caused the necessity of several bail-out-
packages in the United Kingdom432 
 
2.3. Implementation of a systemic risk buffer  
To effectively contain one similar financial crisis in the future it seems notably 
essential to protect (financial) institutions from insolvency where the asset values fall, 
although these are only ancillary to the referred-to liquidity measures.433 Thus, many banks 
implemented a systemic risk buffer by operating with a higher equity level.434  
 
3. Monitoring of credit accumulation  
 The information basis of the directors can be seen as the initial point of hidden 
information and hidden transaction if the directors use their freedom of action to pursue 
their own individual agendas. This phenomenon is well-known as principal-agent conflict 
or moral hazard, and can be identified as another core reason for the recent financial crisis. 
To reduce this conflict of interest that can be found in almost every capital corporation, it 
is discussed whether a compulsory and advanced monitoring system should be established. 
The monitoring of money and credit growth is essential to contain inflation and to avoid 
cyclic disruption.435   
 
In addition, a compulsory monitoring system contributes to the transparency of the 
director’s portfolio strategy, and it can be seen as one significant parameter of an effective 
risk management that helps to avoid systemic risks. Financial supervisory bodies must 
allow (financial) institutions to continue to innovate and expand although minimum levels 
of disclosure and transparency must be maintained at all times to ensure an effective 
                                                          
432
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (184 ff.). 
433
  Cf. Deloitte, Global systemic risk (2012), pp. 8 ff., 13 ff.; Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation 
(2010), pp. 179 (197). 
434
  Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (196). 
435
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (196). 
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supervisory and market oversight.436 It is significant that the monetary authorities monitor 
and manage any credit accumulation appropriately at all times.437  
 
The group of financial experts working with De Larosière proposes ESRB 438  to 
coordinate the supervision of systemic risks.439 The ECSR can be described as a parent 
authority that aims at concentrating the expertise of the European Member State’s central 
banks and all supervisory bodies in the branch of banks, insurances and market 
supervision, identifying systemic risks and finding solutions to prevent those risks in the 
future.440 The ESRB shall ensure overall financial stability, which can be seen as a first 
step towards a European financial monitoring,441 bringing together the heads of national 
central banks, the ECB and the EU officials.442 By possessing comparative advantages of 
information and action that results from their oversight of payment systems, their own 
refinancing operations, their various activities in the financial markets443 and their presence 
in international committees, these bodies are able to assess possible domino effects and to 
identity disequilibria.444 The ESRB would be an essential element of the future European 
monetary supervision, which will be able to provide a Europe-wide view of developments 
in the different EU markets and therefore would be able to address warnings and 
recommendations to the national supervisors.445 
 
As is proposed by walker, The ERSC could also have been an advanced monitoring 
system that could have contributed to contain the dimension of the recent financial crisis. It 
                                                          
436
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (196). 
437
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (196). 
438
  Introduction and overview on the new European financial supervisory system: Cf. Bauer/Boegl, BKR 
(2011), pp. 177-186; cf. also Diekmann/Fleischmann, WM (2011), pp. 1105-1109; 
Zülch/Hoffmann/Detzen, EWS (2011), pp. 167-173. 
439
  About the supervision of hedge funds under the regime of the AIFM cf. Nietsch/Graef, ZBB (2010), pp. 
12-20. 
440
  Cf. N.N., G20-Agenda, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 5/2010, pp.3 (4, 5). 
441
  Monitoring means the long-term identification, collection and evaluation of financial data in the frame 
of a systematic investigation, respectively an inquiry that is centralised by a superior body or authority. 
442
  Cf. N.N., rulebook, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 37/2010, pp. 8 (8). 
443
  About the requirements of a sustainable regulation of the financial markets: N.N., Regulierung, Auszüge 
aus Presseartikeln No. 8/2011, pp.16-20. 
444
  Cf. N.N., Lessons, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 5/2010, pp.5 (7). 
445
  Cf. Wymeersch, ECFR (2010), pp. 240, 250. 
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can be seen as a part of an advanced risk management, which446 conveys a suitable early-
warning system and is one essential element of an advanced corporate compliance.447 To 
maintain suitable working conditions at the international financial markets, the concerned 
credit institutes take over an essential part of the financial supervisory and thereby keep the 
impact on the volume of compliance costs. It is generally well-known that the financial 
institutes try to shift their compliance costs onto their customers by increasing the credit 
costs. Higher credit costs have a negative impact on the domestic demand, on the 
development of the GDP and finally on the rate of employment. As a conclusion, an 
advanced monitoring system, as proposed by Walker, combines the advantage of an 
effective risk management with the advantage of a lower credit rate level and several other 
benefiting economic effects. It creates a win-win-situation for all market participants: for 
the credit institutes, for their customers and the general public. 
4. Well-functioning risk management  
 Normally, the institutional position and the validity of the abovementioned BJR 
convey to the directors a comfortable projection of information. However, this projection is 
significant to a well-functioning board of directors and to enable the ruling of a portfolio 
strategy that is predominant in the global economic competition. Moreover, it is essential 
to take the necessary compliance measures and to establish a well-functioning risk 
management for the case of unexpected risks - in particular, in view of the awareness of 
the FCIC that the dramatic failure of corporate governance and risk management of 
systemically relevant financial institutions set another essential reason of the financial 
crisis of 2008/2009.448  
 
A well-functioning risk management is important because financial institutes have 
recently widened their portfolio by using securities and dealing with financial vehicles of 
                                                          
446
  For further information on the requirements of an advanced risk management system see 
Bloss/Ernst/Häcker/Sörensen, Financial Engineering (2011), p. 532 ff.; Hull, Risk Management (2011), 
p. 14 ff.; Lee/Lee, Encyclopedia of Finance (2006), p. 491 ff. 
447
  The term “corporate compliance” stands for those measures that are taken by a firm or corporation to act 
in accordance with the relevant legal requirements. Corporate Compliance can be seen as a part of the 
risk management of a corporation. 
448
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 18 f., 26 f., 183 f., 307 ff.; 319; 336 ff. 
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an increasing complexity449 An effective individual bank internal risk management system 
provides that those areas of underlying high risk activity (e.g., subprime-lending450) should  
be managed directly and immediately, and neither delegated nor incorporated into larger, 
more complex products.451 Therefore, a well-informed board of directors is also in the vital 
interest of each investor. Walker further states that a well-functioning risk management 
requires that all areas of underlying high-risk activity, such as the segment of sub-prime 
lending, should be managed directly and immediately; they should neither be delegated nor 
incorporated into larger, more complex products with the destabilising effects that they 
may have on the repackaged debt and the subsequent solvency of the purchasing banks or 
other institutions concerned.  
 
5. Stronger economic convergence among the European Member 
States  
5.1.  Stronger economic convergence by a European transfer union?  
Whatever the answer is to the recent financial crisis, the significance of private credit 
supply and the declining significance of national frontiers452 should be considered. One 
must find a sustainable compromise between the interest of the private lending business 
and the investors to realise a satisfactory yield – otherwise, there is no attraction for private 
investors - and the general public interest of avoiding systemic risks. The recent financial 
crisis has shown that the prevention of systemic risks is a public concern. In particular, it 
endangers employment, public finances, and, finally, national independence, as is shown in 
the case of Greece. The realisation of systemic risks endangers the supranational 
“community of values” that is represented by the EU. The community of values finds its 
direct expression in the European Charter of Basic Rights (the EU Charter)453 or in the 
                                                          
449
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (198). 
450
  On the necessity of an advanced risk management cf. First Chapter, 1.1. 
451
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (198 f.). 
452
  For further information on the declining meaning of national frontiers see Renner, Transnationales 
Recht (2011). 
453
  Borowski in Meyer, Charta (2011), preliminary remark article 1, bullet No. 1a; Meyer in Meyer, Charta 
(2011), preamble, bullet No. 28. 
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Charter of the United Nations (the UN Charter)454, which represent two strong sources of 
transnational law. 
 
With regard to the enormous mobility of private capital and the fact that the EU is both 
an economic place without national frontiers and a community with common values, the 
prevention of systemic risks is not only a national concern but a European concern. Thus, a 
common European response to the recent financial crisis could be one step to achieving a 
stronger economic convergence among the Member States of the EU. One essential step 
would be to achieve a stronger convergence between the northern states that set a stronger 
financial focus on monetary stability and the many southern states that set their focus on 
social welfare.  
 
A common European answer to the recent financial crisis is the proposal to implement 
effective measures against a transfer union in the European Contract and to work towards a 
stronger financial discipline of each European Member State. The term “transfer union” 
describes a joint responsibility of the more prosperous European Member States such as 
Germany,as well as for the less prosperous European Member States such as Ireland.455 A 
transfer union stands for the (unlimited) purchase of governmental bonds by the ECB456 
and is an expression that either hints at the rescue of the European currency union or its 
collapse. The transfer union is a governmentally organised transfer of wealth on a legal 
basis and, according to an international contract, several states are committed to each other 
to a regular financial equalisation.457  
 
The European Constitution contains the interdiction of “no bail out”; according to the 
constitutional principle that was implemented by the Maastricht Contract, the EU bears no 
responsibility to adhere for the debts of any single European Member State. The former 
                                                          
454
  Neu, A., UN-Reform (2006), p. 1. 
455
  On the legal development of the EU towards a transfer union cf. Callies/Schoenfleisch, JZ (5/2012), p. 
477 ff.; Müller-Franken, JZ (5/2012), p. 219 ff.; Sester, EWS (3/2012), p. 80 ff.; Weber, DVBl. 2012, p. 
801 ff. 
456
  On the role of the ECB under the conditions of the European debt crisis: Sester, EWS (3/2012), p. 80 ff. 
457
  Cf. http://www.boerse.de/boersenlexikon/Transferunion, requested October/19th/2012. 
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president of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Ottmar Issing, stated that a monetary union without 
a stable Euro could only survive if central bank independence is respected, which implied 
that the ECB abstains from fiscal policy actions, such as buying sovereign bonds in 
secondary markets. However, to change the “no bail-out” clause in the direction of a bail-
out regime was not a step towards a democratically-legitimised political union.458 Even if 
the ECB is authorised to purchase an unlimited amount of governmental bonds of the 
European Member States, the TFEU still includes a direct interdiction of bail-out in Article 
125 paragraph 1. 
 
5.2. Convergence by the introduction of Eurobonds  
For the practical implementation of the transfer union, it is important that the ECB is 
authorised to purchase government bonds from the financially suffering southern European 
countries such as Greece. In view of the probability of a Greek state insolvency, there is an 
on-going political debate on the so-called Euro bonds459 , whose introduction is rejected by 
those countries such as Germany who have a strict budgetary discipline, and who recently 
launched a constitutional debt bracket to reduce their budgetary deficit. The federal 
government of Germany has opted to define a “debt brake”460 in the German Constitution 
that will be effective in 2016. A similar solution is also being discussed at the European 
level. The governments of those countries with a constitutional debt bracket reject Euro 
bonds because they hold the view that these bonds reduce the pressure on the financially 
suffering countries to reduce their own budgetary deficit by taking suitable measures to 
improve their competitiveness.  
 
5.3. Convergence by the implementation of the ESM  
The discussion of a European transfer union was recently highlighted by the discussion 
on the steady Euro rescue fund ESM (European Stability Mechanism) that was launched in 
                                                          
458
  Cf. Issing, Slittering to the wrong kind of union, Financial Times (2011/08/08). 
459
  For further information on so-called eurobonds see cf. Müller-Franken, JZ (5/2012), p. 219 ff. 
460
  According to Articles 109, 115 and 143d paragraph 1 dGG, the German federal state is committed to 
reduce its structural deficit down to 0.35% of its GDP at the beginning of 2016, and each single German 
state is committed to present debt-free budgets until 2020, cf. IFSt, contribution No. 479 (May 2012), p. 
32. 
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view of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland.461 The ESM 
can legally be qualified as an international contract for the supplementation of the EU’s 
integration program that is beyond the control of the European Parliament.462 
 
As it is underlined by the defendant in the recently published decision of the German 
BVerfG, the legal regulations on the ESM contribute to the security and the stability of the 
European Currency Union and do not enable the introduction of an extensive union of 
liabilities and transfers but authorise punctuality within a clearly defined situation to 
temporarily limited relief actions and stipulate a strict conditionality.463 
 
5.4. Further analysis and Conclusion  
A proper governmentally well-organised transfer of wealth could contribute to the 
general public welfare within the EU if it helps to equalise the wealth differences between 
the more prosperous northern European Member States and the less prosperous southern 
European Member States. In general, the equalisation of wealth differences can be a 
suitable measure to defang political and social conflicts and to enhance the identification 
with the European project. Even the most serious competitors of the EU, such as India, 
know about a kind of interior financial equalisation. Nevertheless, the legal provisions 
should be comparatively detailed to contain the risk of general welfare losses and the risk 
of a “suffocation” of the national performance stimulus. 
 
An adequate pressure on the budgetary discipline of each single European Member 
State is a mandatory provision for the consolidation of the EU as a whole. Among the 
conditions of globalisation and the tectonic shift that results from the emerging countries 
such as India  can be seen as the initial point of a redefinition of the global powers It is an 
                                                          
461
  On the European debt crisis and its impact on the national budgets of the European Member States cf. 
Kopp, NVwZ (No. 24/2011), p. 1480 ff. 
462
  BVerfG, Judgment from September/12th/2012; Rs. 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 
BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 BvE 6/12, bullet 257; Lorz/Sauer, DÖV (2012), p. 573, 575.  
463
  BVerfG, Judgment from September/12th/2012; Legal case 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 
1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 BvE 6/12, Marginal no. 178. 
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essential provision for a sustainable coherence between national chances and risks.464 
Indeed, at the national level, one can see a kind of transfer union, such as the financial 
equalisation among the 16 German federal states since the late 1960s - in Germany the 
more prosperous federal states such as Hamburg are constitutionally committed to 
financially assist the less prosperous federal states such as Berlin.  
 
Nonetheless, one has to consider that the EU is neither a state nor a national common 
destiny but a supranational legal personality that follows the principle of subsidy. It is 
important that the EU as a community of values faces the challenges of globalisation. To 
face the challenges of globalisation, it seems important to implement a stronger 
synchronicity between the EU as a political community and the EU as an economic 
community. Thus, there is an on-going political discussion on a fiscal union, and on a bank 
union it is essential to consider the (mandatory) elements of a sustainable reform of the EU 
and - following Winston Churchill’s vision that he presented in his well-known speech - 
even the concept of a real political union following the political concept of the United 
States of America. As long as the constitutional provisions of a real political union are not 
in force, the concept of a transfer union following the conception of the federal financial 
equalisation seems constitutionally questionable. As it is shown by the example of 
financially distressed Greece, probably the most essential condition of real political 
independence is the national financial consolidation that is based on budgetary 
discipline,which could get lost under a transfer union beyond a real political union. A 
European transfer union finally honours those Member States with less discipline and less 
willingness for a substantial contribution to the EU. If it does not consist of mandatory 
boundaries, it could endanger the whole European project. Thus, any European fiscal 
transfer mechanism should not consist of long-lasting contributions similar to the system of 
federal financial equalisation.465  
 
                                                          
464
  On the coherence between chances and risks as a requirement for a sufficient response to the recent 
financial crisis and for the future European regulation of alternative investments cf. third chapter, 1.5. 
465
  BVerfG, Judgment from September/12th/2012; Legal case 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 
1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 BvE 6/12, Marginal no. 171. 
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Namely, the propositions of the De Larosière group aim at combating regulatory 
arbitrage by deciding compulsory minimum EU-wide standards, providing a binding 
mediation between disagreeing national authorities and coordinating international 
“colleges of supervisors” without forbidding the national bodies to go beyond the common 
standards.466 As was highlighted by Axel A. Weber, the former president of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, a (legal) solution is needed that strengthens the financial system and its 
resistivity as a whole - one superior objective that was underlain by a detailed road map for 
a reform of the financial market regulation at the various G20 meetings.467 
                                                          
466
  Cf. N.N., rulebook, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 37/2010, pp. 8 (8); cf. also N.N., G20-Agenda, 
Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 5/2010, pp.3 (3). 
467
  Cf. N.N., G20-Agenda, Auszüge aus Presseartikeln No. 5/2010, pp.3 (3). 
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Fourth Chapter -  
THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS 
DIRECTIVE  
(AIFMD) 
AS AN RESPONSE TO THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS  
 
1.  Introduction of the AIFMD  
1.1.  Chronology, general concept and overview 
1.1.1.  Chronology 
The European Commission has reacted to the recent financial crisis with AIFMD. In 
its very first design this financial market regulation is based on the ideas of Klaus-Heiner 
Lehne468 and Poul Nyrup Rasmussen,469 who came to the conclusion that - in view of the 
global financial crisis470 - a worldwide regulation and supervision of all participants of the 
financial market,471 including the financial products, would be necessary. As most of the 
other propositions for the future regulation of the financial markets, the AIFMD focuses on 
an improvement of market discipline and the reduction of information asymmetries,472 
whereas not every initiative aims at a strengthening of financial market regulation.473 The 
AIFMD aims at the strengthening of investor protection, market integrity, market 
                                                          
468
  The report of Klaus-Heiner Lehne aims at the transparency requirements of institutional investors for 
further information on Klaus-Heiner Lehne see cf. http://www.kh-lehne.de/ (requested on 
August/24th/2011). 
469
  The report of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen aims at the regulation of hedge funds, private equity funds, 
transparency requirements of institutional investors and the future framework of the rating agencies. 
470
  Cf. introduction. 
471
  Whereas the worldwide market for equity transactions increased by 5% to almost €900 billion in the 
year 2010, the west European market for those transactions decreased by more than half to €150 billion - 
in opposition to the relevant market in the United States (increase of 40% to €356 billion), Asia 
(increase of 72% to €272 billion) and South America (increase of 211% to a historic top position of €81 
billion), cf. Theisselmann, CORPORATE FINANCE law 1/2011, p. 1, 2 (on the basis of Thomson 
Reuters Deals BI); Generally resume the development of the capital market law in 2010, cf. Weber, 
NJW (2011), p. 273 ff. 
472
  On the regulation of information asymmetries in the investment law: Schmolke, WM 2006, p. 1909 ff. 
473
  Cf. Müller, Hedgefonds (2011), pp. 243, 280. 
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efficiency and the monitoring of capital accumulation 474 . 475  As already stated, the 
monitoring of credit accumulation is one decisive provision for the premature 
identification of systemic risks as a part of an advanced risk management. 
 
As already mentioned, the latest version of the AIFMD,s based on the ideas of Jacques 
de Larosière, was released by the European Commission on 30 April 2009. This version 
was generally accepted by the European Parliament on 10 November 2010476 and finally 
released in the official gazette 477  of the EU on 1 July 2011. After this final act of 
legislation, the AIFMD became effective on 21 July 2011. The precise determination of its 
legal validity is decisive for the calculation of the time corridor that is given to the 
European Member States to transfer the AIFMD into their own national laws. 
 
1.1.2. Overview  
Besides general  (Articles 1-3 AIFMD) and particular guidelines  on the certification 
of the alternative investment fund manager (AIFM) (Articles 3a-8 AIFMD), the AIFMD 
includes  on the operative business activities of the AIFM that refer to the good conduct,478 
equity requirements, organisational requirements and the outsourcing of AIFM tasks 
(Articles 8a-18 AIFM). Chapter 4 states transparency requirements (Articles 19-21). The 
following chapter refers to AIFM that administrate leveraged funds, those with a 
dominating influence (Articles 25-30 AIFM).  
 
With the conditions of the new information technologies, private capital is a very 
mobile factor of production. With regard to the BRIC countries and their enormous 
economic growth - in 2010 China achieved an economic growth rate of almost 10% - the 
regulation in non-European countries avails of a similar industrial structure that competes 
                                                          
474
  Walker identifies a well-functioning monitoring of credit accumulation as one principal economic 
requirement of an appropriate response to the recent financial crisis, Walker, in: The Future of financial 
regulation (2010), pp. 179 (196). 
475
  Cf. Schmuhl, Corporate Finance biz (2011), p. 139, 139. 
476
  http://www.aifm.de/tl_files/pdf/Angenommene%20Texte.pdf (requested August/29th/2011). 
477
  Official Gazette of the European Union L 174, dated July/1st/2011, pp. 1 ff. 
478
  On the future of “good conduct” in Europe cf. Fleischer, ZGR (2011), pp. 155 ff. 
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with the European countries for the favour of private investors. In the age of a private 
capital with a high global mobility and under the conditions of the new information 
technology, it is important to find an answer to the recent financial crisis that does not 
prevent private investors from choosing the European market. In view of the increasing 
transnational mobility of capital and the principal objective to implement a harmonised 
regulation in the EU, Chapter 6 describes rules of the “European Passport of Fund 
Managers” (article 34 AIFMD) by defining the right of any AIFM to administrate and 
distribute AIF in all European Member States (Articles 31-34). Particular rules about third 
countries are described in Articles 34a-35 AIFM. In particular, in view of the necessity of 
enhanced financial supervision, Articles 40-48 of the AIFM define the responsibilities of 
the financial authorities and refer to the nomination, capacities and legal measures,  
remedies, and to the cooperation between the different responsible authorities (Articles 40-
48 AIFM). Chapter 9 stipulates transitional and final clauses.  
 
1.2.  Objectives of the AIFMD  
1.2.1.  Overview  
The objective of the AIFMD is to implement an enhanced level of financial market 
transparency (transparency towards investors, supervisors and the employees of the 
companies in which they invest), enhanced information of the financial market 
supervision479  (European Securities and Markets Authority - ESMA480  - and ESRB to 
implement a monitoring of substantial systemic risks, the introduction of a common and 
resilient approach to the protection of the relevant investors, the strengthening and 
deepening of the single market and the increasing of accountability of AIFM holding 
controlling stakes in companies towards employees and the general public. It shall 
implement a coherent regulatory framework at the European level to protect investors, 
depositors and financial markets. 
 
                                                          
479
  Further information on the future regulation of financial market supervision in the EU cf. Wymeersch, 
ECFR (2010), pp. 240, 250 ff. 
480
  For further information on the ESMA see Zülch/Hoffmann/Detzen, EWS (2011), pp. 167 ff. 
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1.2.2.  Realisation of a harmonised regulation in the EU  
Because of the transnational mobility of capital, the AIFMD aims at a harmonised 
regulation of alternative investments in the EU. The expression “harmonisation” that is 
often used synonymously with the expression “approximation” of laws means the issue-
related convergence of national law towards a supranational standard that aims at the 
abolition of national differences in law and the abolition of any distortion of 
competition.481 The effort towards a legal harmonisation in the EU shall contribute to the 
objective of economic decision neutrality482 in view of the order of a maximum practical 
effectiveness (effet utile). Decision neutrality demands that all market participants have the 
freedom to decide autonomously in terms of investment, financing and legal 
organisation.483 It is a central objective of the European Commission and the OECD and 
aims at the reduction of capital export into third countries.484 
 
In particular, the European Passport of Fund Managers (article 34 AIFMD) can be seen 
as one essential step towards a stronger legal harmonisation: For someone to develop her 
or his business activities in any European country, it takes only one registration in any 
European Member State. The registration procedure (Article 3a-8 AIFMD) can be seen as 
an integral part of the preventive control of the AIFM and a superior risk management to 
identify significant systemic risks. An effective preventive control may cause additional 
administrative costs, but it is the less-serious burden for the GDP than those resulting from 
the realisation of systemic risks. 
 
To achieve the allowance of the responsible supervisory bodies, the AIFM has to 
submit suitable documents that prove her or his qualification and attach suitable 
information that reveals her or his portfolio strategy. These attachments must include the 
names of all investors or shareholders who maintain a qualified participation in the fund, 
the business strategy, including detailed compliance information, detailed information on 
                                                          
481
  Cf. Kahl, in: Calliess/Ruffert, EUV/EGV (2007), Article 94, bullet 1. 
482
  Cf. Brähler, Umstrukturierungen (2006), p. 3; Fischer/Kleinedamm/Warneke, Steuerlehre (2005), p. 44; 
Jacobs, Unternehmensbesteuerung (2011), pp. 293 f. 
483
  Cf. Jacobs, Unternehmensbesteuerung (2011), pp. 293 ff. 
484
  Ibid. 
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the features of the fund, contract conditions or statutes of all administrated funds, 
information on the portfolio strategy and the business objectives of the fund and significant 
information on the procedure to amend these objectives, information on the assessment 
procedure and possibly the calculation model for the assessment of these assets, 
information on the possible outsourcing of services and suitable information on the 
depositary of the fund assets, the assessment agency and the auditor.485 Any AIFM who 
complies with these provisions will be entitled, upon notification to manage or market 
funds, to professional investors throughout the EU by creating a single regulatory and 
supervisory regime for all AIFMs, and the AIFMD will contribute to market participants to 
master the barriers and inefficiencies that result from the current patchwork of national 
regulation.486 
 
The allowance is only given when the responsible authority decides that the AIFM will 
respect all relevant legal requirements.487 As an exception to the latest development of the 
jurisdiction 488  of the ECJ, the allowance furthermore provides that the administrative 
centre of the AIFM and her or his statute centre are located in the same Member State of 
the EU. 489  According to Article 6 of the AIFMD, the responsible authorities must 
correspond to the application if the AIFM is expected to fulfil all legal requirements, avails 
himself or herself of an adequate capital (Article 6 lit. a AIFM) and adequate references 
and (practical) experience and - in the case where the investors hold a qualified 
participation - this qualified participation is suitable to a solid and cautious conduct of the 
AIFM.Also, the main administration and the statute centre are located in the same Member 
State.490 
 
1.2.3.  Investor protection by transparency and disclosure  
 According to Walker´s point of view any enhanced regulation of the financial market 
should secure investment trust and the fact that effective operation of those markets is 
                                                          
485
  Cf. Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 188, 193. 
486
  http://www.aifm.de/tl_files/pdf/MEMO-10-572_EN[1].pdf (requested August/29th/2011. 
487
  Article 4 AIFMD. 
488
  ECJ, judgment on December/18th/2008, C-210/06 (Cartesio), www.curia.europa.eu. 
489
  Article 4 AIFMD. 
490
  Cf. Heese/Lamsa, CORPORATE FINANCE law 1/2011, p. 39, 42 f. 
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well-protected in all major markets because the recent financial crisis could have resulted 
from the failure of investment trust.491 To realise stronger investor protection, it provides 
stronger requirements of transparency and disclosure. 492  The AIFMD differentiates 
between the registration procedure that realises a stronger preventive transparency towards 
the supervisory authorities, stronger informatory requirements towards creditors, the 
current informatory requirements towards the financial supervisory authorities and the 
additional informatory requirements of leveraged funds (Article 25 AIFMD) or funds with 
a dominating impact (Article 26 ff. AIFMD).493 Article 21 AIFMD provides additional 
informatory requirements towards the responsible authorities because any short selling494 
and the most important asset categories have to be announced. These provisions are 
completed by informatory requirements on the AIFM’s most important market places, her 
or his business tools, her or his most important commitments, her or his most significant 
earnings and on the essential risk concentration (Article 10 AIFMD). 
  
Under the provision that the AIFM respects the legal requirements of the annual report, 
the informatory obligations towards investors and towards the responsible supervisory 
authorities and certain further informatory obligations, the Member States of the EU are 
entitled to allow the distribution of those AIF in their countries that are administrated by a 
AIFM who is a resident of a third country.495 
 
 Because of the European Commission’s view that a reliable and objective assessment 
of assets is decisive for the protection of investors, the AIFM has to ensure that all assets 
that were purchased by the AIF and the value of the AIF shares are annually assessed.496 In 
the case of open funds and an irregular capital increase or decrease, the AIFM also has to 
                                                          
491
  Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (195 ff.). 
492
  Basically the requirements of transparency as the provision of a sustainable and proportional regulation 
cf. Bhagat/Romano, ECFR (2010), pp. 273 ff. 
493
  Article 1 ff. AIFMD. 
494
  On the present and future regulation of short selling cf. Zimmer/Beisken, WM (2010), pp. 485 ff. 
495
  Cf. Müller/Staub, GesKR 2/2010, pp. 216, 223; on the future regulatory framework on the distribution 
of financial products in Germany cf. Bruchwitz, BB (2011), pp. 1226 ff.; Voigt, BB (2011), pp. 451 ff. 
496
  http://www.aifm.de/organisation.html (requested on August/31st/2011). 
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implement an additional assessment for periods of less than a year.497 The assessment 
underlies the regulatory regime of the resident country.498 
 
1.2.4. Strengthening of market integrity and market efficiency  
Systemic risks that result from highly leveraged portfolio strategies will be contained 
by a limitation of leverage. The legal restriction of leveraged portfolio strategies aims 
directly at the containment of systemic risks and will implement a harmonised regulation 
for an enhanced market efficiency and market integrity.499 This requirement is decisive 
because Walker points out that a well-functioning market provides that all market 
participants must trust markets to carry out their essential functions, among others. 
Referring to the author´s point of view, the essential market functions are the allocation of 
capital, processing information, risk management and wealth creation.500 
 
On closer inspection, there is a closer correlation between the key factors of leverage, 
systemic risk and trust. For instance, a professional fund management company can get 
into a situation where it cannot fulfil all investor requests to refund if these are submitted at 
the same time, as was shown by the 2008 bank runs. Normally, the fund management 
companies are committed to disclose the relation between their equity position and their 
leverage in their balance sheets. Thus, each investor can approximately estimate her or his 
individual risk of investment. A highly leveraged corporation may have the chance of 
having a comparatively higher yield, but it is also confronted with the higher distrust and 
reservation among investors that can finally result in a credit gap. Thus, Basel III requires a 
higher equity position as a shield against bank insolvency, stronger investor trust and the 
realisation of systemic risks that result from a shortage of credit supply and investor trust.  
 
                                                          
497
  http://www.aifm.de/organisation.html (requested August/31st/2011). 
498
  Ibid. 
499
  Cf. Schmuhl, Corporate Finance biz (2011), p. 139, 140. 
500
  Cf. SEC, The Investor´s Advocate (2013), published under http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml, 
(requested July/17th/2013). 
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1.2.5. Monitoring of capital accumulation  
 Following Walker´s point of view the new financial world brought significant benefit 
and advance but it also generated new problems and challenges in terms of oversight, 
control and stability.501  Thus, an advanced monitoring of credit accumulation must be 
secured at all times. To prevent a similar scenario such as the recent financial crisis in the 
future, the AIFM provides a stronger monitoring of capital accumulation.  
 
As it is underlined by the considerations of the European Commission, the AIFMD 
aims at providing a legal framework for the enhanced monitoring of macro-prudential risks 
and improving risk management and organisational safeguards to minimise micro-
prudential risks. The issue is not only whether investors understand the risk inherent in the 
CDO products which they are buying, but also that the risks that banks are taking on have 
to be monitored trhough public authorities being able to verify, without inordinate effort, 
the true level of the risks to which the bank is exposed.502 The AIFMD will enhance the 
protection of the investors, improve public accountability for the AIF holding controlling 
stakes in companies and develop the single market for AIFM. Thus, the AIFM has to take 
suitable measures to ensure that the managed funds appoint an independent and qualified 
depository that is responsible for the monitoring of the fund’s activities and to ensure that 
the fund’s cash and assets are well-protected. Thus, the depositories will be held to a high 
standard of liability in the case of a substantial loss of assets, and the burden of proof will 
reside with the depository.503 
 
 
The AIFM has to ensure that the depositary of the fund assets uses generally accepted 
methods for the assessment of the fund assets to guarantee that all fund assets are assessed 
in correspondence with the generally accepted standard. In view of the objective of an 
effective containment of credit fraud and other types of white-collar crime, the AIFM is 
neither entitled to overtake the function of the depositary itself - she or he has to transfer 
this function to any credit institute that is registered in the EU - nor is she or he entitled to 
                                                          
501
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (202 f.) 
502
  McIlroy in Straus, Future of Banking (2009), pp. 119, 125. 
503
  http://www.aifm.de/tl_files/pdf/MEMO-10-572_EN[1].pdf (requested August/29th/2011). 
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transfer his principal responsibility to a third person.504 To build an effective shield against 
white-collar crime in the segment of alternative investments, it is essential that the future 
regulatory framework505 provides a clear definition of responsibilities as one condition for 
an effective containment of systemic risks. Namely, the FCIC regards those public officers 
as primarily responsible who should have protected the financial system, those who should 
have conducted the regulatory agencies and those who wrongfully conducted systemically 
relevant corporations (manipulation of financial reports, waging of too-strong risks): Who 
reaches for public accountability and obtains the trust of the public.506 
 
1.3.  Contents of the AIFMD  
1.3.1. Fund managers focused approach 
First of all, we must define the scope of the directive to gain a clear perspective about 
what kinds of investments are subject to the AIFMD. The AIFMD is aimed not at the funds 
themselves but at the fund managers and their current business activities. Its regulatory 
approach is to be seen in view of the AIFM’s widespread economic freedom that results 
from the BJR.507 In many cases it is the fund manager who decides on the investment 
strategy and consequently on its risk profile.508 Because hedge funds are often located in 
non-European countries to obtain a greater flexibility under the less-restrictive jurisdiction 
of offshore-countries - a non-regulated decision of asset classes and the non-regulated use 
of short selling and leverage can be identified as important criteria for the success of hedge 
funds - this approach of indirect regulation seems appropriate because a direct access to the 
regulated funds is often problematic.509 Any regulation of the investment strategies instead 
of regulations for fund managers that could be based on the definition of investment limits 
as - for example - the German approach of the dUBGG 510  could cause enormous 
                                                          
504
  Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 188, 194. 
505
  On the future regulation of the European financial supervision cf. Hopt, NZG (2009), pp. 1401 ff. 
506
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 13. 
507
  On the BJR cf. Second Chapter, 1.3.2. 
508
  Cf. Sustmann/Neuhaus/Wieland, CORPORATE FINANCE law 2/2012, p. 78, 85. 
509
  Cf. Schmuhl, Corporate Finance biz (2011), p. 139, 141. 
510
  Gesetz über Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaften (dUBGG) as amended and promulgated on 
September/9th/1998 (Federal Law Gazette I 1998, p. 2765), last time amended by Article 78 of the law 
of December/17th/2008 (Federal Law Gazette I 2008, p. 2586); on the future of the UBGG in the light of 
the AIFMD: Sustmann/Neuhaus/Wieland, CORPORATE FINANCE law 2/2012, p. 78. 
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restrictions and a decline of the private equity segment.511 However, does this indirect 
approach really solve the supposed core problems of the recent financial crisis? 
 
The AIFMD defines an AIFM as a legal or natural person whose regular business 
activity consists of the administration of one or more alternative investment funds (Article 
3 paragraph 1 lit. c AIFM). An alternative investment fund512 is defined as an organism for 
the collective financial investment, including its investment branches that do not underlie 
the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS513). The 
AIFMD does not apply to the UCITS funds. As a basis for the transnational distribution of 
financial products, the UCITS directive aims at the harmonisation registration, supervision, 
structure, business activities and information of UCITS in the EU.514 
 
1.3.2. Regional scope  
Regionally, the AIFMD not only applies to those AIFMs that are located in the EU. 
According to the proposal of the Spanish presidential of the European Council of 1 
February 2010, the AIFMD will also apply to those AIFMs who are resident in third 
countries515 (e.g., offshore countries516 such as the Cayman Islands) and who distribute 
share certificates within the EU. 
 
 
 
                                                          
511
  Cf. Swoboda/Schatz, in: Striegel/Wiesbrock/Jesch, Kapitalbeteiligungsrecht (2009), p. 852. 
512
  On the definition of the Alternative Investment Fund under the AIFMD cf. Kind /Haag, DStR (2010), 
pp. 1526 ff. 
513
  Directive of the European Council on the coordination of laws, regulation and administrative provisions 
relating to untertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS). 
514
  Cf. Müller/Staub, GesKR 2/2010, pp. 216, 216. 
515
  http://www.aifm.de/anwendung.html, requested August/31st/2011. 
516
  The term “offshore” stands for the phenomena that - under the conditions of economic globalisation, the 
increasing transnational mobility of capital and the digitalisation of information media - numerous 
microeconomic functions and processes are dislocated into countries where the market participants 
discover more advantageous frame conditions for their production and less expensive labour costs. 
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1.3.3. One-size-fits-all  
1.3.3.1. Definition of investment fund 
Against the general objective of the European Commission to subject all types of 
investors and all kinds of financial business activities (the one-size-fits-all approach517) 
that bear a substantial systemic risk and to implement an adequate and harmonised 
regulation of the financial markets, the AIFMD applies to all kinds of funds.518 Primarily, 
in view of this widespread scope of the AIFMD, it is useful to describe briefly the 
expression “fund”. Generally, this legally and not precisely defined term stands for each 
kind of collective capital accumulation that is invested and administrated by third persons 
(fund managers and portfolio manager) for the investors.519 Funds can be defined as special 
assets that are separated from the assets of the asset management company and whose 
objective consists of the collective investment in transferable securities. They were already 
very well-known as an investment strategy in Great Britain in the second half of the 19th 
century. Conceptually, these funds followed the idea of opening a profitable investment 
strategy with a straightforward risk, even for the lower-income brackets. By investing in 
funds, the lower-income brackets could share the advantages of the capital market and 
obtain well-designed opportunities of diversification.520  Due to the batch of numerous 
small engagements, the asset management company gets into a stronger market position 
und normally obtains relatively advantageous sales conditions. The investor saves time and 
transaction costs because the fund manager overtakes the professional choice of assets and 
the professional market observation. 
 
In particular for the lower-income brackets, investment funds represent a 
comparatively advantageous investment strategy because the investment is not focused on 
a single asset but on a portfolio and has to acknowledge the principle of risk spreading. 
From the investor’s perspective, the abovementioned separation of assets conveys an asset 
shield in the case of the insolvency of the asset management company - even with this 
perspective the investment risk that results from the participation in a fund is normally 
                                                          
517
  Cf. Schmuhl, Corporate Finance biz (2011), p. 139, 141. 
518
  Cf. Swoboda/Schatz, in: Striegel/Wiesbrock/Jesch, Kapitalbeteiligungsrecht (2009), p. 852; 
http://www.aifm.de/hintergrund-detail.html (requested August/29th/2011). 
519
  Cf. Böhringer//Funck, in: Haisch/Helios, Finanzinstrumente (2011), p. 744. 
520
  Cf. Volkart, Corporate Finance (2008), p. 487. 
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comparatively low. However, the investor generally decides on the market segment where 
the investment takes place. For instance, one can choose between real estate funds, energy 
funds or commodity funds. Recently, funds are even distributed at the organised markets. 
Moreover, one can choose the investment style and opt for a cautious, risk-aware or 
speculative strategy. Nevertheless, the fund manager who has a direct impact on the fund 
administration is mandatorily committed to the principle of risk spreading and must not 
focus on one single asset. To secure an appropriate control and supervision and the steady 
correspondence with the legal requirements, the fund responsibility is not concentrated 
with one single person but is allocated within a triangle. If someone decides to invest in a 
fund, she or he contacts the asset management company that is responsible for the 
professional and proper administration of the fund and decides on the investment strategy. 
The safekeeping of the fund assets is allocated at a depositary bank, which even assumes 
the function of stating the daily acquisition and market price. 
 
1.3.3.2.  The Approach of the AIFMD  
The one-size-fits-all approach of the AIFMD evidently aims  at  cutting regulatory 
gaps. As it is underlined by the European Parliament and the financial supervision in the 
EU, the AIFMD will abolish trading with any non-regulated financial product.521 Thus, the 
AIFMD aims at the regulation of each legal or natural character independent of her or his 
legal entity responsible for the administration of an AIF that is not subject to the UCITS 
directive.522 It covers almost every kind of institutional funds, such as shipping funds. 
Moreover, it covers real estate funds, commodity funds, currency funds, mezzanine funds, 
infrastructure funds and other types of credit accumulation, respectively other kinds of 
institutional523 funds for alternative assets - independent of their legal entity or structure of 
organisation.524 
 
 
                                                          
521
  http://www.aifm.de/hintergrund-detail.html (requested August/29th/2011). 
522
  Cf. Müller/Staub, GesKR 2/2010, pp. 216, 222. 
523
  A fund can be qualified as institutional if its main business consists of the undertaking of financial 
investments, cf. Kind /Haag, DStR (2010), pp. 1526, 1527. 
524
  Cf. Swoboda/Schatz, in: Striegel/Wiesbrock/Jesch, Kapitalbeteiligungsrecht (2009), p. 852; 
http://www.aifm.de/hintergrund-detail.html (requested August/29th/2011). 
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1.3.3.3. Open and closed investment funds 
In particular, the AIFMD applies to open funds and closed funds.525 In contrast to a 
closed investment fund, an open investment fund is generally accessible to anyone who 
avails himself or herself of the required minimum investment (sometimes €25) and enables 
the investor to the sale and purchase at any arbitrary point of time. By purchasing the 
shares of the fund, the investor achieves the legal position of a joint owner of the fund 
assets and is entitled to participate in the surplus of the fund. In contrast to a participation 
in a closed-end fund, the investment management company takes the legal position of a 
formal proprietor of the assets, according to which it is signed in the respective land 
register. 
 
By request, the fund management company is normally legally committed to resell the 
fund shares at any point of time at the respective market price, which means that an open 
fund investment does not result in a restricted cash flow for the depositor/investor: The 
investor remains liquid because the steady availability of the invested money is secured. 
General restrictions do not exist. The total investment of an open investment fund is not 
limited. As a typical feature of open funds, the number of shares is generally not defined 
and corresponds to the number of requests. In contrast, the number of shares of a closed 
investment fund is limited, which means that the fund is closed as soon as all available 
shares are sold. Nevertheless, the “shareholders” of a closed fund are entitled to transfer 
their shares to another person. At best, in exceptional cases, the access to the fund can 
temporarily be restricted if the fund is based on shares whose quantity is limited - for 
example, this can happen at the emerging stock exchange of a small, developing country.  
 
The generally limited investment risk resulting from the portfolio investment can be 
further limited if the investment is focused on an umbrella fund. An umbrella fund focuses 
on several further funds, which has the effect that the relevant risks are additionally spread. 
As a consequence, even the current market developments can be displayed in the 
                                                          
525
  On the recently discussed topic whether the AIFMD is even subject to the so-called family offices cf. 
Krause/Klebeck, BB (2012), pp. 2063 ff. 
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development of the fund investment with a significant delay. Thus, not only the investment 
risk but also the yield of an umbrella fund is typically under average.  
 
From the investor’s perspective, another disadvantage of open investment funds can 
result from those information asymmetries that result from the fact that the asset 
management company is not committed to deliver more information on its investment 
strategy than she or he is legally committed to. It is, however, questionable whether those 
information asymmetries really create a disadvantage for the single investor - if she or he is 
not a financial expert and only has the objective to earn money but not to take a strategic 
impact on a certain market development. In this situation, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the possession of information and the ability to analyse the available information 
properly, specifically in correspondence with the chosen investment strategy. Normally, 
the fund management company consists of financial experts who have access to sources of 
information that are not readily available to each single investor. Furthermore, they operate 
very close to the markets and can react more speedily than the single investor, which is a 
great advantage with the conditions of high-frequency trade (HFT).526  
 
Another potential disadvantage that should be considered before the investment 
concerns those practical problems that can arise if a greater number of fund investors 
decide to disinvest at the same time. If the asset management company cannot fulfil its 
legal commitment to immediately meet the reclaim by the respective cash flow, the 
fulfilment of the investor’s request can be delayed - thus, this delay can cause capital losses 
for all fund-participating investors. If the fund is a real estate fund, a synchronised reclaim 
can cause additional losses for all investors because these assets are typically financed by 
bank loans - specifically, a synchronised reclaim towards leveraged funds can result in an 
interest compensation claim. 
 
                                                          
526
  Latest information on the development of the HFT in view of the often political biased discussion on the 
introduction of an European financial transaction tax that shall contain systemic risks cf. Frey/Bruhn, 
BB (No. 29/2012), p. 1763; Hunkemöller, BB (No. 29/2012), First page.  
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As an exception, the managers of pension funds and the administrators of non-pooled 
assets such as foundations, state funds or those investments that are held by credit 
institutes, assurance companies and reassurances are also not subject to the AIFMD.527 
Those funds that also aim at a monetary participation of employees (Article 2 paragraph 2 
lit. f AIFMD), social assurance and pension funds (Article 2 paragraph 2 lit. e AIFMD) and 
holdings (Article 3 paragraph 1 lit. r AIFMD) are not subject to the AIFMD.528 In addition, 
those fund managers who administrate one or several funds whose only investor is the 
AIFM itself, its holding company, its affiliate company or other affiliate companies of 
those holding company as far as none of those investors is an AIF itself, do not underlie the 
AIFMD (corporate groups privilege). Finally, it is also not subjected to supranational 
institutions, such as the World Bank, member organisations of the World Bank Group and 
other entities.529 
 
1.3.4. De minimis exemption (quantitative scope)  
As another exemption of the general scope of the AIFMD that refers to the business 
volume of the AIFM, the de minimis exemption eases the future regulatory framework for 
small accumulations of capital. The de minimis exemption states that AIFMs who 
administrate an asset volume of not more than €100 million only have to fulfil the 
requirements of Article 2a paragraph 3 of the AIFMD: They only have to fulfil the 
requirement of registration and disclosure of their portfolio strategy towards the 
responsible national supervisory authority. Moreover, when they do not administrate a 
leveraged portfolio and the investors are not entitled to cancel their investment within five 
years from the initial launch of the private equity fund, the de minimis exemption goes up 
to €500 million. This exception aims at the reduction of administration and transaction 
costs by the financial supervisory authorities. Transaction costs are those that are necessary 
for the execution of any transaction, such as the costs of information, communication and 
coordination (e.g., contractual costs).530  
 
                                                          
527
  Cf. Swoboda/Schatz, in: Striegel/Wiesbrock/Jesch, Kapitalbeteiligungsrecht (2009), p. 852. 
528
  http://www.aifm.de/tl_files/pdf/MEMO-10-572_EN[1].pdf (requested August/29th/2011). 
529
  http://www.aifm.de/tl_files/pdf/MEMO-10-572_EN[1].pdf (requested August/29th/2011). 
530
  Cf. Dietl, in: Köhler/Küpper/Pfingsten, Betriebswirtschaft (2007), pp. 1750, 1751; Jost, in: 
Köhler/Küpper/Pfingsten, Betriebswirtschaft (2007) pp. 782, 783. 
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When an AIFM does not cross the relevant bar of €500 million, she or he must inform 
the responsible financial authorities about the most important tools, the biggest risks and 
risk concentration at those funds she or he administrates; this requirement will also contain 
significant systemic risks.531 The trigger point of €500 million will exclude many fund 
managers from venture capital funds from the scope of the AIFMD to ease the access to 
the capital market, even in times of a generally restricted credit supply.532 
 
The de minimis exemption can be seen because systemic risks are a result of the 
amount of credit accumulation. A certain level of credit accumulation can be seen as a 
result of a well-functioning competition if it contributes to the general public welfare such 
as maintaining price stability. However, if it crosses a certain level, it can cause serious 
risks to the market integrity. Walker identifies the volume of credit accumulation in the 
financial segment as one core reason for the recent financial crisis. Thus, the de minimis 
exemption that states an exception for a small AIFM is a consequence of the principle of 
proportionality. 533  In a way, it respects Walker´s 534  postulation that any sustainable 
financial regulation must avoid overreaction. 
 
The AIFMD neither precisely defines the procedure for how the relevant business 
volume should be determined nor does it define the relevant point in time. Because of the 
principal objective to implement effective investor protection, and in view of the fact that 
any “portfolio-focused approach” does not contribute to the further objective of legal and 
planning security, it is preferable to focus on the depository obligations of the investors.535 
Referring to the phrase “assets under management”, which also covers those deposits that 
are already performed, it also seems possible to focus on the already-performed deposits.536  
 
                                                          
531
  http://www.aifm.de/anwendung.html (recently requested on August/31st/2011). 
532
  Tollmann, Hertz-Eichenrode/Illenberger/Jesch/Keller/Klebeck/Rocholl, Private Equity-Lexikon (2011), 
p. 4 (5). 
533
  Cf. third chapter, 1.1. 
534
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (202). 
535
  Cf. Swoboda/Schatz, in: Striegel/Wiesbrock/Jesch, Kapitalbeteiligungsrecht (2009), p. 854. 
536
  Ibid. 
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1.3.5.  Administrating activities requirements  
In this content, the legal interpretation of the word “administrate” , which describes the 
key element of the alternative fund managers’ activity, is not yet clear because Articles 8a-
18 of the AIFMD do not include any legal definition. Furthermore, it does not define 
precisely what measures it takes to fulfil the requirement of “cautious” conduct. Many of 
the terms that are used by the directive, such as the requirement of honest, cautious, 
diligent and fair conduct (Article 9 AIFMD), are general principles. They are less concrete, 
not legally defined and can be qualified as sentences that neither underlie the juridical 
control nor that can be controlled fragmentarily. Finally, they are subject to national 
implementing rules that still have to be enacted and that must respect the general objective 
to protect market integrity and the principle that all investors must be treated justly and 
equitably (Article 9 paragraph 1 lit. f AIFMD). The principle to treat all investors justly 
and equitably is concretised at the end of Article 9 paragraph 1 AIFMD, which forbids the 
AIFM to give any investor special privileges. 
 
The systematic position of the AIFMD in EU law hints at an interpretation that covers 
services such as the portfolio management, the risk management and the marketing of the 
fund, whereas any activity that does not include an element of power for strategic decisions 
cannot be defined as “administration” - thus, only consulting activity of the fund manager 
cannot be defined under the term “administration”.537 Finally, the interpretation must not 
neglect the objective of the AIFMD to contain systemic risks. A mere consulting activity 
that aims at the preparation of portfolio decisions seems insufficient to cause systemic risks 
because it has no direct impact on the market integrity. Finally, Article 34a of the latest 
version of the AIFMD allows this kind of distribution under the provision of suitable tools 
that guarantee the monitoring of systemic risks in accordance with the international 
standards and the continuous corporation between the supervisory authorities of the 
concerned Member State and the third country.538 
 
                                                          
537
  Cf. Heese/Lamsa, CORPORATE FINANCE law 1/2011, p. 39, 41. 
538
  Cf. Müller/Staub, GesKR 2/2010, pp. 216, 223. 
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Article 18 of the AIFMD entitles the AIFM to transfer certain administrative tasks to 
an experienced third person. In the latest version of the AIFMD, the AIFM is entitled to 
outsource the portfolio management and the risk management to a company in a third 
country under the provision that this company underlies a (financial) supervision in its 
function as fund manager, and that the responsible supervisory authority in the third 
country cooperates with the delegating AIFM.539 This regulation goes back to the Spanish 
proposal for an amendment of the AIFMD and can be seen as a consequence of the liberty 
of economic freedom of organisation that is granted by the ECFR. It is a tribute to the 
awareness of the enormous transnational mobility of capital. Moreover, the AIFM 
normally has a strong intrinsic incentive not to lose the “allowance to operate”, so that it 
does not seem very probable that one will abuse one´s economic freedom for an efficient 
organisation, an (international) division of labour.  
 
Due to Articles 34a-35 of the AIFMD, the distribution of any AIF that is located in 
third countries and administrated by an AIFM who resides in a Member State of the EU 
provides that the AIFM fulfils all requirements of the AIFMD except those from the 
articles on the depository, and, furthermore, that there exists an agreement with the third 
country which secures an efficient exchange of information with the third-country 
supervisory authorities.540  
 
1.3.6. Equity requirements  
 Because the European Commission holds a minimum capital of the AIFM as inevitable 
to contain significant liability risks of the AIFM, Article 14 AIFMD provides harmonised 
capital requirements in the EU and will ensure that the AIFM avail himself or herself of 
adequate capital to fulfil the current contractual obligations.541 Article 14 of the AIFMD is 
based on an “impact assessment” approach that will seriously affect the implementation 
and organisation of an AIFM.542 Finally, it is seen as a significant barrier for the further 
                                                          
539
  Article 18 paragraph 1 AIFMD in the version of the Spanish proposal, dated March/10th/2010. 
540
  Cf. Müller/Staub, GesKR 2/2010, pp. 216, 222. 
541
  Cf. Swoboda/Schatz, in: Striegel/Wiesbrock/Jesch, Kapitalbeteiligungsrecht (2009), p. 857. 
542
  Ibid. 
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development of the European private equity market.543 The minimum capital requirements 
that are stipulated by the AIFMD will secure a minimum of liquid assets that are 
transferable into cash immediately and that do not include speculative elements (Article 6 
lit. a paragraph 8 AIFM) and which also aim at a continuous and regular administration of 
the AIF by its managers.544 
  
To secure a continuous and regular administration of the AIF, the AIFM must avail 
himself or herself of a minimum of capital resources that must be liquid and quickly 
available. Its volume must cover 25% of the general costs of the last business period-- 
specifically, the business planning but not less than €125,000, €300,000 in the case of an 
internal AIFM.545 If the relevant assets go over €250 million, it takes additional capital 
resources that must correspond to 0.02% of that capital amount, which goes over the 
relevant amount of €250 million. 546  Effectively, in view of Walker’s experience that 
systemic risks result from the amount of credit accumulation, the total amount of capital 
resources is limited by €10 million. Finally, the AIFMD entitles the AIFM to deposit 50% 
of the minimum capital in the form of an assurance or bank guarantee.547 
 
1.3.7.  Risk management requirements  
To lessen the potential for systemic risk, the AIFM has to implement an advanced risk 
management system that focuses on a functional and hierarchical separation of risk 
management and portfolio management.548 An adequate risk management strategy has to 
ensure that all systemically significant risks are continuously identified, assessed and 
contained-- specifically, that the liquidity profile of the deposits corresponds with the 
relevant debts.549  
 
                                                          
543
  Ibid. 
544
  Cf. Heese/Lamsa, CORPORATE FINANCE law 1/2011, p. 39, 43. 
545
  http://www.aifm.de/eigenkapitalanforderungen.html (requested August/31st/2011). 
546
  http://www.aifm.de/eigenkapitalanforderungen.html (requested August/31st/2011). 
547
  Ibid. 
548
  Ibid. 
549
  Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 188, 194. 
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Although alternative investments can be characterised by certain general features, such 
as the use of leverage tools, the use of short selling and the fact that they are normally not 
traded at an organised market, they appear in a very different way as a consequence of 
their business volume, their structure of investors (e.g., strategic investors or financial 
investors) and their product placement. As a consequence, the AIFMD does not state 
detailed requirements for the implementation of the risk management that needs to be 
established. In view of the principal objectives of the AIFMD (effective containment of 
systemic risks, effective protection of investors), it is imperative that the AIFM secures the 
full correspondence between the contractual conditions with the portfolio strategy and its 
principal objectives.550 Moreover, it is decisive that all systemically relevant risks and their 
effect on the portfolio as a whole can be monitored at any time by a suitable “stress 
test”551.552 
 
 The AIFM must ensure that the risk management corresponds to a certain standard. 
This requires an accurate identification, evaluation and supervision of those risks that 
result from investments and that directly affect the portfolio as a whole, inclusively the 
implementation of a “stress test”.553 Furthermore, this must take suitable measures for the 
compliance of the relevant risk profile in relation with the total business volume, the 
portfolio structure, the investment strategies and the investment objectives that are defined 
in the statute, the business prospect and the emission attachments.554 The AIFM is subject 
to specific requirements if the business model should be based on the use of leverage 
effects.555 An advanced risk management has to inform all investors about leverage tools, 
secure a continuous monitoring of the risks of the portfolio as a whole and take suitable 
measures that these risks are in compliance with the relevant contract conditions and 
emission prospects. 
 
                                                          
550
  Ibid. 
551
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (196). 
552
  Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 188, 194. 
553
  http://www.aifm.de/verhaltensregelungen.html (requested August/31st/2011). 
554
  Ibid. 
555
  Ibid. 
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As a minimum, the required risk management will also have to embrace an adequate, 
regularly updated due diligence before any investment.556 A due diligence aims at the 
exposure of chances and risks of an investment to verify the purchase price. It should be 
mandatory in view of the normative decision theory,557 which provides that any investment 
decision should only be made on the basis of complete information.558 As we know from 
the recent financial crisis, we shouldn’t purchase a product that we don’t understand.  
 
1.3.8. Supervisory requirements  
 Following Walker´s point of view559 , all financial markets must be subject to an 
effective oversight and control that refers to the capital and liquidity reserves, risk 
management, asset valuation and incentives. 560  To secure an effective control of the 
liquidity reserves, the AIFMD provides an adequate liquidity management that requires 
regular “stress tests” for usual and unusual liquidity conditions.561 The regulations on the 
recall of AIF investments and the investment strategy must correspond with the liquidity 
demand of the AIF.562 
 
1.3.9.  Transparency requirements  
Transparency helps to build a “bridge of confidence and trust” as one essential 
condition for the protection of what is probably the most important capital of a corporation: 
its reputation. An enhanced transparency contributes to reduce the current transaction costs 
of a corporation because the investors rely on this reputation. A corporation that 
voluntarily respects certain transparency standards has a comparatively higher business 
reputation - not only among customers and investors but also among the financial 
                                                          
556
  Article 11 AIFMD; http://www.aifm.de/verhaltensregelungen.html (requested on August/31st/2011). 
557
  The normative decision theory faces the question of what it takes to define an optimal decision in a 
certain situation under all relevant circumstances. It recognises the number of different objectives, the 
information basis of the market participants concerning the reality (security, risk, uncertainty) and the 
character of the person who has to drew the decision, cf. Bamberg, in: Köhler/Küpper/Pfingsten, 
Betriebswirtschaft (2007), p. 383 f.; Further information on the decision theory: Baums, ZGR (2011), 
pp. 218 ff. 
558
  Liekefett, Due Diligence (2005), p. 41. 
559
  Cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 (195 ff. , 202 ff.). 
560
  http://www.aifm.de/verhaltensregelungen.html (requested August/31st/2011). 
561
  Ibid. 
562
  Ibid. 
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supervisory authorities and the general public, whose acceptance is significant for the 
corporation’s “license to operate”.563 Furthermore, the general understanding of financial 
products is one essential condition for the containment of systemic risks because it can be 
defined as one element of the investors’ risk management, where they normally do not 
intentionally purchase a financial product they don’t understand and whose risk they 
cannot estimate. In particular, compelling legal requirements about the transparency of 
alternative investments are decisive in view of the fact that those business models - 
different from the share trade at the organised capital markets – are often based on the 
obscurity of their portfolio strategy, which leads to their financial supervision become a 
“fight against windmills”. Yields on the basis of non-transparent business models often 
bear the danger of significant systemic risk. 
 
Because the lack of transparency can be identified as one core reason for the recent 
financial crisis, the European Commission’s approach to contain a similar crisis in the 
future can be seen as a “key part of the European Commission´s drive to lay the regulatory 
foundations for a secure financial system that supports and stimulates the Real 
Economy.”564 
 
Against the highlighted regulatory background, the AIFMD provides stronger 
transparency requirements (Articles 19-21 of the AIFMD). These include an annual report 
on the current business activities that has to be drawn up no later than six months after the 
close of the relevant financial year (Article 19 of the AIFMD). This mandatory report will 
be submitted to the responsible financial authorities and must contain a balance sheet and 
an overview of the assets, a list of all yields and expenses, information on the manager’s 
remuneration structure and the carried interest and a report on all business activities in the 
relevant period.565 Moreover, the AIFM has to publish the remuneration of those managers 
whose business activities significantly affect the risk profile of the AIF and - before any 
investment - the portfolio strategy, possible leverage tools, and the principles in the case of 
                                                          
563
  Basically the “license to operate” is the synonym for the general acceptance of a corporation under the 
conditions of economic globalisation cf. Heap, Legal framework (2009), p. 171 ff.; Huber, in: Straus, 
Globalized Economy (2009), p. 55 f.; Türk, in: Straus, Globalized Economy (2009), pp. 3 ff. 
564
  http://www.aifm.de/tl_files/pdf/MEMO-10-572_EN[1].pdf (requested August/29th/2011). 
565
  Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 188, 195. 
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a recall of the investment and the assessment principles.566 These mandatory information 
requirements will contribute to a continuous monitoring and analysing of potential 
systemic risks and are strengthened in the case where the AIFM uses leverage tools. In that 
case, the AIFM also has to inform the responsible financial authority about the total 
amount of leverage of each AIF and the source of leverage (credits, lender of shares or 
derivatives). 567  The comparatively five biggest creditors (share lenders) must be 
identified.568 
 
1.4.  Transformation into national law  
1.4.1.  Regulatory technique  
In comparison with the European Legal Ordinance that sets a harmonised and 
mandatory regulatory framework in all European Member States, the European Directive is 
only compelling with regard to its regulatory objective. It principally requires the 
transformation in each Member State into its own national law.569 Thus, the European 
directive is the relatively proportional measure to realise the superior objective of the 
common market by respecting national traditions and customs570  because the Member 
States as the consignees of the directive have a formal arrangement571 at its transformation 
into national law: They must not go below the compelling minimum standard of the 
directive, but they are free to stipulate stronger rules. Thus, the EU awards a “sovereignty 
reserve” to the Member States. Functionally, the regulatory technique of the directive 
principally contributes to the coordination of the different national legal and administrative 
rules.572 In view of the principle of practice effectiveness (effet utile)573 any natural or legal 
person is entitled to directly invoke the rules of the directive should the time corridor for 
the national transformation elapse without result.574 According to the jurisdiction of the 
                                                          
566
  Ibid. 
567
  Ibid. 
568
  Article 21 paragraph 4 AIFMD. 
569
  In particular, on the transformation of the AIFMD into German law cf. Jesch/Geyer, BKR (No. 9/2012), 
p. 359 ff. 
570
  Cf. Härtel, Handbuch (2006), p. 173 (§ 9, bullet 14). 
571
  Cf. Hetmeier, in: Lenz/Borchardt, EGV (2006), § 249, bullet 9. 
572
  Cf. Härtel, Handbuch (2006), p. 173 (§ 9, bullet 14). 
573
  Cf. Nagel, Wirtschaftsrecht (2003), p. 59 ff. 
574
  Cf. ECJ, C-221/88 (Busseni), Collection of decisions (1990), p. I-495 = NJW 1991, p. 1409; ECJ, C-
91/92 (Faccini Dori), Collection of decisions (1994), p. I-3325; ECJ, C-5/83 (Rienks), Collection of 
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ECJ575 , each European Member State is forbidden to interdict the direct invoke on a 
European directive. 
 
As one consequence of the legal character of each directive, the targets of the AIFMD 
are mandatory to any European Member State. Each European country has the decision 
autonomy to implement a regulation for all types of AIF or only for those that cross the 
relevant bar.576 However, each European Member State makes the independent decision 
whether it transfers all relevant articles into national law or only those that go beyond the 
de minimis exemption.577 
 
1.4.2. Time corridor  
After the AIFMD was released in the European Gazette, the European Member States 
had two years to transfer it into their own national laws. These two years began with the 
first day after the AIFMD became effective, 21 July 2011, and it ends on 22 July 2013 
(Article 66 AIFMD). Within this time period, the European Commission, assisted by the 
European Securities Supervision (ESMA), will release implementation rules that contribute 
to the practical implementation of the AIFMD.  
 
1.5.  Level 2-Measures (AIFMD-IRR)  
1.5.1. Timeline and introduction 
To enable any concretisation of the AIFMD by the European Member States, the 
ESMA578 has already been requested to work out the so-called “Level 2 Measures” - the 
consultation of the relevant market participants ended on 14 January 2011. With the “Level 
                                                                                                                                                                                
decisions (1983), p. I-4223; ECJ, C-8/81 (Becker), Collection of decisions 1982, p. 53 = NJW (1982), p. 
499. 
575
  Cf. ECJ, at: Bieber/Epiney/Haag, EU (2005), § 6, bullet 64. 
576
  Cf. Proposal of the European Commission, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/de/10/st06/st06795-
re03.de10.pdf, Article 2b (requested August/25th/2011). 
577
  Cf. Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 188, 193. 
578
  ESMA, ESMA’s response to the European Commission’s provisional request to  CESR/ESMA for 
technical advice on possible Level 2 measures concerning  the Directive for Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers (AIFM), published under http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2011_382.pdf. 
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2 Measures” the European Commission is requested to define all kinds of possible 
conflicts of interests and the organisational and administrative requirements to contain 
those conflicts of interest prospectively.579 Additionally, the European Commission must 
define the criteria of an enhanced risk management580 , such as the liquidity requirements 
(liquidity management systems, liquidity management procedure and the coherence 
between investment strategy, liquidity profile and the principles on the recall of 
investments).581 The ESMA presented its propositions for suitable implementing rules on 
16 November 2011 on time (ESMA recommendations on general provisions, authorization 
and operating conditions, depositary, transparency requirements and leverage and 
supervision). Already on 23 February 2012, the ESMA released a discussion paper on key 
concepts of the AIFMD and types of AIFM, which represented a first step to elaborating 
the draft regulatory technical standards (RTS) subject to Article 4 paragraph 4 AIFMD. 
Based at the ESMA-recommendations, the European Commission released implementing 
rules for the AIFMD - Supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council with regard to exemptions, general operating conditions, depositaries, 
leverage, transparency and supervision (AIFMD-implementing rules and regulations, 
AIFMD-IRR582) - on 19 December 2012. The AIFMD-IRR shall be implemented by an 
additional state law of the European Commission, Nr. 231/2013 (EU), dated 19 December 
2012583.584 
 
1.5.2. Legal objectives  
In view of the predominating objective of the AIFMD to provide a clear and consistent 
framework for the regulation and supervision of AIFM in the EU and to ensure a high level 
of investor protection in the European Union, the AIFMD-IRR shall secure preferably 
consistent implementation of the AIFMD in the European Member States and, moreover, 
contribute to the effective containment of systemic risks. In view of these objectives, the 
AIFMD-IRR shall provide  
 
                                                          
579
  http://www.aifm.de/verhaltensregelungen.html (requested July/6th/2013). 
580
  Ibid. 
581
  Ibid. 
582
  Published under http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/20121219-directive/delegated-
act_en.pdf. 
583
  Official Gazette of the European Union L 83/1 (22 March 2013). 
584
  Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/20121219-directive/delegated-act_en.pdf 
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- Firstly, a common approach to calculate the respective assets under management - AuM - 
(“issue 1”), 
 
- Secondly, common methods to determine an AIF´s leverage, both as a reflection of the 
AIF´s “footprint” as a trigger for leverage-related reporting - “substantial use of leverage” - 
(“issue 2”), 
 
- Thirdly, a common approach on the AIF´s level of additional own funds - operational 
continuity - (“issue 3”), 
 
- Fourthly, a common approach on the scope of custody and, moreover, the repositories 
liability to return financial instruments lost in custody (“issue 4”), 
 
- Fifthly, a common approach to AIF´s frequency (“issue 5”). 
 
 
 
1.5.3. Contents at a glance  
The AIFMD-IRR embrace comparatively detailed rules that notably concern the 
calculation of the administrated assets (Article 3 paragraph 6 AIFMD-IRR) and the 
methods to calculate the leverage (Article 4 paragraph 3 AIFMD-IRR). It prescribes 
requirements of additional own funds or the professional indemnity insurance 
(PII 585 ),which covers professional liability risks and therefore implicates the level of 
investor protection achieved by the AIFMD (Article 9 paragraph 9 AIFMD-IRR). 
Moreover, it prescribes the perimeter of financial instruments that can be registered in a 
depositary's financial instruments account, which determines the scope of the latter's 
obligation to return instruments lost in custody (Article 21 paragraph 17 AIFMD-IRR). It 
also provides the scope of liability for losses that occur while an instrument is held in 
custody, determining the level of investor protection (Article 21 paragraph 17 AIFMD-
IRR), the precise scope of cash monitoring that is important for investor protection  
                                                          
585
  The PII, which is  known under the expression errors & omissions (E&O), particularly in the USA, 
represents a form of liability insurance that contributes to protecting professional advice- and service-
providing individuals and corporations from bearing the unlimited cost of defending against an omission 
claim placed by a client, and damages awarded in such a civil lawsuit.  
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(Article 21 paragraph 17 AIFMD-IRR), and reporting frequencies that are decisive to 
implement adequate monitoring of systemic risks at macro-prudential and micro-prudential 
level to secure an adequate level of investor protection (Article 24 paragraph 6 Level II 
measures). It also gives precise requirements for that case that leverage is to be considered 
to be employed on a substantial basis and crucial in triggering the reporting obligations in 
Article 24 paragraph 4 AIFMD (Article 24 paragraph 6 AIFMD-IRR).  
 
Moreover, the AIFMD-IRR determines conditions and procedures for the 
determination and authorization of AIFMs, including the capital requirements applicable to 
AIFMs; operating conditions for AIFMs, including rules on remuneration, conflicts of 
interest, risk management, liquidity management, investment in securitisation positions, 
organisational requirements, and rules on valuation; conditions for delegation, including 
further clarity on the meaning of a letter box entity; rules on depositaries and rules for 
cooperation arrangements. 
 
 
1.5.4. Contents in detail  
Article 2 AIFMD-IRR demands the AIFM to precisely calculate the total AuM. The 
AIFM is therefore committed to register all AIF (Article 2 paragraph 1 lit a) AIFMD-IRR). 
For each administrated fund, one has to register the respective portfolio value according to 
the binding rules of one´s locating country and, should this be necessary, register the value 
of the AuM according to valuating rules that are determined by the statutory law of the AIF 
(Article 2 paragraph 1 lit b AIFMD-IRR). 
 
To calculate the respective assets, these shall be valued without deducting liabilities 
and assessing the taken financial derivative instruments (FDIs 586 ) at the value of an 
equivalent position in the underlying assets. The FDIs shall be valued under 
correspondence with the underlying assets acquired by the fund reflects the AIF´s exposure 
to these assets. 
 
                                                          
586
  As already mentioned, derivative transactions typically include a broad diversity of financial contracts, 
such as structured debt obligations and deposits, swaps, futures, options, caps, floors, collars, forwards and 
various combinations of these 
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Referring to the leverage ratio (Article 4 AIFMD), the European Commission prefers to  
combine the “Gross-method” and the “Commitment-method”. Resulting from applying the 
first method, those leverage ratios follow the principal objective of the AIFMD to capture 
the respective macro-prudential risks  early and consistently. The “Commitment-method”,  
meanwhile, has become well established and acknowledged in the asset management 
segment. Its effects can be readily compared with those for UCITS funds.  
 
In combination with the “Gross-method”, the “Commitment-method”  provides a good 
insight into the investment strategies and exposure of those AIF relevant for the respective 
stakeholders, notably towards investors and supervisors. In case of proven necessity for an 
additional method to better apprehend systemic risk, the ESMA shall be authorized to 
propose the respective precise parameters. This method would then be adopted by 
modifying the delegated act. Recourse to an advanced method must not obviate the 
calculation of leverage according to the “Gross-method” and the “Commitment-method” - 
both remain mandatory to all AIFM. According to the author ´s point of view, these 
leverage conditions could nevertheless result in the disclosure of figures that do not 
properly represent the true leverage of the fund and, moreover, cause significant confusion 
to investors. 
 
According to the aforementioned ESMA-recommendations, the AIFM should calculate 
any additional fund based on the variable AuM and, moreover, combine additional own 
funds and PII subject to certain conditions (General operating conditions).587 Thus, any 
additional own fund cover professional liability risks up to a volume of 0.01% of the AuM, 
calculated on gross assets valuing derivatives at market price. Alternatively, any PII with 
coverage of 0.9% of AuM for aggregate of claims/year and 0.7% of AuM per individual 
claim seem to be appropriate to protect investors from damages that result from the 
AIFM's professional failures. This approach differs from the ESMA recommendation for a 
minimum threshold and a cap on the PII. The European Commission regards this proposal 
as being inconsistent with the absence of any cap in calculating additional own funds. 
 
Concerning the custody requirements, the European Commission holds the view that, 
following the option to consistently register systemically relevant financial means 
                                                          
587
  Cf. http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2011_382.pdf 
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(transferable securities, money market instruments 588 , units in collective investment 
undertakings) belonging to an AIF, shall be held in custody. Even this approach differs 
from the ESMA-recommendation to the extent that AIF assets may not be excluded from 
the scope of custody since they are subject of a security interest collateral arrangement. 
Should any AIF provide its assets as collateral to collateral takers, the AIFMD requires that 
these assets remain in custody - except if the AIF transfers ownership of the collateralised 
assets to the collateral taker (title transfer collateral arrangement). 
 
Custody of the collateralised AIF assets can be ensured either through the process that 
the collateral taker is appointed custodian over the collateralised AIF's assets or the AIF's 
depositary appoints a sub-custodian that acts for the collateral taker.Alternatively, 
collateralised assets remain with the AIF's depositary and are 'earmarked' in favor of the 
collateral taker. Anyway, the aforementioned custody design reflects industry practice and 
ensures that the depositary is not liable for the return of those assets that do not underlay its 
“control”. Moreover, the proposed approach that corresponds with the AIFMD Level 1-
measures does not require that a central counterparty (CCP) becomes a sub-custodian. 
 
Concerning depositary and the definition of an “external event”, the European 
Commission shares the recommendations of the ESMA and advises to deem any event that 
does not relate to the operational sphere of a depositary or its appointed network of sub-
custodians (custody operations fraud, operational failures or any lack of compliance with 
the respective AIFMD's legal operational provisions) as an external event. In case of 
insolvency of any sub-custodian, possibly operational mistakes by the sub-custodian, like 
its lack of ability to organize the segregation requirement, is not qualified as an "external 
event". As a consequence, external events would be natural disasters or acts of state or 
government measures (e.g. market closures). 
 
Concerning the scope of cash monitoring, the European Commission prefers to assign 
the mandatory commitment to the depository to perform ex-post periodic reconciliations of 
AIF's cash flows. This would enable the depositary to identify cash flows that obviously do 
not comply with the investment strategy of the AIF. Furthermore, it could notify the AIFM 
and, if the discrepancies are not resolved, the responsible authority would be informed. On 
                                                          
588
  Definition money markets cf. Annotation No. 48. 
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the one hand, this approach could effectively minimize those significant expenses that 
possibly result from delays in AIF's transactions in the case of an ex-ante cash monitoring 
regime. On the other hand, a cash monitoring regime that reduces the function of the 
depositary on verifying that the AIFM or any third party has procedures in place to 
reconcile the AIF’s cash flows and monitoring the outcomes of the reconciliations is 
considered less effective and robust than the preferred option. The effectiveness of this 
approach would entirely depend on the effectiveness and the accuracy of the cash 
monitoring and reconciliations by the AIFM itself with the inherent conflicts of interest. 
Since the AIFM or any third party are not legally required to perform the reconciliations, 
the verification regime also entails legal uncertainty as to whether the reconciliations 
would be performed at all and whether the depositary has duly discharged its cash 
monitoring obligations. Providing legal certainty and containing operational weaknesses 
and risks of fraud were the main reasons for deviating from the regime based on 
verification of procedures as proposed by the ESMA. 
 
 
Concerning the reporting requirements, following the recommendations of the ESMA 
and realizing adequate regulatory reporting standards in a major non-EU AIFM 
jurisdiction, the AIFM shall be generally committed to quarterly reporting. Should the 
respective AuM reach a total volume of more than 1 billion Euros, semi-annual reporting is 
mandatory. Moreover, the AIFMD-IRR prescribes annual reporting for AIFM with AuM 
below the AIFMD-threshold. Against the background of the characteristic investment 
policy of private equity and venture capital and to effectively contain non-proportional 
administrative burdens for smaller AIFMs, managers that “rule” non-leveraged AIFs which 
invest in non-registered corporations and issuers in order to acquire control only have to 
perform annual reporting.  
 
Furthermore, As the European Commission underlines, an AIF would be ideally 
considered to be employing leverage on a substantial basis when its exposure, as calculated 
using the before-mentioned “Commitment-method”, exceeds three times the net asset 
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value (NAV 589 ) of the AIF. This shall provide the preferably best trade-off between 
adequate reporting on leverage and the administrative effort on the AIFM and the 
responsible authorities. A threshold that covers three times that of the NAV would realize 
leverage related reporting by AIFMs that employ higher levels of leverage while 
exempting AIFMs, whose leverage is similar or close to those employed by UCITS. This 
approach would even require one level playing field and, moreover, legal certainty to 
AIFMs due to their reporting obligations. The significance of legal certainty was probably 
the predominating cause for the differences from the ESMA-recommendation that 
proposes self-assessment by the AIFM. 
 
1.6. Review  
As the first attempt to establish a harmonised European regulation of the private equity 
segment, the AIFMD tries to close a threatening gap in the financial market regulation. It 
shall close this gap by stipulating an equal regulatory framework that is mandatory for 
various kinds of alternative investments. It focuses on the alternative fund manager who 
avails himself or herself of a widespread economic freedom and who has responsibility for 
the liquidity management and the risk management of the AIF. The AIFMD will abolish 
trading with any non-regulated financial product. Also, the equal treatment shall enhance 
the neutrality of economic decisions.  
 
The AIFMD contains detailed requirements on the registration, the administration, the 
portfolio strategy, and the annual reporting to strengthen investor protection, market 
integrity and market efficiency. Moreover, to reduce current information asymmetries and 
in view of the awareness that the financial crisis of 2008/2009 revealed a widespread 
failure of investment trust, the AIFMD puts one major focus on the transparency of the 
administrated financial product, the investment strategy and the remuneration of the 
involved fund managers (Articles 19-21) to enhance the protection of investors and 
                                                          
589
  In general, the NAV can be defined as the mutual fund's price per share or exchange-traded fund's (ETF) 
per-share value. In both cases, the per-share dollar amount of the fund is calculated by dividing the total 
value of all the securities in its portfolio, less any liabilities, by the number of fund shares outstanding, cf. 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nav.asp. 
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depositors (“good conduct”). It will contribute to the establishing of an advanced 
monitoring of the alternative investment circulation as one essential provision for the early 
identification of systemic risks and, moreover, the implementation of an enhanced 
financial supervision. Furthermore, the AIFMD aims at the strengthening of the equity 
position of the AIFM (Article 14 AIFMD). Thus, it requires an annual assessment of all 
relevant assets and a limitation of leverage. In correspondence with Walker´s awareness 
that systemic risks result from a too-strong credit accumulation, it implements a “de 
minimis exemption” that excludes those investment funds that do not cover more than 
€100 million, specifically €500 million: A sustainable financial regulation should avoid 
over-reaction and unnecessary regressive response. 
 
The current 28 European Member States are being given until 21 July 2013 to 
transform the AIFMD into their own national laws. Due to the legal character of a 
European directive, the AIFMD is only mandatory in terms of its objective (Article 288 
paragraph 3 TFEU) and leaves a “sovereignty reserve” to each European Member State. As 
one consequence, in many European countries it is not yet clear whether this will happen 
through the integration into an existing law - in Germany the integration into the German 
Investmentgesetz (dInvG590) is being discussed - or through the creation of a particular 
private equity law. 
2. Evaluation of the AIFMD: The AIFMD as an appropriate reaction 
to the recent financial crisis  
2.1.  Is the AIFMD a complete solution or merely a single-focused solution?  
 In view of the increased complexity of the financial crisis of 2008/2009, the editors of 
the AIFMD obviously neglected the principle of risk diversification that is well-known to 
each retail investor. If one concentrates on one specific risk profile by neglecting other risk 
profiles, one does not minimise but increase the risk of a total loss of the whole investment. 
Thus, it seems questionable if the regulatory focus on the AIFMs is a suitable approach to 
contain future systemic risks. Furthermore, the one-size-fits-all focus of the European 
Commission bears the risk that many financial market participants that do not really bear a 
                                                          
590
  Investmentgesetz (dInvG) of December/12th/2003 (Federal Law Gazette I 2003, p. 2676), lately 
amended by Article 5 of the law dated February/13th/2013 (Federal Law Gazette I 2013, p. 174). 
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systemic risk will suffer a serious profit collapse and receive incentives to leave the EU, 
choosing instead offshore countries like the Cayman Islands. A regulatory approach that 
produces an exodus of capital instead of a sustainable containment of systemic risk does 
not contribute to the common good, is not proportional and should be omitted. The 
common good does not require any kind of overregulation but requires precise incentives 
for a sustainable economic growth.  
 
Because the economic depression that followed the financial crisis of 2008/2009 was a 
crisis of liquidity and trust among investors and at the interbank market, precise incentives 
require the safeguarded perspective of a steady and reliable credit supply of the real 
economy, including courageous start-up corporations and a steadily well-functioning 
monitoring of credit accumulation. Any non-proportional credit accumulation bears not 
only systemic risks but also aggravates the access to affordable (venture) capital as a 
consequence of a market concentration on the supply side. Thus, a sustainable legal 
approach should not follow a one-size-fits-all perspective. It seems preferable to design a 
regulatory framework that matches the specific shape of an (alternative) investment.  
 
2.2.  Critical reflection on the AIFM-focused approach  
In opposition to Walker, the regulatory focus on the AIFM instead of the AIF seems 
proportional and sustainable because many significant systemic risks are caused by the 
managers who are resident in the few global centres of finance and therefore more easily 
approachable than the administrated AIF that are predominantly resident in the off-shore 
centres such as the Cayman Islands.591 A regulation of the AIFM also seems preferable as 
the relevant supervisory information if this information is often only available from these 
managers.592 
 
                                                          
591
  Cf. Koller, Bankenstabilisierung (2011), pp. 97, 134. 
592
  Ibid. 
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2.3.  Evaluation of selected contents  
2.3.1. Critical reflection on the one-size-fits-all approach 
The essential question is whether all types of alternative investments should be 
regulated equally. If it is the objective of the AIFMD to reduce the systemic risk but not 
the “breath” of private entrepreneurship, which requires a steady supply of private capital, 
it may be a risk to regulate the activities of private equity without considering the principle 
of proportionality. Also, the Basel Capital Accord requires a precise analysis of risk and a 
realistic access of risks as one condition of a proportional and sustainable regulation.  
 
With regard to the significance of private equity to the credit supply of private business 
activities and the economic growth of the national economy, any overregulation can harm 
the attractiveness of the European capital market. Private equity is not severe at all. For 
example, the private equity investor can have a direct impact on the operative and strategic 
decisions of the management of the target corporation to enhance the discipline of its 
managers and reduce the moral hazard. Thus, the use of private equity gives the managers 
of the target corporation a strong incentive to spend the capital resources more 
efficiently. 593  In addition, private equity contributes to reducing the agency costs. 594 
Agency costs that can be seen as a direct consequence of the principle-agent conflict can 
be defined as the tangible and intangible expenses borne by shareholders because of the 
self-serving actions of managers. This includes the explicit costs over the out-of-pocket 
expenses (direct agency costs) to the more implicit ones (implicit agency costs).595  
 
Moreover, the use of private equity can minimise the tax and increases the amount of 
capital that is available for future investments.596 The on-going economic globalisation 
strengthens the competition among private corporations and among the national 
economies. This competition concerns not only the price and the quality of products but 
also the speed and minimises the time that is left to a corporation to face unexpected 
developments. A sufficient reaction towards unexpected market developments requires a 
                                                          
593
  Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 188, 189 f. 
594
  Ibid. 
595
  Lee/Lee, Finance (2006), p. 11. 
596
   Jaskolski/Grüber, Corporate Finance Law (2010), pp. 188, 189. 
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sufficient availability of capital and a current supply of private capital. A sufficient 
regulation of the alternative fund managers’ activities should not only consider the risks of 
this capital branch. It must also focus on its chances and its future perspectives, with regard 
to the legal framework of private equity, and on the emerging markets such as Brazil. 
Thus, it is the objective of this analysis to face the question of whether the AIFMD is really 
a sufficient compromise between the concern to minimise systemic risks and that potential 
that private equity offers to private corporations and to the welfare and growth of the 
European national economies. It might be seen as an invitation to the European 
Commission to reflect on its approach once more. 
 
Against the abovementioned background, the one-size-fits-all approach of the 
European Commission that treats almost each kind of alternative investment equally is a 
breach of the principle of proportionality anchored in the European Charter. One cannot 
say that every type of alternative investment bears the same risk profile. Many of these 
funds-- such as private equity funds, closed real estate funds and special funds-- do not 
really bear a systemic risk.597 By covering each kind of fund, the AIFMD not only affects 
the market integrity that actually should be promoted but also the efficiency of public 
resources. As already discussed, a well-functioning private equity contributes to public 
wealth, innovation and to the monetary capital and the intellectual resources of a 
corporation. 598  Any sustainable regulation cannot neglect these functions. Thus, the 
AIFMD causes a significant amendment of the regulatory framework for fund managers in 
the EU and consequently results in an undifferentiated supervisory treatment of different 
types of alternative investments.599  In view of their contribution to general welfare, it 
would be desirable that actively administrated certificates, “managed futures” and “index 
bonds” would also not be subject to the AIFMD. 
 
In referring to its core approach, one cannot doubt that the AIFMD aims at hedge 
funds and private equity. The one-size-fits-all approach embraces a broad variety of 
different investment types and therefore realises a uniform regulation concept that neither 
                                                          
597
  Cf. Koller, Bankenstabilisierung (2011), pp. 97, 133. 
598
  Cf. Jordan, Private Equity (2007), p. 1, 2. 
599
  Cf. Müller, Hedgefonds (2011), pp. 243 (281). 
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considers their different features nor the different economic arrangements designed by the 
market participants.600 Financial experts, financial associations, financial consults601 and 
financial institutions such as the German association of closed funds, or VGF, 
consequently complain that the AIFMD embraces many kinds of credit accumulation that 
do not really bear a systemic risk.602 Instead of covering all types of AIFM, it is preferable 
to avoid any exception and to set the focus on all systemically relevant AIF to promote the 
financial market stability.603 
 
Moreover, one cannot find any coherence between the AIFMD and other directives of 
the EU. Therefore, it is not really surprising that an opinion poll by Pregin - an 
independent research institute with a focus on alternative forms of investment - came to the 
conclusion that that 89% of the interviewed fund managers admit that the AIFMD is not 
necessary.604  In view of the central objective of the AIFMD to establish an effective, 
harmonised investor protection scheme, the one-size-fits-all approach seems questionable.  
 
Finally, the questionability of the EU Commission’s approach is even shown in the 
time period between submitting the application for the authorisation of the AIFM and the 
final decision by the responsible supervisory authority. Because many investors will not 
accept the uncertainty that results, a schematic approach may be suitable in the meantime 
for many asset classes but not for private equity funds.605  
 
                                                          
600
  Cf. Swoboda/Schatz, in: Striegel/Wiesbrock/Jesch, Kapitalbeteiligungsrecht (2009), p. 891 (1.3.: 
objectives of the Directive). 
601
  Overview on the relevant questions from the perspective of the consulting practice: Cf. Bernhard/Mark, 
in: Festschrift für Schwark (2009) p. 349 ff. 
602
  Cf. Schmuhl, Corporate Finance biz (2011), p. 139, 147; http://www.aifm.de/hintergrund-detail.html 
(requested August/29th/2011). 
603
  Cf. Schmuhl, Corporate Finance biz (2011), p. 139, 147; On the impact of the European legislation on 
the German “Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz” cf. Horn, BB (2009), pp. 450 ff. 
604
  Cf. Heese/Lamsa, CORPORATE FINANCE law 1/2011, p. 39, 39. 
605
  Cf. Swoboda/Schatz, in: Striegel/Wiesbrock/Jesch, Kapitalbeteiligungsrecht (2009), p. 856. 
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2.2. Critical reflection of the quantitative scope/De minimis exemption  
 It also carries negative weight that the de minimis exemption seems too low and does 
not correspond to the real stability requirements, as it does not prevent the regulation of 
almost each AIFM who has not recently been subjected to the Directive of the European 
Council on Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities (Directive 
85/611/EWG, dated 20 December 1985) - UCITSD.606607 Therefore, it goes far beyond 
those regulatory postulations of the G20608 that were released for systemically relevant 
hedge funds.609 Although the credit accumulation of many hedge funds can be identified as 
one core reason for the recent financial crisis, one cannot deny that these funds have 
created a widespread transnational wealth, and that they fulfil an essential function for the 
credit supply of the real economy. Because the European Member States themselves 
cannot fulfil each function and that their enormous (public) debts consequently caused the 
recent Euro crisis, one should treat their functions sophistically. One should abandon the 
widespread belief that their business policy only follows the mantra of “Buy it, strip it, flip 
it 610 ”, which means a business strategy that imposes enormous debt to corporations, 
reduces the number of working places and causes a decline in taxes.  
 
Should the principal objective of the AIFMD really consist of the promotion of 
financial stability, a bar of US$1,000 million (€750 million) should actually be sufficient.  
Thisis in view of the fact that, in 2008, 1% of the hedge fund managers administrated 75% 
of the total assets and simultaneously 3% of the hedge fund managers covered assets of 
more than US$1 billion.A regulatory framework at a bar of €750 million would embrace 
widely more than 80% of the hedge fund assets – more than enough to contain significant 
                                                          
606
  The UCITSD defines specific requirements on the coordination of the different rules of the European 
Member States on funds, other common investments and the permitted portfolio strategies (eligible 
assets). It is concretised in the European Directive 2007/16/EG that states rules on the implementation 
of the UCITSD. 
607
  For further information on the latest version of the UCITSD see Patzner/Kempf, EWS (2010), pp. 366 
ff. 
608
  The G-20 represents the informal association of the 19 most important industrial countries (United 
States of America, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, South Korea, Australia, 
Mexico) and emerging countries (China, Brazil, Russia, India, Turkey, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
Argentina, South Africa) plus the EU that aims at the implementation of a steady panel for corporation 
and consultation in terms of the international financial system. 
609
  Cf. Koller, Bankenstabilisierung (2011), pp. 97, 134. 
610
  Cf. Jordan, Private Equity (2007), p. 1, 2. 
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systemic risks.611 This underlines that the AIFMD does not fulfil Walker’s requirement of a 
proportional approach. 
 
In view of the increasing importance of an effective risk management and compliance, 
it is expected that these privileged “small” AIFMs will also respect all requirements of the 
AIFMD: For an increasing number of investors, it is becoming more important that the 
target corporation avails itself of an effective risk management.612 On the one hand, an 
effective risk management might result in higher transaction costs, and thus reduce the 
yield. On the other hand, it reduces the risk of a total loss of the investment. 
 
2.3. Critical reflection of the European passport  
The European passport is an element of the “core field harmonisation”, creates a “level 
playing field” and directly results in the European freedom of movement of capital and the 
European freedom of movement of employees. Because Walker identified the volume of 
credit accumulation as one core reasons for the recent financial crisis, it applies to a credit 
accumulation of €1 million (de minimis exemption). As Schmuhl613 states, the introduction 
of a European passport for an AIFM can contribute to the investment volume in the AIF 
segment, enhance the transparency of the venture capital market614 and the willingness of 
those investors to venture an investment, but also stimulate the inner European market by 
simplifying the AIF commerce. Under the conditions of economic globalisation, the 
European passport of the AIFM can be seen as a seal of quality that stands for a high level 
of investor protection. 
 
                                                          
611
  Cf. Koller, Bankenstabilisierung (2011), pp. 97, 134. 
612
  Cf. Heese/Lamsa, CORPORATE FINANCE law 1/2011, p. 39, 42. 
613
  Cf. Schmuhl, Corporate Finance biz (2011), p. 139, 148. 
614
  The venture capital market contributes to the financing of “young” corporations in the high-technology 
segment with an over-averaged capital request that results from research intensity, cf. Lenenbach, 
Kapitalmarktrecht (2010), p. 1469. 
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3.  Interim result  
As already mentioned, the AIFMD can be seen as another attempt towards an 
international regulation of collective deposits, respectively collective investment whose 
effectiveness depends on the development of the international financial markets. It sets a 
contrast to the Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity615 that has 
been submitted by Walker. These guidelines prefer a more voluntary regulation at the basis 
of private corporations (comply or explain) that goes back to the initiative of the British 
Venture Capital Association (BVCA).  
 
Due to the background of the increasing (economic) impact of the emerging markets 
and that of the BRIC states and the increasing transnational mobility of capital that is 
promoted by the development of the new media of information and communication, the 
national governments seem to be driven by the international financial markets. They react 
towards the international market development, but they do not really act because the 
increasing significance of the financial markets makes it increasingly complicated to take 
any legal measure at the national level. As a consequence, the regulation of alternative 
investments is also regulation under extreme uncertainty. Thus, it would be a wise decision 
to limit its validity for a certain period of time and to decide on its prolongation as soon as 
it is possible to deduce any conclusion on its effectiveness on the basis of the real financial 
market development.  
 
Under the conditions of economic globalisation, any regulation of the financial 
markets - seen from the investor’s perspective - is not more than a product because of the 
international competition of economic locations.616 If one wants to ease this competition 
that often results in a “race to the bottom”, it is inevitable for each national body to 
strengthen the efforts towards internationally compelling standards of financial regulation. 
  
                                                          
615
  Guidelines for disclosure and transparency in Private equity, http://walker-
gmg.co.uk/sites/10051/files/wwg_report_final.pdf (requested July/17th/2013). 
616
  On the structure of an economic constitution beside those of the national states: Renner, Transnationales 
Recht (2011), p. 1 ff. 
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Fifth Chapter -  
ALTERNATIVES TO THE AIFMD/ 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
TO THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS  
 
1.  Legal approaches 
1.1.  General annotations 
1.1.1.  Risks of a one-sided focus 
 In view of the enormous mobility of (private) capital, any approach that is suggested as 
a response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009 should consider that any legal regulation of 
alternative investments is an essential location factor. Under the circumstances of a 
globalised economy, any financial investor has the economic freedom of action to decide 
where to place her or his investment. Any too-strong level of legal regulation, at the 
national and even at the European level, can directly cause an exodus of capital towards the 
offshore countries, which usually results in welfare losses. For example, since the 
liberalisation of the British capital market in the late 1970s, many investors left their 
original countries and opted to operate in the City of London617 , which probably has 
become the most significant financial centre in the EU.  
 
                                                          
617
  According to the Global Financial Centres Index, whicht compares the competitiveness (availability of 
qualified labour forces, quality of the labour market, economic framework, market access, infrastructure 
and general competitiveness) of the 75 globally most significant financial places, published twice a year 
by the City of London Corporation, London reaches the position as a financial global leader before New 
York City, Hong Kong and Singapore. For further information on the ranking of the global financial 
Centers see cf. http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-information/research-
publications/Documents/research-2010/Global%20financial%20centres_7.pdf. 
(requested October/24th/2012). 
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Thus, any regulation of alternative investments should not only focus the containment 
of (macro-prudential) systemic risks and the protection of depositors.618 It should set one 
major focus at the steady credit support of the real economy, which is essential to a 
continuous and sustainable economic growth.619 Therefore, one should not only discus the 
risks of alternative investments and other financial innovations but also focus on its 
contribution to public welfare in view of the recent Euro and debt crisis.620 Many market 
participants do not trust these innovations because they do not understand its general 
functions and place too much trust in a negative report in the mass media. The initial 
hypothesis of alternative approaches instead of the AIFMD should therefore consist of a 
careful analysis of the effect and contribution of alternative investments. Any legal 
response should not dry out the public contribution of these financial innovations.  
 
1.1.2. Regulation of the product instead of the fund manager  
 If one discusses alternative legal approaches for the sustainable containment of 
systemic risks, one does not have to focus on the fund managers as the administrators and 
distributors of the fund. In opposition to the AIFMD, it seems reasonable to set the focus 
on the fund itself, the depositors or the specific risk profile of a financial product. Instead 
of being subject to all the different types of alternative investments (open funds, closed 
funds etc.) regardless of their specific risk profile, a more proportional regulation would 
aim at the systemic significance of a specific type or group of investments. For example, 
one could realise this by the legal requirement of a license or certification that has to be 
proved by the editor before the launch of the financial product. A certification in this spirit 
could ease the supervision,621 create a bigger level of (public) transparency and reduce the 
public costs.  
 
                                                          
618
  On the protection of investors and depositors by key investor information and comparable documents: 
Cf. Podewils, ZBB (2011), p. 169 ff.; Casper, BB (20/2011), Die Erste Seite; Steffen/Sachse, ZBB No. 
1/2011, pp. 33 ff. 
619
  On the expected economic growth in the business period 2012 cf. Dams, DIE WELT (September 
/21st/2011), p. 10. 
620
  On the future treatment of “debt sinners” in view of the recent European developments: Greive, DIE 
WELT (September /21st/2011), p. 10. 
621
  Until 2011 there was no independent financial supervision at the European level, cf. Baur/Boegl, BKR 
2011, p. 177 (177). 
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However, one should consider that a regulation of the fund instead of the fund 
manager could easily be avoided by shifting a single feature of the financial product. 
Noteworthy difficulties of hedge fund regulation result from the restricted nature of the 
direct regulation on hedge funds which can be seen as one consequence that an 
internationally generally acknowledged legal definition of hedge funds does not exist.622 
Regardless of some typical characteristic features, such as the use of leverage, 
derivatives623 and short selling that are typical for most hedge funds, a general definition of 
hedge funds does not exist.624 Moreover, in financial practice, there is no clear separation 
between hedge funds and private equity.625 The lack of a legal definition may cause legal 
insecurity among investors, but it contributes to the major public interest because any legal 
definition could easily be circumvented - thus, does a legal regulation enable a suitable 
approach at all? In general, there should be a revision of the current definitions tomake 
sure that they definitely embrace all different kind of funds.626 
 
Finally, any legal regulation of alternative investments could cause a footrace between 
the other involved market participants and the legislators. Though the European 
Commission or the responsible ministry could react more speedily and flexibly towards an 
amendment of the relevant product than the parliamentary legislator, it is usually the editor 
who wins this race - also under the comitology procedure. 627  Thus, in view of the 
enormous mobility and flexibility of capital, any regulation of the fund contributes to the 
fund managers, but not to the public and is therefore not a suitable approach. 
 
 
 
                                                          
622
  On the definition of hedge funds cf. Connor/Woo, Hedge Funds, pp. 5 ff. 
623
  General annotation on the regulation of credit derivates in view of the financial crisis of 2008/2009: 
Litten/Bell, BKR (2011), pp. 314 ff. 
624
  Cf. Faber, in: Hommelhoff/Hopt/Werder, Corporate Governance (2009), p. 223; Buck-Heeb, 
Kapitalmarktrecht (2011), p. 277 (bullet No. 653). 
625
  Cf. Faber, in: Hommelhoff/Hopt/Werder, Corporate Governance (2009), p. 223. 
626
  Cf. Connor/Woo, Hedge Funds, pp. 1 ff. (33).  
627
  As a part of the so-called “Lamfalussy Process” the comitology procedure represents a special 
legislation at the European level: The European Commission concretises the regulatory frame that is 
given by directives of the European Parliament and the European Council by detailed provisions, cf. 
Jung, in: Schulze/Zuleeg/Kadelbach, Europarecht (2010), § 20, Bullet No. 3. 
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1.1.3. Necessity of an international benchmarking  
 Any legal approach should always consider the prospective consequences to the 
allocation of private capital, its supply to the real economy and general public welfare. As 
it is shown by the recent Euro and debt crisis, financial regulation is often an action of 
uncertainty.628 To reduce the risks of uncertainty one possible solution is to undertake an 
international benchmarking and focus the legal framework of comparable industrial 
countries, regions or communities of states like the NAFTA629 (North American Free Trade 
Agreement).  
 
 Under the conditions of a globalised economy and an enormous mobility of capital, no 
country is enabled to maintain its public welfare by measures of protectionism. The 
Contract on the World Trade Organisation (WTO Contract630) that is based on David 
Ricardo’s idea of the comparative advantages of costs631 generally forbids any protectionist 
measures. To keep a substantial piece of the global value-added chain, each country needs 
to steadily monitor the scenery at the foreign markets, including its legal and infrastructural 
framework.  
 
Under the provision of the necessary financial and economic facilities, each market 
participant opts for that country that offers the comparatively best conditions contributing 
to his economic objective. Normally, she or he chooses the country that offers the highest 
gross margin. 632  The gross margin approximately corresponds to the Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR)633 that is calculated at the basis of that weighted average cost of capital that 
leads to a Net Present Value (NPV)634 at the level of zero.635 The benchmarking can be 
                                                          
628
  On economic and investment decisions as decisions under uncertainty: Baums, ZGR (2011), pp. 218 ff.; 
Pacces, ECFR (2010), pp. 479 ff. 
629
  Cf. Nowrot, in: Tietje, Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht (2009), § 2, ann. 38. 
630
  Agreement of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), dated April/15th/1994, Federal Law Gazette 1994 
II, p. 1625 = Official Journal of the European Communities (EU) 1994 L /336/3, effective 
January/1st/1995. 
631
  On David Ricardo´s theory of comparative advantages cf. Second Chapter, 1.6.2. 
632
  Cf. Spengel, ifo Schnelldienst (13/2004), pp. 3, 4. 
633
  Profit on capital investments or securities, cf. Lee/Lee, Finance (2006), p. 231. 
634
  The net present value, respectively the net benefit of an investment is the present value of a project’s 
cash flows minus its costs, cf. Lee/Lee, Finance (2006), p. 189. 
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described as a procedure to identify the international decisive factors of success and 
consists of a comparison of the framework for alternative investments.636 It requires a 
comparative analysis that follows a clearly determined reference value that makes it easier 
to identify and to adapt the respective best practices. By undertaking a benchmarking of 
the international different regulation of alternative investments, the regulating country can 
reduce the public costs of regulation and its public transaction costs. Furthermore, it can 
take measures against welfare losses. It is an integral element to analyse the economic 
consequences of a legal regulation. 
 
1.2.  International and European level  
1.2.1. Separation of commercial banks and investment banks 
 An approach that is seriously discussed as a legal approach at the European level 
consists of the separation of commercial banks and investment banks.637 It is an open 
secret that the objective of an equity return of 25% that was operated by Deutsche Bank is 
only realistic if the credit institute focuses on strong investment banking, which means its 
financial engagement in big industrial companies. Primarily, the proposal to separate 
commercial banks and investment banks (a separate banking system) goes back to the 
American Glass-Steagall Act638 of 16 June 1933 - one American response to the worldwide 
economic depression that started in October 1929.639 
 
On the one hand, this proposal faces the challenge of containing systemic risks 
effectively because those risks even result from overflowing investment banking. On the 
other hand, it seems to ignore the necessity of a well-proportioned portfolio and a 
                                                                                                                                                                                
635
  Cf. Hasselbach/Rödding, in: Eilers/Rödding/Schmalenbach, Unternehmensfinanzierung (2008), p. 803 
f.; Volkart, Corporate Finance (2008), p. 198. 
636
  Cf. Behrends, Managementsysteme (2005) p. 105 (referring to the use of benchmarking systems in the 
building sector). 
637
  On this proposition cf. Steinberg/Somnitz, ZfBW 6/2012, pp. 384 ff.; Rexer, DIE WELT 
(October/18th/2011), p. 9. 
638
  The Banking Act of 1933 is most commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act whose name results from 
its legislative sponsors, Carter Glass and Henry B. Steagall, cf. Kroszner/Rajan, Glass-Steagall Act, 
1993, p. 1 ff. 
639
  Sinn, Kasino-Kapitalismus (2009), p. 90. 
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diversification of risks.640 It belongs to the very first lesson of any investor in shares that it 
is essential to acquire shares of a different class of risks: small risks (“cautious 
investment”), middle risks (“decided investment”) and comparatively big risks 
(“speculative investment”). If one decides only to take small risks, there is hardly any 
chance to earn money. If one decides only to take big risks, the probability to lose money 
is comparatively large. This lesson should also be considered in the discussion of a 
separation of commercial banks and investment banks. What it takes is a well-proportioned 
diversification of risks – otherwise, a credit institute loses its attractiveness to investors and 
its competitive position. The proposed separation can aggravate a pronounced anti-cyclical 
portfolio strategy and, therefore, can even minimise a credit institute’s immunity against 
systemic risks.  
 
The Glass-Steagall Act probably forced the recent financial crisis because the 
forwarding of savings by the capital markets was overestimated.641 Although the separate 
banking system was successively transformed after the legal compulsion to decide for one 
of these business models was abolished in 1999, and many commercial banks cautiously 
approximated towards the investment banking, the separate banking system still remains 
after the breakout of the financial crisis.642 
 
The proposal to separate commercial banks and investment banks is not an appropriate 
response to the recent financial crisis. Moreover, in view of the principle of risk 
diversification, it could emerge as a boomerang under certain circumstances. 
 
1.2.2. Good conduct of rating agencies  
Until the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2008/2009, the managers of many rating 
agencies often used mathematical applications instead of their common sense to estimate 
                                                          
640
  In Germany § 2 paragraph 5 InvG requires that assets for the common capital investment are subject to 
the principle of risk spreading. 
641
  Sinn, Kasino-Kapitalismus (2009), p. 90. 
642
  Ibid. 
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the relevant risks - thus, their risk management often turned into a risk justification643 As 
the FCIC points out, they overrated mortgage securitised instruments by using wrongfully 
designed computer models and by underlying the pressure of financial corporations that 
paid for the ratings - against the background of fighting for market quotes.644 Against this 
background, notably Walker pointed out the significance of properly rated financial 
products and structured financial products.645 The European Commission enacted the VO 
1060/2009 regulation that states minimum requirements for the rating agencies. According 
to its Article 1, this regulation will contribute to integrity, transparency, responsibility, 
good governance and reliability of the rating agencies and improve the quality of financial 
ratings in the EU. The term “good governance” refers to the analysis and organisation of 
processes and structures to enhance a corporation’s ability to solve the problems that result 
from its public institutional and interactive engagement.646 
 
1.2.3. Propositions of the G20  
 In view of the financial crisis of 2008/2009, the Member States of the G20 Summit 
that took place in London on 2 April 2009 proposed a consistent international supervision 
that no longer neglects any financial market participant, financial product or financial 
region.647 In compliance with the regulatory intention of the European Commission, the 
direct supervision will remain with the national supervisory authorities.648 Nevertheless, 
the G20 states agreed to implement common international standards, a tight corporation of 
the national authorities and an enhanced function of the IMF.649 
 
Together with the IMF,650 the Financial Stability Board (FSB) - one essential element 
of the new European financial supervision651 - has undertaken collaborative early-warning 
                                                          
643
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 19, 72 f., 149. 
644
  Cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen 
(2009), p. 8. 
645
  Basically on structured financial instruments: Wolf/Hill/Pfaue, Strukturierte Finanzierungen (2011), p. 1 
ff.; see also De Vries Robbé, Structured Finance (2010), pp. 1 ff. 
646
  Cf. Budäus/Hilgers, in: Hommelhoff/Hopt/Werder, Corporate Governance (2009), p. 885. 
647
  Cf. Lenenbach, Kapitalmarktrecht (2010), p. 1497 (15.79 f.). 
648
  Ibid.  
649
  Ibid.  
650
  On the current assessment of the global economy by the IMF under its chief secretary Christine Lagarde 
Cf. Dams, DIE WELT (September /21st/2011), p. 10. 
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measures to strengthen the assessment of systemic risks and to identify possible regulatory 
controls and supervisory practices as a response to the changing face of systemic risks in 
financial markets.652 Another comparatively suitable tool to identify hidden risk potentials 
of a credit institute or any other financial investment is the leverage ratio:653 When the 
leverage ratio shifts by more than 5%, the German capital market law states a mandatory 
obligation on the part of the credit institute to inform the public (§ 15 of the German 
Security Trading Act, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz - dWpHG654).  
 
 The G20 states authorise the FSB to design international financial standards for an 
enhanced control of systemic risks and a more effective oversight of the global financial 
system and to devise more effective international regulatory frameworks that durably link 
micro-prudential supervision with broader macro-prudential systemic concerns.655 Its focus 
on macro-prudential regulatory involves devising regulatory standards to measure and limit 
leverage levels in the financial system as a whole. This requires financial institutions to 
have enhanced liquidity reserves against short-term wholesale funding exposures and 
counter-cyclical capital regulation, whereby capital requirements are linked to points in the 
macro-economic and business cycle. 
 
1.2.4. Systemic risk containment by the Financial Transaction Tax  
Another measure that is currently discussed to contain systemic risks that result from 
the international cross-linking of financial market participants is the (global) taxation of 
financial transactions by the FTT - an international tax for financial transactions. The FTT 
is also known as Tobin Tax, which represents one specific type of transaction tax.656 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
651
  On the new European financial supervisory architecture: Lehmann/Manger-Nestler, ZBB No. 1/2011, p. 
2 ff. 
652
  Cf. Alexander, ZBB/JBB (2011), p. 337 (343). 
653
  Lenenbach, Kapitalmarktrecht (2010), p. 1495 (15.73). 
654
  Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (dWpHG) as amended on the bulletin dated September/9th/1998 (Federal Law 
Gazette I 1998, p. 2708), last amended by Article 10 paragraph 1 of the law of February/13th/2013 
(Federal Law Gazette I 2013, p. 174). 
655
  Cf. Alexander, ZBB/JBB (2011), p. 337 (343). 
656
  On the international taxation by the Tobin Tax that aims at the taxation of global financial transaction 
(Financial Market Transaction Tax) cf. Rosen, BB 3/2010, p. I. 
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A tax rate of only 0.1% on each financial transaction could significantly contribute to 
the national budget of the benefited countries - financial experts expect a plus of several 
thousand million Euros. In addition, they expect that the FTT would significantly contain 
speculative financial transactions and the derivative commerce. However, financial experts 
expect a serious exodus of capital towards offshore countries. Regarded comprehensively, 
the FTT could make the intense financial cross-linking less attractive and minimise the 
total volume of financial transactions.  
 
Financial experts expect that the FTT could dry out the HFT that is normally based on 
a complex algorithm and results in information advantages that enable the market 
participants to realise better-than-average profits. The FTT could substantially harm this 
business model because the yield of a single HFT transaction normally does not go beyond 
a few cents.657 The proposition to contain the HFT is to be seen against the flash-crash658 
that happened at the New York Stock Exchange on 6 May 2010 when the Dow Jones Index 
declined by some 1,000 points within a few minutes without any obvious reason - the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC659) came to the result that this incident resulted 
from a computer-based transaction at the volume of several thousand million US$.660 
Nevertheless, the United States and Great Britain reject any financial market transaction 
tax, so that it is expected that the FTT will be subject to the European continental states - 
the United States prefers a bank levy on its biggest credit institutes to ensure that these 
institutes contribute to the financing of the response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009.661 
  
The introduction of a FTT could consequently result in an exodus from the organised 
financial markets into the OTC commerce and other types of shadow banking and 
aggravate the present lack of transparency in the financial segment. The OTC commerce662 
                                                          
657
  Cf. Kaiser, DIE WELT (November/5th/2011), p. 21. 
658
  This term describes the phenomena of an enormous slump in prices that happens within a very small 
time period. 
659
  On the latest SEC requirement concerning the remuneration of managers in the United States: 
Lander/Flägel, RIW No. 7/2011, pp. 425 ff. 
660
  Cf. Kaiser, DIE WELT (November/5th/2011), p. 21. 
661
  Cf. Goffart, HANDELSBLATT (November/4th/2011), p. 16. 
662
  On the draft of the European Commission on the future regulation of the OTC commerce cf. 
Diekmann/Fleischmann, WM (2011), p. 1105 ff. 
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is neither executed at the stock exchange nor at other organised financial markets. It can be 
described as a telecommunication network of dealers who provide liquidity to investors by 
their willingness to “make markets” in particular securities: When an investor wants to 
purchase a security, a dealer firm will sell it from its own inventory of securities - if an 
investor wants to sell, the dealer will purchase the security and hold it in inventory.663 The 
abovementioned exodus should be contained in view of the awareness of the FCIC that the 
rise of the shadow banking system, which could easily compete with the traditional 
banking system, was accompanied by widespread short-term debts.664 On the eve of the 
financial crisis of 2008/2009, key segments of the financial market-- such as the Repo-
market,665 off-balance business units666 and off-balance derivates--were kept invisible and 
free from suitable protection measures that had been implemented to prevent financial 
„meltdowns“.667  In view of this awareness, the FCIC regards the US Government as 
primarily responsible for the financial crisis because it opted for the deregulation of OTC-
transactions.668  
 
Because the OTC commerce has risen by a volume of US$60 billion in only the year 
2010 and because an inclining number of hedge funds and speculators try to concentrate 
“their” risks in the OTC commerce and other models of shadow banking, the G20 decided 
to also extend bank supervision to these business models.669 Since Germany liberalised the 
investment restrictions for special assets, it is no longer forbidden for investment 
companies to take part in the OTC commerce.670 If one considers that OTC transactions 
can reach a total business volume of approximately €6 billion, it is easy to understand that 
- under the conditions of international financial cross-linking and the international 
                                                          
663
  Lee/Lee, Finance (2006), p. 199. 
664
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 27 ff. 
665
  Repo is the abbreviation for repurchase agreement, which signifies the regular auction of a central bank 
which contributes to providing the commercial banks with short-term liquidity. Conceptionally, the 
central bank purchases assets from the commercial banks that are resold to the central bank after the 
elapse of the respective Repo transaction, cf. Hertz-
Eichenrode/Illenberger/Jesch/Keller/Klebeck/Rocholl, Private Equity-Lexikon (2011), p. 158. 
666
  Financial structures that are not reported in the balance sheet of a corporation, such as ABS and SPVs, 
and that aim at achieving a better rating by „hiding“ the debts of a corporation, cf. cf. Hertz-
Eichenrode/Illenberger/Jesch/Keller/Klebeck/Rocholl, Private Equity-Lexikon (2011), p. 132. 
667
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 20 ff. 
668
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), pp. 24 ff., 74 ff.; Nationale Kommission zur 
Untersuchung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen (2009), p. 10. 
669
  Cf. Goffart, HANDELSBLATT (November/4th/2011), p. 16. 
670
  Cf. Möllers, BKR (2011), p. 353 (353). 
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securitisation of risks - OTC transactions can easily cause fatal chain reactions. 
Nevertheless, it does not seem a proportional response671 if one forbids these transactions - 
in view of their contribution to the immediate credit supply of corporations. A proportional 
approach consists of an enhanced transparency, including of these transactions. The FTT 
is, therefore, no suitable legal tool to contain systemic risks. 
 
1.3.  National level  
1.3.1. Interdiction of short selling 
 As another response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009 and because (uncovered) short 
selling can bear a substantial systemic risk, the German government decided to amend its 
dWpHG in 2010 by placing a general interdiction of these financial transactions. Under the 
law for the prevention against abusive trading of securities and derivatives (Gesetz zur 
Vorbeugung gegenüber missbräuchliche Wertpapier- und Derivategeschafte672), uncovered 
short selling in shares and other debt certificates (state bonds) must not be transacted any 
longer at any German stock exchange. The German government and the German Federal 
Agency for Financial Market Supervision (BaFin) holds the view that the non-regulated 
trade with CDS that is not motivated by a security interest represents a potential risk for the 
stability of the financial system as a whole.673  
 
Because the use of short selling and derivatives is one typical feature of hedge funds 
and private equity funds, the European Commission also presented a draft for an order that 
refers to the regulation of CDS on debt certificates of the EU Member States.674 This legal 
order consists of information requirements for the case of uncovered short selling on debt 
certificates of EU Member States and an authorisation of the national supervision 
authorities to effect a limited restriction of certain CDS.675 In comparison to the German 
                                                          
671
  On the principle of proportionality cf. Third Chapter, 1.1. 
672
  Gesetz zur Vorbeugung gegenüber missbräuchliche Wertpapier- und Derivategeschafte (dVmWDG), as 
amended on July/21st/2010 (Federal Law Gazette I 2010 dated June/14th/2010, p. 786). 
673
  Cf. Litten/Bell, BKR (2011), p. 314, 314. 
674
  Cf. Draft for an order of the European Parliament and the European Council on short selling and certain 
other aspects of CDS (September/15th/2010), KOM (2010), p. 482. 
675
  Cf. Litten/Bell, BKR (2011), p. 314, 320. 
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regulatory approach, the European approach does not generally forbid uncovered short 
selling.676 
 
1.3.2. The “integrated approach” by the German Investmentgesetz  
 The AIFMD is an isolated solution because it sets the focus only at the regulation of 
alternative investments as its own segment. Instead of choosing an isolated solution, 
Germany has given an example for an “integrated solution” with the German InvG. By 
separating the fund administration from the fund safekeeping by the implementation of a 
depository bank as a relatively independent instance, the legal conception of the InvG not 
only institutionally secures the position of the special assets and the investors and protects 
them against any abuse of the investment company, but it also creates legal security for 
each single investor.677 
Its regulatory approach sets the focus on different types of investment (§ 1 dInvG) 
covering public funds inclusively its organization, registration, prospect requirements, 
disclosure requirements678  and portfolio restrictions - although it covers some specific 
features with regard to tools to enhance the leverage, short selling and prime brokers.679 It 
is significantly different from other regulatory concepts that cover a specific approach to 
alternative investments, normally different from the regulation of traditional investment 
funds that are made for retail investors.680 Retail investors are private depositors with a 
comparatively small investment volume (private customers, manufacturers with small 
income, small corporate clients) who are subject to standardised financial products that do 
not have to be explained in each case.681 
 
1.3.3. Bank licenses of industrial companies  
As one first step against an overflowing capital accumulation and towards a bigger 
independence of the real economy, one can mention the “bank licenses” that can be 
                                                          
676
  Ibid. 
677
  Cf. Möllers, BKR (2011), p. 353 (355). 
678
  Cf. Pütz, in: Striegel/Wiesbrock/Jesch, Kapitalbeteiligungsrecht (2009), pp. 486 ff. 
679
  Cf. Dornseifer, in: Leible/Lehmann, Hedgefonds (2009), pp. 77, 82. 
680
  Ibid. 
681
  Hockmann/Thießen, Investmentbanking (2009), p. 563. 
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acquired through the central supervisory authority: in Germany, the BaFin.682 These bank 
licenses contribute to a more decentralised grant of credits by industrial companies with a 
minimum investment volume of €5 million. For example, big German companies such as 
Siemens acquired a bank license and thereby contribute to the economic independence of 
subcontractors whose function is essential to keep the value-added chain alive for the final 
good. These companies have comparatively better facilities to properly rate the 
creditworthiness of their subcontractors. Therefore, a bank license can be seen as an 
appropriate measure towards an overflowing capital accumulation, an enhanced rating of 
creditworthiness and enables a suitable compromise between the two superior objectives, 
the preservation of freedom of economic action and the effective containment of systemic 
risks. 
1.3.4. US Private Fund Investment Advisors Registration Act of 2009  
 In view of the recent financial crisis in 2008, the Obama administration introduced the 
draft of the Private Fund Investment Advisors Registration Act of 2009 on 15 July 2009. 
This regulatory draft is subject to any fund that covers a minimum of US$30 million and 
states the binding obligation to the fund advisors to inform the SEC on the total volume of 
administrated assets, lenders of off-balance-sheet obligations and other positions that are 
essential to rate the impact of their operative business on the financial stability as a 
whole.683 It is being considered to transfer this information to the Federal Reserve to fulfil 
its function as supervisor of systemic risks and to identify the possible need for further 
regulation of the relevant funds.684 This American draft for the regulation of alternative 
investments aims at the quick identification of systemic risks but not at the registration of 
private equity investments by the supervisory authorities.685  
 
 
                                                          
682
  According to the regulatory intention of the European Commission the direct supervision shall remain at 
the national authorities while enhancing the corporation between them, creating uniform supervisory 
standards and giving the definitive decision to the European authorities in the case of different opinions, 
cf. Lenenbach, Kapitalmarktrecht (2010), p. 1496 (15.77); on the question whether corporations of the 
Real Economy are subject to the legal framework of banking supervision cf. Wieland, BB (2012), p. 
917. 
683
  Cf. Swoboda/Schatz, in: Striegel/Wiesbrock/Jesch, Kapitalbeteiligungsrecht (2009), p. 851. 
684
  Ibid. 
685
  Ibid. 
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1.4.  Harmonisation versus regulatory competition 
1.4.1. Introduction and overview 
The AIFMD harmonizes the licensing requirements of AIFM in the European Member 
States and follows a direct approach by facing the entities instead of the products. In view 
of this approach it seems appropriate to discuss whether one supranational uniform legal 
solution is a more suitable response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009 and to what extent 
this approach is economically more preferable than any regulatory competition. Since any 
regulation that does not focus on the current situation of financial markets and corporations 
could fail the target to effectively contain systemic risks, there is the need to discuss the 
economic contributes of harmonisation over regulatory competition.686  Already in June 
1985, the European Commission released a White Paper687 that contained a broad program 
of rules to harmonise the national law on the supervision of financial institutes688 and to 
strengthen the protection of depositors. The White Paper followed a new harmonisation 
concept that set on the harmonisation of significant rules and standards concerning 
supervision and licensing and the mutual acknowledge how to transform these into national 
law. The White Paper consequently contained a harmonisation concept that set on the 
realization of a minimum coordination of the nationally different rules and the mutual 
acknowledgement of the differing national rules. 
 
1.4.2. Definition  
Conceptually, harmonisation is based on the successive adjustment of the capital law 
of the European Member States. Harmonisation means the adjustment of nationally 
                                                          
686
  Critically on the legal concept of harmonization: Anzinger, StuW (3/2002), pp. 261 ff.; Brüggelmann, 
ifo Schnelldienst  (11/2004), pp. 5 ff.; Fuest, Steuerharmonisierung (2006), pp. 1 ff.; Herzig, StuW (2006), 
pp. 156 ff.; Hey, Unternehmensbesteuerung (1997), pp. 1 ff.; Jacobs, ifo Schnelldienst (11/2004), pp. 3 ff.;  
Meitinger, Schutz von Geschäftsgeheimnissen (2001), pp. 1 ff. Ruffner, FS Zaech, S.409 ff. Spengel, ifo 
Schnelldienst (13/2004), pp. 3 ff.;  Spengel/Braunagel, StuW (2006), pp. 34 ff. 
687
  White Paper from the European Commission and the European Council on “Completing the Internal 
Market”, published under  http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf. 
688
  As Walter underlines, it particularly takes one coherence of micro-prudential and macro-prudential 
supervision, equal starting conditions and adequate protection of the financial consumers against unfair 
business practices, cf. Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 973. 
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differing legal requirements of the European Member States, the (partial) deletion of 
differences in their legal situation.689 
 
Thereby, one can distinguish technical measures such as the Level 2-measures and 
political measures of harmonisation. At the European level, the harmonisation of the 
financial regulation can notably concern the licensing requirements or the equity capital 
requirements. Stability and competitiveness of the financial services segment essentially 
depend on adequate equity to steadily cover losses of unexpected dimension.690 Directives 
such as the AIFMD represent probably the most important technical measures of 
harmonisation. 
 
Notably, the change towards the Lamfalussy process is accompanied by a change from 
partial towards full harmonisation, notably to adopt international standards and to 
strengthen the Common market by the unification of requirements.691 It was primarily 
driven by the fact that the European Commission successively followed not only the 
superior target of market integration but even regulative and supervisory objectives - as 
one consequence, the respective directives currently reached full harmonisation and the 
European Member states lost any right to influence a legal relationship by 
unilateral declaration.692 Against the background that banks are economically essential for 
the macro-economic commerce of goods, services and financial deposits. Notably the 
effective containment of systemic risks and the conservation of financial market stability 
successively came into the legal focus of the European Commission.693 
 
Based on a fourth-step procedure, the Lamfalussy process gives the European 
Commission more legislative power by simultaneously reducing the legislative power of 
the European Parliament and minimizing the transformation scope of the European 
                                                          
689
  Cf. Herrnfeld, in: Schwarze, Europarecht (2012), AEUV, Article 114, bullet No. 29. 
690
  Cf. Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 974. 
691
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 38. 
692
  Cf. Moloney, CMLRev. (2010), pp. 1317, 1356. 
693
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 79 ff. 
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Member States. To reach a maximum level of approximation of laws, it shall realize the 
concept of full harmonisation. 
 
1.4.3. Legal objectives  
By name, the European legislation is faced with the regulatory challenge that the 
financial commerce is widely decentralized, with the consequence that it is practically 
almost impossible to consistently control the contracts of credit institutes, security houses 
and assurance companies. Due to the fact that any market-based financial system can only 
function as long as the performance of those market participants who take on economic 
risk correspond to the probability of the respective risks , it is the primary target of the 
regulatory framework to create those conditions that enable the market participants to 
identify and to access their respective risks. 
 
Under the scope of Article 114 TFEU, the European Commission is principally free to 
opt for any legal approach and set the respective rules as it sees fit since the principle of 
subsidy does not unfold any significant force to financial markets regulation. 694  As 
Herrnfeld points out, the harmonisation subject to Article 114 TFEU is not “end in itself”, 
but it shall contribute to reaching specific legal objectives of the European primary law as 
the effective functioning of the Single Market, the effective practice of fundamental rights 
and the minimizing of distortions of competition resulting from the application of different 
national rules.695 
 
By opting for the legal measure of a directive, the European Commission has chosen 
an approach that normally leaves a transformation scope to the European Member States. 
At the latest, since the beginning of the new millennium, the European Commission 
changed from the committee process towards the Lamfalussy process. The Lamfalussy 
process is named after Alexandre Lamfalussy, chairman of the Committee of Wise Men, 
and shall accelerate and adapt the whole regulatory process in particular by a better 
                                                          
694
  Cf. Fleischer/Schmuhl, NZG (2010), pp. 1241, 1245. 
695
  Cf. Herrnfeld, in: Schwarze, Europarecht (201), AEUV, Article 114, bullet No. 1. 
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coordination between the EU-directives and the factual market developments. It was 
confirmed by the European Council in 2001 and based on four steps: Firstly, the governing 
political bodies decide on principal topics; secondly, the comitology process recruiting 
from the CESR (Committee of European Securities Regulators696) and the ESC (European 
Securities Committee 697 ) clears the respective technical questions; thirdly, national 
supervisory bodies overtake the coordination of the directives in the single European 
Member States; fourthly, the European Commission controls that the directive is properly 
transferred into national law on time. 
 
1.4.4. Harmonisation of the licensing and capital requirements  
Concerning the licensing requirements that are significantly amended by the legal 
validity of the AIFMD, the European law significantly contributed to one harmonised legal 
framework that preventively aims at the realization of the directive objectives to allow the 
market access only to those corporations that prospectively secure the steady fulfillment of 
a good corporate conduct698 and the careful handling of the entrusted assets.699  
 
In contrast, the harmonised equity requirements are based on adequate and actual 
available equity capital to enable the steady functionality of the financial markets and the 
protection of consumers who serve as the debt capital creditors of the respective financial 
institutions.700 The harmonisation of equity capital requirements shall flank the realization 
of the single European market for financial services and follows the idea to economically 
consolidate the confidence into the performance of the respective credit institutes by 
providing an (additional) security for the primary creditors for the case of their possible 
insolvency.701  
 
                                                          
696
  Cf. http://www.esma.europa.eu/.  
697
  Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/esc/index_de.htm 
698
  Cf. Fifth chapter 1.2.2. 
699
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 82. 
700
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 86. 
701
  Cf. German Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin January 2012, p. 43; generally on the confidence into the 
economic rationality cf. Dullen, ZfBW special edition „Verdient der Markt noch unser Vertrauen“ (2013), 
pp. 23 ff. 
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Moreover, the harmonised equity requirements limit the leverage of financial institutes 
and even the volume of its business operations since they are generally calculated at a 
percent basis in addition to the balance assets and other decisive risk factors.702 Under the 
provision that any credit institute only avails of a certain amount of equity at a certain point 
of time, this amount represents the calculative cap for its total business volume and 
effectively limits its risks.703 Under the impression of the financial crisis of2008/2009, 
Basel III proposed a harmonised regulatory framework of the financial markets to limit the 
acknowledgeable equity elements to deposited share capital and actual realized earnings, 
limit the use of hybrid financial means704 and significantly enhance the equity ratio from 
currently 8 percent.705 According to the view of Walter, Basel III would not endanger the 
ability of the banking segment to supply the real economy with financial means as one 
provision of provision of economic growth and innovation.706 
 
1.4.5. Positive effects of harmonisation  
On the one hand, a maximum level of harmonisation can principally contribute to 
higher legal security, enhances reliability to corporations locating in the European Union 
and contributes to the outstanding legal target of general freedom of movement of capital 
(Article 63 TFEU). The superior European target to establish a common market for all 
commercial goods (Article 26 TFEU) is comparatively widely realized in the segment of 
financial services, primarily as a consequence of the immaterial character of capital whose 
exchange only depends on contracts.707 By intensifying and accelerating the transnational 
commercial streams between the European Member States, it contributes to the general 
wealth and can be seen as one essential condition for steady economic growth and one 
measure to maintain their competitiveness towards other economic power centers like the 
BRIC-states.  
                                                          
702
  Cf. German Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin December 2006, p. 70. 
703
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 86. 
704
  Hybrid securities such as convertible bonds combine two or more different financial means and 
therefore avail of both debt and equity characteristics.  Convertible bonds avail of features of an ordinary 
bond but are significantly impacted by the price movements of the stock into which it is convertible, cf. 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hybridsecurity.asp. 
Cf. Second Chapter 1.8.2. 
705
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 88. 
706
  Cf. Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 974. 
707
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 32. 
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The economic integration of all European Member States is economically and 
politically desired since some financial experts assume that big financial markets are more 
liquid and therefore more stable, which was clearly demonstrated during the financial 
crises of 2008/2009. 708  In addition, the competitive pressure between the different 
providers of financial services is stronger under the conditions of a higher level of 
economic integration. Resulting from the higher competitive pressure among the providers 
of financial services, there would be more options for the financial consumer and even a 
higher level of risk diversification, better capital allocation and more economic growth.709 
Finally, the financial integration eases the operation of a European monetary policy by the 
ECB since the monetary incentives are more equally adapted by the commercial banks.710 
 
From this perspective, a strong level of legal harmonisation can be seen as one 
condition to strengthen welfare in the European Member States. Against the background of 
the financial crisis of 2008/2009, the original legislative target to ease the transnational 
activities of banks and credit institutes and to harmonise the equity capital requirements 
turned into the primary target of keeping stability of the financial system,which means the 
public interest as well as a stable and functioning credit institutes and markets.711 
 
1.4.6. Negative effects of harmonisation  
On the other hand, the concept of full harmonisation bears some risks that should be 
taken seriously in view of the legal objective of the European Union to effectively contain 
system risks in the future. Namely, the reverse of the bigger European financial market has 
the consequence that local and regional crises can easily expand (harmonisation as a “risk 
amplifier”) and geographically reach a wider diffusion.712 
 
                                                          
708
  ECB, Monthly bulletin (April 2011), pp. 61 ff. 
709
  European Commission, SEC (2007) 1696 - final edition - , European Financial integration Report 
(2007), p. 8. 
710
  Cp. Alexander, ERA Forum 2011, pp. 229, 232. 
711
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 2. 
712
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 34. 
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Secondly, one should not neglect that any full harmonisation approach could aggravate 
cyclical effects. If nearly all financial market participants in the European Union is subject 
to the same regulation and almost each legal option to circumvent that regulation is 
abandoned, the economic effects of an unexpected financial crisis could be comparatively 
more massive than those of the financial crisis of 2008/2009. Thus, any full harmonisation 
could amplify negative economic effects - in particular, should the ESRB fail, its objective 
to identify early future systemic risks on time, like the drying shrinkage of any single 
market or another serious lack of liquidity.  
 
As Romano points out, any full harmonisation approach such as the Basel Capital 
Accord bears the significant risk that, when that business strategy fails catastrophically, the 
crisis was not restricted to one nation and a few institutions, but spread worldwide.713 
Principally, one could compare the basic line of Romano´s point of view to the principle of 
risk diversification. Since historical data can only be transferred to novel and  unknown 
risksof the future  a very limited level, it generally takes a broad scope to effectively face 
those risks.714 
 
Any economic decision and, notably any decision of a corporation, is a decision under 
uncertainty715 and therefore it bears the risk that its assumptions do not materialize but 
instead are refuted by real economic developments. To minimize the respective risks, 
corporations do not set everything on the same card but follow the principle of risk 
diversification. Any harmonised approach that does not follow the principle of risk 
diversification enhances the risk of a total loss. In view of this awareness, Romano 
emphasizes that any globally harmonised framework can dramatically increase systemic 
risk if regulators make an error in their regulatory approach.716 Therefore Romano holds 
the view that the more plausible serious source of catastrophic systemic risk was an 
international regulatory harmonisation, rather than diversity in regulatory regimes.  This is 
because of the perpetual uncertainty regarding how best to measure institutions’ and 
                                                          
713
  Cf. Romano, Yale Law & Economic Research Paper No. 414, p. 17. 
714
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 100. 
715
  On the uncertainty of economic actions and notably those of a corporation cf. Cf. Pacces, ECFR (2010), 
pp. 479 ff. 
716
  Cf. Romano, Yale Law & Economic Research Paper No. 414, p. 17. 
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instruments’ risk and contribution to systemic risk, particularly because such risk 
dynamically changes over time as the business environment changes. 717  All in all, a 
preferably broad diversity in regulatory regimes seems essential since systemic risks are 
regionally, temporarily and objectively extremely variable and require one preferably 
flexible approach. 718  Moreover, the respective uncertainty exacerbates the risk that 
regulators will get things seriously wrong, and with any harmonised regulation, regulatory 
error is much more costly, as it will ripple across the global financial system.719  
 
In contrast to the concept of harmonisation, with a diversity of regulatory regimes720, 
there was at least a chance that not all regulators underlay the same mistake and - 
accordingly - would not incentivize all financial institutions to follow the same flawed 
strategy.721  The diversity of financial market regulations always leaves the option for 
regulatory arbitration722. Thus, as Romano additionally points out, regulatory arbitrage was 
a “key driver” of financial innovation - by name, the impressive innovation in U.S. 
derivative products 723  has been facilitated by the US-American regulatory regime’s 
fragmentation, which spurs firms to devise new products that avoid the less favorable and 
the more expensive regulator’s jurisdiction and, in addition, correlatively creates an 
incentive for more efficient regulation as regulators respond to firms’ jurisdiction-shifting 
decisions.724  
 
                                                          
717
  Cf. Romano, Yale Law & Economic Research Paper No. 414, p. 17. 
718
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 100. 
719
  Cf. Romano, Yale Law & Economic Research Paper No. 414, p. 18. 
720
  Nevertheless, according to the concept of harmonization, there is a diversity in the financial market 
supervision expressed by the “division of labor” between the Committee of European Securities Regulators - 
an independent expert group for securities markets that is recruited by high-level representatives of the 
national supervisory bodies -, the European Securities Committee (ESC), the Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Suüpervisors (CEIOPS), the ESMA, the EBA, the ESRB and the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions authority (EIOPA). 
721
  Cf. Romano, Yale Law & Economic Research Paper No. 414, p. 18. 
722
  Arbitration can be defined as a process in which a disagreement between two or more parties is resolved 
by impartial individuals (“arbitrators”) in order to avoid costly and lengthy litigation, cf. 
http://www.investorwords.com/249/arbitration.html. 
723
  A derivative such as options, forwards and futures can be defined as financial instrument whose value 
depends upon the value of an underlying security, cf. Grabaravicius Dierick, ECB-Occasional Paper No. 34 
(August 2005), p. 59. 
724
  Cf. Romano, Yale Law & Economic Research Paper No. 414, p. 18. 
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The “invisible hand725” that was confirmed by Adam Smith as the healthful force of 
competition can even contribute to finding the most suitable financial market regulation.726 
Thus, the aforementioned financial innovations, on balance, have even generated 
substantial social value by lowering transaction costs and permitting efficient risk-sharing. 
All in all, in any regime of global harmonisation, regulatory error could result in 
heightened systemic risk, as regulatory incentives lead financial institutions worldwide to 
adopt similar business strategies - when such strategies fail, they could do so 
catastrophically, as witnessed in the recent financial crisis.727 Against the background that 
regulatory arbitrage as a “byproduct” of regulatory diversity can definitely contribute to 
building a valuable hedge against the realization of systemic failure, it would be a 
profound mistake to view it as a weed that needs to be eradicated in order to have a more 
well-manicured garden.728 
 
Thus, any full harmonisation approach could foil the superior legal target to effectively 
contain systemic risks. As mentioned before, should the financial markets be affected by 
any regulatory competition problem that bears the risk that the collapse of single 
corporations or markets can also affect other market participants - against this background, 
it is one important target of the financial market regulation to take suitable measures to 
overwatch the functioning of the financial markets even in critical situations.729 
 
Under the provision that one defines harmonisation as one complete respectively 
partitial equalization of regulatory framework, it creates pressure towards the economically 
less powerful countries like, for example, the new European member state Croatia to reach 
the average economic strength of the European Member States and to steadily fulfill the 
convergence criteria that are legally defined in Article 140 paragraph 1 sentence 3 TFEU 
(price stability; equilibrium of public earning and debts; stability of exchange rates; 
                                                          
725
  On the conception of the invisible hand that significantly bases on the teachings of Adam Smith , cf. 
Van Suntum, Unsichtbare Hand (2001), pp. 1 ff. 
726
  Critically on the conception of the invisible hand cf. Dullen, ZfBW special edition (2013), pp. 23 ff.; 
Horn/Klodt/Preissl, ZfBW special edition (2013), pp. 2 ff.; Nullmeier, ZfBW special edition (2013), pp. 34 
ff. 
727
  Cf. Romano, Yale Law & Economic Research Paper No. 414, p. 20. 
728
  Cf. Romano, Yale Law & Economic Research Paper No. 414, p. 20 f. 
729
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 6. 
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stability of public interests). The objective to steadily fulfill the convergence criteria could 
increase the demand for additional capital, notably venture capital. If the regulated banks 
cannot correspond to the increasing demand for capital since they are subject to the 
respective equity requirements and other legal provisions, the harmonisation can create 
more economic incentives towards shadow banking that, as already before-mentioned, 
often bears serious systemic risks, notably as one consequence of an expanded line of 
credit intermediation. Under this provision, harmonisation of the capital market law can 
generate additional systemic risks since countries with economically different frame 
conditions are subject to the same legal framework. Therefore, it seems very questionable 
if the AIFMD, which sets on a strong level of harmonization, represents an adequate 
response to the financial crisis 2008/2009. Any legal approach that neglects the specific 
economic requirements, which are very different between the currently 28 European 
Member States, neglects the principle of proportionality. 
 
Thirdly, any full harmonisation bears the risk of losing national “chambers of 
experience”, which contribute to finding the most effective approach to effectively 
containing systemic risks - in particular, in view of the background that the European 
Union is not a federal state but a supranational confederation that is based on the principles 
of subsidy (Article 5 paragraph 3 TEU) and the limited single authorization (Article 5 
paragraph 2 sentence 1 TEU). According to the principle of limited single authorization, 
the European Union must not act out of the expressive responsibilities and competences 
that are transferred by the European Member States and written in the primary European 
law. The actions of the European Commission are not based on a parliamentary mandate 
but on an authorization by the national head of states. In case of doubt, these competences 
must be outlaid restrictively.  
 
In Germany, there is currently a pending action at the BVerfG as to whether the ECB 
is authorized to the unlimited purchase of bonds.730 In critical situations, if the interbank 
                                                          
730
  The first senate of the BVerfG is currently involved with the question whether the unlimited purchase of 
bonds by the ECB (Outright Monetary Transaction-Program, OMT) corresponds with the German 
constitutional provisions, cf. http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg13-029; critical 
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market fails or the deposit business dries out, the ECB generally overtakes the primary 
source of liquidity.731 In view of the experience that the drying shrinkage of any single 
market is one essential symptom for the assumption of a systemic crisis, it is currently the 
principal approach of the ECB to take suitable measures against lacks of liquidity and to 
supply the respective credit institutes adequate central bank money, to reduce the 
respective requirements for credit securities and to purchase assets. On the one hand, 
against the background that the easy money policy is one probable source of the financial 
crisis of 2008/2009, any legal measure that is taken as a response to the financial crisis of 
2008/2009 must correspond to the outstanding objective to enhance the resistivity of the 
international financial system.732 On the other hand, credit institutes must strengthen their 
“defense line” against shocks of liquidity by adequate devise and business models (e.g. 
own customer deposits), adequate equity and remuneration systems.733  
 
According to this point of view the rescue of suffering banks is primarily the task of 
the investors and depositors since they have chosen for the respective engagement. The 
recapitalization of the central banks is nevertheless a commitment of the European 
Member States whose budget is financed by the tax payer who does not automatically have 
a contractual link to the suffering bank. It should be one principal target of any legislation 
to take suitable measures against a nationalization of losses. Besides the question of 
keeping those limits set by the principle of limited single authorization, one should not 
neglect that any unlimited purchase of bonds may contribute to system dependability but 
even to “moral hazard” since the expectation of any final rescue sets the false incentive to 
underestimate the respective risks.734 
 
Any full harmonisation approach could result in the loss of diversity of different legal 
approaches, which contributes to the effective containment of systemic risks as long as the 
provisions of a systemic crisis are not definitely explained. The resulting standardization 
                                                                                                                                                                                
on the commitment of the state cf. Graf, in: Studiengesellschaft für Wirtschaft und Recht, 
Finanzmarktregulierung (2012), pp. 105 ff. 
731
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 14. 
732
  Cf. Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 973. 
733
  Cf. Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 973. 
734
  Cf. Ohler, in: Ruffert, Europäisches sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2012), § 10, bullet 6. 
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minimizes individual financial innovations and even individual defense strategies of 
financial corporations.735 According to the author´s point of view, this loss is a severe 
development as individual solutions are one essential provision of any market-based order. 
 
In view of the enormous acceleration of the economic development in the industrial 
states that is driven by the economic globalization, it seems very questionable whether 
anyone will be able to find a really satisfactory response to the financial crisis 
of2008/2009. Due to the ongoing process of financial innovations that could generate new, 
so far unexpected and probably more severe systemic risks, a diversity of different legal 
approaches seems desirable. As it is shown by designing any investment strategy, where 
the diversity of risks creates a shield against the realization of unexpected risks, the 
diversity of legal national approaches in the regulation of financial markets can build a 
shield against the realization of systemic risks.  
 
1.4.7. Interim result  
As the AIFMD follows a direct regulatory approach facing the AIFM instead of the 
AIF and, moreover, it shall consistently cover these entities, it could be revealed as one 
pro-cyclical risk amplifier that bears the questionable incentive to transfer capital outside 
of the European Union and thereby contribute to those global disequilibria of commerce 
that stood at the beginning of the financial crisis of 2008/2009. Should the AIFMD 
consequently cause a capital exodus towards financially less regulated countries, it could 
contribute to future liquidity gaps that were essential drives of the financial crisis of 
2008/2009. If one takes these serious doubts into consideration, one cannot access the 
AIFMD as a satisfactory response to the financial crisis 2008/2009 and as one adequate 
approach to contain the realization of systemic risks in the future. Public wealth as one 
essential consequence of economic growth depends on financial innovations, whose 
realization is endangered by any harmonised approach that takes many market players the 
“air to breathe”, which means the short-term and steady supply with liquidity.  
 
                                                          
735
  Walter, in: Bechtold/Jickeli/Joachim/Rohe, FS Möschel (2011), pp. 969, 975. 
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Finally, it is important to submit the question as to whether the European Commission 
opts for the legal measure of a directive if the European “government” intends to reach a 
maximum level of harmonisation of the capital market law. Why has the European 
Commission not chosen the legal measure of statutory regulation - in particular, against the 
background that an accelerated response seems essential to effective containment of 
systemic risks? Why does the European Commission leave any transformation scope to the 
European Member States if full harmonisation is the superior legal target, which could be 
realized as more effective, less expensive and more accelerated by statutory law? 
 
1.5. Further Discussion  
In view of the various different legal approaches, it must be discussed whether it is 
preferable to set the regulatory focus on the fund managers, the investors or the product. In 
a global comparison, the regulatory frameworks for alternative investments differ 
significantly - a circumstance that is essential in view of the fact that hedge funds736 and 
private equity funds act globally and can opt for another country at any point of time 
because the legal requirements in the origin country are either too restrictive or not 
practical enough.737 Thus, the omission of an international harmonisation of regulatory 
concepts can cause a “race to the bottom” - a race that contributes to the country with the 
most liberal legislation. 
2.   Voluntary approaches  
2.1.  General annotations 
2.1.1.  Market-based intervention 
 Within a competitive market order the probably less expensive and even the most 
effective containment of systemic risks consists of a “market based intervention” that is 
rudimentary realised by the IFRS setting on a high level of transparency towards market 
participants. 738  A market-based intervention” means a direct control by the market 
                                                          
736
  Cf. §§ 112 ff. of the German InvG. 
737
  Cf. Dornseifer, in: Leible/Lehmann, Hedgefonds (2009), pp. 77, 82. 
738
  On the IFRS cf. Second Chapter 1.3.3.; cf. Walker, in: The Future of financial regulation (2010), pp. 179 
(202 f.). 
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participants. According to the author´s point of view it is probably the most proportional 
approach since direct regulation is (only) useful where market processes fail, although any 
“market based intervention” may underlay certain limitations in terms of incentive, cost, 
efficiency, moral hazard and liquidity.739 It is the comparatively best approach because it is 
the most immediate, flexible, responsive and cost-effective solution and contributes to 
avoiding (several) associate information problems. 740  Finally, a “market based 
intervention” seems conclusive because the access and the costs of the relevant market 
information can often be identified as the origin of a market dysfunction. 
 
A market-based intervention that focuses on the capital and credit accumulation is 
probably the less expensive and the more effective control because almost each market 
participant has her or his own interest in affordable consumer credits and a steady credit 
supply and the steady availability of affordable venture capital. As a consequence of the 
international securitisation of credit risks and the transnational entanglement and cross-
linking of credit institutes that normally increase with the (concrete) volume of credit 
accumulation, the level of systemic risks increases with the volume of capital and credit 
accumulation.  
 
On the one hand, the international entanglement and cross-linking that is promoted by 
the international liberalisation of commercial streams resulting from the WTO efforts 
contributes to the public welfare of many - not only industrial countries. By creating a 
corrective in those times where the domestic demand decreases, the international 
commercial entanglement and cross-linking creates a kind of (anti-cyclical) buffer741 , 
which minimises a country’s credit risks and which helps to keep its level of 
creditworthiness. It helps to optimise a country’s risk diversification. Thus, the 
                                                          
739
  On the requirement of a proportional approach to the effective containment of systemic risks cf. Third 
Chapter, 1.1. 
740
  According to the author´s point of view, any response that is given to the financial crisis 2008/2009 and 
to contain future systemic risks should even consider the resulting costs that are decisive in the competition 
of financial corporations and, of course, have a strong impact on the yield and consequentially even on the 
steady liquidity towards market participants. 
741
  The Basel III-Convention also aims at the strengthening of the cyclical immunity of (private) credit 
institutes by a mandatory anti-cyclical equity buffer that can be seen as a complementary tool of its risk-
prevention and that shall neutralise unexpected losses, cf. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf 
(requested October/24th/2012). 
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international commercial entanglement and cross-linking contributes to a country’s public 
welfare and wealth.  
 
On the other hand, the international entanglement and cross-linking makes it 
increasingly complicated to isolate a dysfunction that probably affects the whole system. 
For example, a dysfunction in Russia742 may directly infect the financial market integrity in 
the United States Also the Basel III Committee743 came to the conclusion that the intense 
commercial relations and an often non-proportional cross-linking between the systemically 
relevant credit institutes intensified the global dimension of the financial crisis 
2008/2009.744 The danger that a dysfunction of any single credit institute directly leads to a 
global financial collapse increases with the volume of a single bank’s capital and credit 
accumulation because its international financial engagement makes it complicated to 
supervise and control the resulting risks – because even under the WTO regime sufficient 
international standards, on a credit institute’s equity equipment or a (sufficient) 
international monitoring of credit risks do not exist. Under these conditions, a well-
functioning market-based intervention requires a better coherence between micro-
prudential risk management and the macro-prudential monitoring of systemic risks. This 
coherence requires a better disclosure and transparency towards investors. 
 
The international financial cross-linking has the tendency to strengthen the capital 
concentration at the financial markets. It let the total volume of financial transactions and 
consequently also the yield of the internationally engaged corporations increase. In any 
case, one has to state that with the increasing international financial cross-linking, even the 
volatility that expresses the number of financial transactions in the stock index increases 
enormously. Also, the Member States of the G20 that recently met at their summit agreed 
that the 29 biggest and systemically relevant credit institutes worldwide will widen their 
                                                          
742
  As one of the so-called BRIC-states Russia is expected to enter the WTO at the end of 2011, cf. Goffart, 
HANDELSBLATT (November/4th/2011), pp. 16 (16). 
743
  On the respective conclusions of the Basel III Committee cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
Basel III (2011), pp. 1 ff. 
744
  Also the Basel III-Convention aims at the strengthening of the cyclical immunity of (private) credit 
institutes by a mandatory anti-cyclical equity buffer that can be seen as a complementary tool of its risk-
prevention and that shall neutralize unexpected losses, cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III 
(2011), pp. 5 ff. 
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equity position by 1-1.5% by 2016 - an equity requirement that goes beyond those equity 
requirements of Basel III that demanded a (regular) equity position of 7%.745 
 
2.1.2.  Further Requirements  
Whereas financial analysts find it comparatively easy to identify (potential) systemic 
risks, with the value-at-risk-coefficient746 that also remains a significant indicator in times 
of a declining proper trade, the general public and also the majority of (small and mid-
size747) corporations find it complicated to identify systemic risks precociously. Normally, 
corporations need a special department or external analysts for the precocious 
identification of relevant systemic risks, which causes them relatively high costs of 
transaction and information. Finally, these costs minimise the effectiveness of direct 
control from the market participants instead of state regulation. Nevertheless, the market 
participants, specifically the counterparties of the systemically relevant credit institutes, 
have a direct interest in containing the capital and credit concentration because it usually 
directly results in a rise in prices of credits. Under the conditions of a market economy, 
each market participant has a vital interest to earn money and save the income source.748 In 
the financial segment, a concentration of market power enables the benefited market 
participant to decide on the (general) price level.  
 
As a consequence of this concentration process, the credit prices increase whereas the 
availability of venture capital decreases. The reduced availability of venture capital can 
restrain the implementation of industrial projects and other innovations that are essential 
for a country’s future. Finally, it can cause significant welfare losses. Thus, it is essential to 
implement measures to keep a well-balanced competitive structure in the financial segment 
that contributes to the containment of systemic risks and the steady availability of 
affordable credits for start-up companies. The question that has to be discussed is what 
measures it takes to establish this competitive structure.  
                                                          
745
  Cf. Goffart, HANDELSBLATT (November/4th/2011), p. 16 f. 
746
  Value-at-risk is a procedure for estimating the maximum loss associated with a security or portfolio over 
a specific period of time, associated with a given confidence level, cf. Lee/Lee, Finance (2006), p. 283. 
747
  On the consistent assessment of equity capital by risk premiums depending on ratings: Gleißner/Knoll, 
BB (2011), pp. 2283 ff. 
748
  Cf. Baetge, Bilanzanalyse (2004) p. 2. 
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If one agrees with Walker and focuses on a direct control by the market participants 
and the market counterparties, it requires an enhanced transparency and disclosure that 
reduces their information costs and that can be seen as one essential provision of a more 
effective “self-supporting” market control. Thus, an adequate response to the financial 
crisis 2008/2009 as well as an instrument to effectively contain future systemic risks 
particularly requires incentives to a higher level of market discipline as an integral 
component of a well-functioning risk management.749 Market discipline requires the proper 
evaluation of assets, a well-proportioned risk diversification and a clear coherence between 
chances and risks--specifically, a strict liability concept. 
 
From the author´s perspective market discipline can particularly generated by effective 
counterparty risk management, internal risk management, market controls on specific 
exposures (leverage ratio, concentration and asset composition), disclosure and liquidity 
and an efficient and effective infrastructure oversight.750 In addition, one enhanced risk 
management751 requires some adequate market directives to take sure that funds and even 
fund managers operate prudentially and effectively in terms of the respective operational 
issues, management and internal controls, client relations, valuation, risk management, 
regulation, documentation and business consistence.752 The requirement of an enhanced 
transparency concerns the balance sheet, the structure of the investment fund manager’s 
remuneration and the relevant risks. Another step towards a direct control by the market 
counterparties consists of a reform of the rating agencies, which have to convey all 
significant information to the market participants necessary to identifying systemic risks 
precociously. 
 
                                                          
749
  Cf. Labonte, Systemically (2013), pp. 1 ff. (13 ff., 35 ff.). 
750
  Cf. Labonte, Systemically (2013), pp. 1 ff. (13 ff., 35 ff.). 
751
  On the requirements of an enhanced risk management cf. fourth chapter, 1.3.7. 
752
  On respective requirements of advanced risk management cf. AIRMIC, Structured approach, pp. 1 ff. 
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2.2. The Basel III Capital Accord  
 The Basel III 753  capital requirements 754  that are based on the Basel equity 
recommendations (Basel Convention) released in 2004 can be seen as a response to the 
financial crisis of 2008/2009. As probably the most important and influential international 
regulatory framework, the Basel Capital Accord sets regulatory capital standards for 
banking institutions and for establishing the principle of consolidated supervision based on 
home country control and mutual recognition, as set forth in the Basel Concordat.755 In 
comparison with Basel II, they aim at a more exact calculation of risk positions than the 
provision of equity equipment that corresponds with the real risk position of a 
corporation.756 Basel III focuses on a stronger self-regulation by enhanced methods to 
verify the risk of a corporation and the consideration of credit risk minimisations, by 
securitisation and transfer of credit risks.757 
 
Basel III, which requires a core capital, specifically a tier 1-capital, 758  is only 
mandatory to the Basel III Member States, which only make up a relatively small part of 
global financial commerce. To minimise the risks of the transnational cross-linking, the 
Basel III Committee decided to face potential systemic risks by capital incentives for the 
credit institutes to wind up OTC and derivate transactions with the support of central 
counterparties, 759  stronger capital requirements for specific financial transactions 
(derivative transactions, securitisations and off-balanced transactions), and stronger capital 
requirements for the interbank market. In particular, due to the legal character of Basel III 
as non-binding “soft law 760 ”, the credit institutes will decide how to calculate their 
individual equity demand: Either they opt for their own models and create a default buffer 
that corresponds to their specific risk positions, or they use the standard approach that is 
                                                          
753
  For further information on the Basel Capital Accord see footnotes 171, 257 f. and 577. 
754
  Critical reflection of the strengthened capital requirements by the European Commission: Jost/Rexer, 
DIE WELT (October/19th/2011), p. 10. 
755
  Cf. Alexander, ZBB/JBB (2011), p. 337 (340). 
756
  Cf. Jung, in: Schulze/Zuleeg/Kadelbach, Europarecht (2010), § 20, ann. 109. 
757
  Ibid. 
758
  The term “tier 1 capital” is used synonymously for the core capital quote that describes those assets that 
are covered by (own) capital resources of the corporation, credits (“going concern capital”), cf. Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, Scope of Application/Part I/I. B. 1.; published under 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf (requested October/24th/2012). 
759
  Cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III (2011), pp. 2 ff. 
760
  Cf. Alexander, ZBB/JBB (2011), p. 337 (338). 
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based on the results of the rating agencies.761 This option has become essential because 
systemic risks result from the default risk of state bonds, as it is shown by the recent Euro 
and debt crisis: 54 of the 90 biggest credit institutes use exception clauses to remove 
themselves from the requirement of building a risk buffer against the default of state 
bonds.762 
 
2.3. Discussion  
 It is questionable whether the AIFMD is a suitable approach to face systemic risks as 
they result from a too-large volume of credit accumulation. According to Hilmar Kopper, 
former president of Deutsche Bank-- the balance sheet of which almost corresponds to the 
German GDP-- less than 5% of the staff of a systemically significant credit institute such 
as Deutsche Bank create that (financial) innovation that is necessary to maintain their 
competitive position on the international capital market. Those human resources are 
extremely rare. Because of the increasing international competition for “high potential” 
and capital, it is unavoidable for any credit institute to set substantial incentives to hire 
these labour forces. Those incentives can be of an economic, financial or other nature. The 
recent Euro crisis has shown that many economic decisions are decisions made under 
extreme uncertainty.  
 
An economic crisis of a similar dimension like that of 2008/2009 has never happened 
in history. Because a flexible response to an economic crisis without such a precedent in 
history needs a minimum of freedom of economic action, and the state supervisory 
authorities generally do not have a superior economic expertise, one should consider a 
voluntary approach as a serious alternative to any legal regulation. Thus, financial 
institutes that are resident in countries with a comparatively liberal regulation will have the 
comparatively better possibilities to hire that staff they need to create financial innovation, 
to maintain their international competitive position and to generate a welfare surplus. They 
are in a comparatively better position because the range of freedom of economic action is 
an essential competitive feature, also in the international competition for labour forces. 
                                                          
761
  Cf. Osman, HANDELSBLATT (November/4th/2011), p. 42 (42). 
762
  Ibid. 
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Therefore, a more voluntary approach can face the exodus not only of capital. It is a 
measure to prevent the escape of qualified labour forces that it takes to develop the 
comparatively best solutions to economic crises without any historic example, to prevent 
welfare losses and to maintain a country’s position under the conditions of economic 
globalisation. Instead of a non-proportional legal regulation of economic freedom, it takes 
legal measures against an overflowing capital accumulation that can be identified as the 
“superior” core reason of the recent financial crisis because it directly infect other parts of 
the national economy. 
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Sixth Chapter -  
CONCLUSIONS  
1. Outlook 
 The AIFMD sets the regulatory focus on the activities of the fund managers instead of 
the funds. On the one hand, this is a sophisticated idea because the funds as special assets 
are unable to act and primarily underlie the design of the fund managers. As it was pointed 
out in this thesis, there is no clear definition of hedge funds or private equity. Among 
investors and corporations, the lack of a clear definition may cause legal insecurity. 
Nevertheless, because of the conditions of a speedily changing market, any legal definition 
of these business models could have the effect that the legal requirements could easily be 
overcome. The significant systemic risks whose realisation contributed to the financial 
crisis of 2008/2009 do not result from the mere existence of special assets but from the 
tools the fund managers chose to administrate these assets.  
 
The FCIC comes to the conclusion that the most serious crisis since the „Great 
Depression“ of 1929/1930 was evitable. It was evitable because it was the result of the 
actions of human beings („anomaly“).763 As the FCIC points out, the involved persons 
were warned by the rapid distribution of risky and second-rated mortgage loans and its 
securitisation, the rapid incline of real estate prices, reports on relentless credit-lending 
practices and a significant increase of private mortgage debts.764 Between the year 2001 
and the year 2007, the national mortgage debt almost doubled, and the amount of mortgage 
debt per household rose more than 63% from US$91.500 to US$149.500, even while 
wages were essentially stagnant.765  Unfortunately, these warning signs, primarily as a 
result of  blind trust and an insufficient control were ignored. The FCIC speaks of a „21st-
                                                          
763
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 17, 22 ff. 
764
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 17, 20, 23. 
765
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 20. 
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century financial system with 19th-century safeguards“.766 In view of this awareness, it 
seems arguable and coherent to set the regulatory focus on the fund managers instead of 
the funds. The market-based control that should be strengthened by the AIFMD is 
optimised by the separation of fund administration and the deposition of the assets. This 
separation strengthens the market-based control of the relevant assets, minimises conflicts 
of interests and reduces the danger of any market abuse.  
 
However, it neither seems proportional nor sustainable and, moreover, it contradicts 
the ideas of Basel III that based on a precise identification of the individual risk profile that 
the AIFMD subjects all to different kinds of alternative investments. The neglect of the 
individual risk profile of the funds reduces the possible economic growth in the segment of 
alternative investments, stimulates the capital exodus towards the offshore countries and 
can cause significant welfare losses. A capital exodus as a consequence of the one-size-
fits-all approach can result from higher organisational requirements concerning financial 
transactions, compliance and information. As it is pointed out by Kee-Meng Tan, European 
chief of the financial consulting firm Knight Capital, there are no principal complaints 
against any financial market regulation as long as they do not cause higher costs.767 The 
higher costs that result from the legal effect of the AIFMD will probably cause a rise of 
credit costs, contradictory to the central regulatory objective to secure the steady credit 
supply of the real economy and can reduce the availability of venture capital. Within the 
global competition of economic locations, an adequate availability of venture capital is 
essential to realise locational advantages any country needs to keep its public welfare. 
Thus, the AIFMD neither seems a proportional nor sustainable approach. It may help the 
supervisory authorities to reduce the costs of administration and control. The neglect of the 
individual risk profile of the administrated funds by using a more general, wholesale and 
exhaustive approach not only contradicts the more market-based Basel III but - following 
the experience of Kee-Meng Tan768 - it also reflects that many governmental officials, at 
the European level and at the national level, do not really understand the commerce of the 
alternative investments.  
                                                          
766
  Cf. FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011), p. 20; cf. Nationale Kommission zur Untersuchung 
der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, Schlussfolgerungen (2009), p. 6. 
767
  Cf. Kaiser, DIE WELT (November/5th/2011), p. 21. 
768
  Ibid. 
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Instead of facing all the different types of alternative investments without regard to 
their (precise) risk profile, it is preferable - following Alexander769 - to implement an 
effective international regulatory reform that is based on a more macro-prudential 
approach to regulation, supervision and crisis management that will necessarily require 
enhanced measures to control excessive risk-taking whilst mitigating and paying for the 
tremendous social costs imposed by financial crises. What it takes is a stronger coherence 
between micro-prudential and macro-prudential risk management, monitoring and 
supervision. Under the provision of a clear regulatory framework and the absence of any 
monopolist or oligopoly structures, as a consequence of their superior expertise (private) 
corporations have the comparatively better facilities to quickly identify systemic risks. A 
market-based approach such as Basel III seems a comparatively better approach than any 
paternalist legal approach. 
  
Any legal regulation represents a narrowing of liberty. Following Immanuel Kant, 
liberty should always be interpreted as liberty for bearing responsibility - under the 
conditions of a market economy. Responsibility means responsibility for the next 
generation. The principle of sustainability according to the ideas of Brundtland, the former 
Norwegian ministry president, says that each generation should always respect the 
requirements of the next generation. If everyone respects these comparatively easy 
principles and tries to act following a perspective that covers a period of more than one 
single business period, one probably needs less legal regulation. Any regulation can be 
identified as a consequence of the community that mandates the state to establish 
equilibrium of interests towards the omission of individual responsibility.  
 
Thus, the intensity of legal regulation correlates to the ability of the individual to 
control her or his actions and to evaluate these actions critically. Applied to the financial 
markets, this means that any corporation could be subject to a more liberal legal regulation 
that respects its individual freedom of action if it shares the principles of “good corporate 
governance”. As it is shown in HFT, the corporations often avail themselves of an 
                                                          
769
  Cf. Alexander, ZBB/JBB (2011), p. 337 (344). 
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expertise that makes it ambitious to the supervisory authorities to control the financial 
markets exhaustive.  
 
On the one hand, financial innovations such as HFT or the increasing shadow banking 
has opened enormous yield expectations to financial corporations. On the other hand, these 
financial innovations make confidence and trust among the other market participants and 
among the state supervisory authorities decline. This decline of confidence and trust that is 
confirmed by recent opinion polls from autumn 2011 not only effects higher transaction 
costs for almost each financial corporation but has also led to the claim of the G20-Summit 
in Cannes for a global taxation of any financial transaction - the FTT could cause the end 
of the HFT - and an update of the European Financial Market Directive (MiFID 2). This 
update will implement more effective supervisory systems against any market abuse, 
annual mandatory information on the credit institute’s business strategy towards the 
regulatory agencies and an interdiction towards these institutes to withdraw from the 
(organised) markets in times of market turbulence.770  
 
Because an interdiction like this will probably cause financial losses for the concerned 
corporations, the strengthening of the European Financial Market Directive could cause 
another exodus of capital which endangers the essential capital supply of the real economy 
and substantial welfare losses. This underlines the significance of adequate transparency 
and disclosure which ensures confidence and trust among the market participants. It 
underlines the initial hypothesis based on Kant’s ideas. Private responsibility among the 
financial market participants enables these to use their expertise to implement profitable 
but even sustainable solutions instead of suffering the consequences of any non-
proportional legal regulation.  
 
According to Kay Swinburne, British member of the European Parliament, who is 
significantly involved in designing the MiFID 2, many representatives of the European 
supervisory bodies would not understand enough of the financial innovations like the 
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HFT. 771  Adequate voluntary information, transparency and disclosure could save the 
concerned corporations from any strengthening of legal regulation. It saves confidence and 
trust among market participants, contributes to reduce the relevant transaction costs and 
sets the provision for a market-based approach as proposed by Walker. Any regulation sets 
on a retrospective view and can be seen as a reaction towards a social, economic or even 
financial development. To establish a more proportional and sustainable solution, the 
legislator should strengthen his focus on the future developments and the practical 
consequences of his decisions. In the final communiqué of the G20-Summit in Cannes, its 
participants underline that they renew their commitment to cooperate, and that they have 
drawn decisions to strengthen economic growth, labour markets, financial security and 
social integration to secure that globalisation contributes to  human beings. The future will 
demonstrate whether these confirmations will become reality. 
 
2.  Closing comments  
The financial crisis of 2008/2009 was an incident of an unprecedented global 
dimension and complexity. In particular, in view of the current global entanglement of the 
financial segment, the crises can be compared with the global economic depression that 
began with the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange on 29 October 1929. Thus, the 
identification of a suitable response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009which promises the 
containment of systemic risks in the next future is a pioneering work. It requires the 
detailed analysis of its history, its symptoms and its supposed core reasons. Any hasty 
reaction of legislators is counterproductive. Thus, this thesis tried to convey a brief 
overview of the abovementioned parameters and introduced the AIFMD as the legal 
approach of the European Commission towards the financial crisis of 2008/2009. By 
discussing the overriding question as to whether the AIFMD can be identified as an 
appropriate approach towards the financial crisis of 2008/2009, it highlighted the issue of 
the AIF-directed focus and the one-size-fits-all perspective. It also reveals that the 
approach chosen by the European Commission will probably not solve the problem of a 
steady and affordable access of the real economy towards venture capital. The 
administrative requirements posed by the AIFMD will probably cause enormous agency 
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and transaction costs. Finally, these costs will be turned over to the side of credit demand. 
Any appropriate response to the financial crisis of 2008/2009 requires legal means to 
contain any non-proportional capital accumulation and to establish an enhanced monitoring 
of credit accumulation. In view of this awareness, this thesis closes with the introduction 
and discussion of alternative responses towards the financial crisis of 2008/2009, such as 
the taxation of financial market transactions by the FTT, the conception of bank licenses 
and the interdiction of short selling. It closes with an outlook. 
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